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I
INTRODUCTION
Priorities. The very word sends chills down the sane lawyer's
spine. But if fear and loathing of Article Nine's priority scheme
served as a deterrent to undertaking this enterprise, they served
as an incentive as well. The complexity of the priority rules is
matched only by their importance, for as long as secured financing
flourishes, priority disputes over personal property are inevitable.
It is the purpose of this project to set forth and explore the body of
law that resolves those disputes: the priority rules of Article Nine.
The yeoman service rendered by Professors White and Sum-
mers made this task much easier. Because their Handbook of the Law
Under the Uniform Commercial Code1 examines the state of Code law
through 1971, this survey concentrates on developments since that
time. Most important among those developments was the extensive
revision of Article Nine in 1972.2 Thus, although prior authority is
drawn on when helpful, this discussion focuses on the Code as
amended and on post-1971 case law.
A. Code Policy and the Priority Rules
The draftsmen of Article Nine, working in the wilderness of
pre-Code law, 3 strove to identify policies upon which to build a
sensible system of priority rules. Central among the draftsmen's
concerns was the need to objectify and simplify legal structures
in order to promote certainty and efficiency in commercial fi-
nancing. 4 In turn, this goal worked hand-in-hand with the Code's
underlying policies of uniformity and modernization. 5 But the
priority rules represent a complex interplay of many, sometimes
subtle, policy considerations. The following discussion isolates the
'J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
2 Throughout this survey, references to the Code sections, unless otherwise indicated,
are to the Code as amended in 1972. Sixteen states have adopted the 1972 amendments. 3
U.L.A. 1977 Pamphlet 2-3 (Adoptions of Revised Article 9).
3 For a discussion of the confused state of priority law existing at the time of Article
Nine's adoption, see 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 655 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE); Coogan, Article 9 of the U.C.C.: Priorities Among Secured Cred-
itors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARV. L. REV. 838, 855-57 (1959).
4 The Comment to U.C.C. § 9-101 states in part: "The aim of this Article is to provide
a simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of present-day secured
financing transactions can go forward with less cost and with greater certainty."
5 See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a), (c).
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most important of these policies and presents specific examples of
their operation within the Code.6
1. Commercial Certainty
Commercial financers must be able to ascertain readily their
rights with respect to borrowers, buyers, and other creditors. The
Code endeavors to address this need with comprehensive provi-
sions. The Code's fundamental priority rule is the race-to-file prin-
ciple of section 9-312. This rule provides a simple test for deter-
mining priority. Public filing will reveal to others security interests
already taken in the debtor's property, and under a pure-race
rule creditors may rely on the files to establish their priority de-
finitively.
7
Significantly changing pre-Code law, section 9-312 makes
knowledge and notice irrelevant to priority. A creditor with knowl-
edge of an unperfected security interest may nonetheless take
priority by filing first. This result is justifiable-it is easy to file, and
secret security interests impede commercial transactions. Eliminat-
ing knowledge as a factor provides more objective standards for
determining priorities and encourages creditors to file. Commer-
cial certainty correspondingly flourishes.
Article Nine's explicit and extensive definitions and compre-
hensive conflict-resolving rules guard against judicial tinkering.8
Although extra-Code law remains applicable under section 1-103, 9
the thoroughness of the priority rules militates against its applica-
tion. Moreover, the Code abolishes a meddlesome multitude of
pre-Code consensual security devices and court-imposed remedies
such as equitable liens."' In short, Article Nine provides sure and
simple rules that should answer most of the secured party's legal
questions before he heads for the courthouse.
2. Efficiency
In general, the certainty and notice supplied by the pure-
race priority scheme facilitate efficiency in the business world.
6 Specific provisions of Article Nine must be analyzed with reference to the underlying
policies of the priority rules. See U.C.C. § 1-102(1).
1 The secured creditor can also achieve priority by taking and retaining possession of
the collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-305.
8 Detailed definitions are provided in U.C.C. §§ 1-201, 9-105 to -109.
9 Whenever possible, the Code's provisions should be applied without resort to non-
Code law. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-104, Comment ("This Act [is] carefully integrated and intended
as a uniform codification of permanent character covering an entire 'field' of law .... ").
"' The Code has abolished equitable liens only in part, and they continue to pose
difficulties. See notes 286-309 and accompanying text infra.
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Businessmen can find out exactly where they stand, and therefore
can plan effectively. Occasionally, however, efficiency requires a
sacrifice of other values underlying Article Nine. For example,
section 9-302(1)(d) automatically perfects purchase money security
interests in consumer goods. With this rule, the Code favors sellers
and other financers of consumer goods, who would otherwise be
required to file innumerable financing statements in collateral fre-
quently of little value. In this exceptional case the Code endorses
the secret security interest, all to encourage efficiency in secured
financing and to avoid economic waste.
3. Protecting Reliance Interests
To avoid adverse reliance, Article Nine usually conditions pri-
ority upon the creditor's provision of notice. Creditors supply this
notice by filing financing statements or by taking possession of the
collateral. The priority rules impose sanctions to encourage this
practice: sections 9-301 and 9-312 reward those who file or take
possession and penalize those who do not. Roughly speaking,
when one relies on the absence of notice of a prior interest, he ob-
tains priority by filing first or by buying without knowledge of a
prior security interest in the collateral. 1
Filing usually suffices to give a creditor priority. However, the
drafters recognized that Article Nine's filing rules would not sup-
ply adequate notice in all situations. The Code therefore provides
or encourages certain special filing procedures, as in the case of
fixtures 12 and motor vehicles. 13 In keeping with the notice value,
the Code in some circumstances makes knowledge of another's
interest a bar to defeating that interest, as in sections 9-307(2),
9-301(1)(c), and 9-308, which govern priority disputes involving
buyers and transferees. In sum, although notice may not explain
all priority outcomes, it is at the heart of priority policy.
4. Encouragement of Commercial Growth
"Good business practice should be good business law.' 4 In
keeping with this maxim, the priority rules encourage socially use-
ful commercial practices. Because the security of purchasers-
1' See, e.g., U.G.C. § 9-307(1), (2) (buyers in ordinary course of business and buyers of
consumer goods), U.C.C. § 9-308 (transferees of chattel paper in inventory sales), U.C.C.
§ 9-309 (transferees of negotiable paper).
12 U.C.C. §§ 9-313(1), 9-402(5).
13 U.C.C. § 9-302(I)(d), (3)(b).
14In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D. Ore. 1967),
aff'd sub nom. DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
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consumers, bulk buyers, holders in due course, or transferees of
chattel paper-is crucial to the free flow of goods through the
economy, these parties receive broad protection.15 Allowing the
seller's secured creditor recourse to collateral purchased by a con-
sumer would, aside from raising serious questions of fairness,
weaken the underpinnings of our economic system by discouraging
marketplace transactions. Accordingly, the Code shelters buyers
out of inventory with one of its most important consumer-protec-
tion provisions-section 9-307(1). Sections 9-306 through 9-309
allow various purchasers to take collateral free of the interests of
secured creditors. Indeed the drafters found the buyer-protection
interest so important that in certain cases they chose to protect
even buyers with knowledge of preexisting security interests.16
On the whole, the simple pure-race rule of section 9-312 keeps
the stream of commerce flowing smoothly and facilitates commer-
cial growth. But the drafters were also aware of problems inherent
in the first-to-file rule. Leery of the adverse effect that monopoliza-
tion of credit might have on our growth-oriented economy, they
wisely arranged for debtor access to alternate sources of funds.
The purchase money priority provisions carry out this purpose, as
do Code-endorsed subordination agreements and the termination
procedures of section 9-404. Moreover, the Code allows debtors to
obtain detailed information on existing credit arrangements, per-
mitting them to deal frankly and fruitfully with other would-be
lenders. 17 In short, the Code allows businessmen to structure their
transactions with complete information and substantial freedom
from restrictive rules.
5. Fairness
Article Nine's simplified and objective rules for settling prior-
ity disputes are remarkably attuned to achieving not just certainty,
but equity as well. To the extent that availability of information is
important to equity, the infusion of notice into the priority rules
"5 See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1)(c), 9-307, 9-308, 9-309.
16 See U.C.C. § 9-307(1) & Comment 2. One interesting example of priority rule
favoritism involves not buyers, however, but construction mortgagees. Section 9-313(6) pro-
tects the optional advances made by these creditors against previously filed purchase
money security interests in fixtures, even if the construction mortgagee has knowledge of
the fixture interest. This priority rule appeared for the first time in 1972, perhaps in
response to a depressed construction industry. See generally U.C.C. § 9-313, Comment 4(e);
notes 450-61 and accompanying text infra.
17 See U.C.C. § 9-401 & Comment 1; U.C.C. § 9-407.
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goes far toward achieving fair results. Section 9-401(2) mitigates
the rigor of a hard-and-fast first-to-file rule by protecting the good
faith creditor who files improperly, if his competitor has obtained
knowledge of the contents of his financing statement. Thus, even
in the hard race between diligent creditors, the Code inserts a rule
to avoid rigidity. The priority rules show a further concern with
equity in distinguishing between those who buy in good or bad
faith, 18 and by generally endorsing equitable doctrines such as
estoppel.' 9
In keeping with notions of equity, the priority rules vigorously
favor the diligent; the most diligent creditor will almost always
win. 211 At times, this emphasis on diligence may trod fairness un-
derfoot. The most obvious case involves the secured creditor who
perfects with knowledge of a preexisting unperfected security in-
terest, yet takes priority over it. This result may seem harsh, but
removing the element of subjective knowledge goes a long way
toward achieving efficiency, simplicity, and certainty in secured
financing.
The interaction of these policies has produced the subtly
sophisticated fabric of rules embodied in Article Nine. Policy issues
will arise repeatedly in this survey of the priority rules. Judges and
lawyers must be ever sensitive to these policies, for they provide
not only fertile sources of argument, but the very bedrock on
which Article Nine is built.
B. The General Validity of Security Agreements-Section 9-201
By establishing the general validity of security agreements,
21
section 9-201 provides the proper point of departure for any ex-
amination of the priority rules:
Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security agree-
ment is effective according to its terms between the parties,
against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors .... 22
I' See U.C.C. § 9-307, Comment 2.
"See U.C.C. § 1-103.
2°See U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-312. Purchase money secured creditors whose interests au-
tomatically perfect under § 9-302(1)(d) obtain extra protection against consumers by taking
the otherwise needless step of filing. See U.C.C. § 9-307(2) & Comment 3.
21 See Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 32 Colo. App. 235, 511
P.2d 912 (1973), aff'd, 184 Colo. 166, 519 P.2d 354 (1974); Walter E. Heller & Co. v.
Salerno, 362 A.2d 904 (Conn. 1975); Salzer v. Victor Lynn Corp., 114 N.H. 29, 315 A.2d
185 (1974).
22 U.C.C. § 9-201.
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In effect, this section provides that upon the debtor's default,
the holder of an Article Nine security interest has rights in the
claimed collateral superior to anyone, anywhere, anyhow-"[e]x-
cept as otherwise provided by this Act."2 3 The importance of that
phrase cannot be overestimated, for the "exception" of section
9-201 encompasses all of Article Nine's priority rules.24
Courts usually refer to section 9-201 only in passing before
beginning their analysis of priorities. In General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,25 however, the court gave section
9-201 an unprecedented reading. In that case, GMAC held a per-
fected purchase money security interest in the debtor's car. The
debtor was involved in an automobile accident with a driver in-
sured by Allstate. As part of the insurance settlement, the debtor's
virtually demolished car was transferred by bill of sale to Allstate.
26
When the debtor defaulted on his contract with GMAC, GMAC
demanded the entire accelerated balance due from Allstate. Rely-
ing on section 9-201's declaration that "a security agreement 'is
effective according to its terms . . . against purchasers of the
collateral,' "27 the court held that Allstate, as purchaser of the au-
tomobile, owed GMAC the balance of the purchase price. Al-
though uncomfortable with its decision, the court felt "bound to
follow the statutes. '28 In "following" section 9-201, however, the
court gave the section an unjustifiable interpretation. The secured
creditor's remedy upon default against a subsequent "purchaser"
of the collateral is repossession.29 Upon default, GMAC could have
repossessed the wreck. By "purchasing" the automobile, Allstate
did not assume contractual liability for the debt. In holding to the
contrary, the court defeated the parties' expectations. The pur-
chaser of collateral subject to a security interest should not have to
fear liability for the balance of the debtor's obligation. In extending
a loan secured by collateral, the secured creditor contemplates a
dual remedy upon default against both the debtor and the collat-
eral. His expected remedy does not include the right to collect
22 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-2, at 901.
24 See U.C.C. § 9-201, Comment.
25 77 Misc. 2d 849, 355 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Dist. Ct. 1974).
26 Id. at 850, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 79. Although Allstate took title, it permitted the debtor
to retain possession so that he could realize the salvage value of the wreck.
2
1 Id. (emphasis deleted).
28 Id. at 851, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
29 See U.C.C. §§ 9-112, 9-503; Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Goodman, 24 Cal. App. 3d
131, 100 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1972).
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1977] ARTICLE NINE PRIORITY RULES
directly from third parties. Providing such a remedy sorely distorts
the language of the Code and contradicts sound commercial
practice.
II
PRIORITIES AMONG SECURED CREDITORS-SECTION 9-312
First in time, first in right. That rule once rode roughshod
through commercial law.3 13 Too gross a generalization,* it left in-
equity and confusion in its train. But time has tamed that unman-
ageable maxim. No longer does it summon up more questions than
answers, or provide a tool for ad hoc jurisprudence. Though it
runs as a theme through Article Nine, the rule has been tempered
in light of its testing. The result is section 9-312. 3'
Section 9-312 settles disputes-disputes arising when multiple
parties hold competing security interests in the same collateral.32
30 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-4, at 905-06.
31 Consider one commentator's observations on pre-Code secured transactions law:
"[T]he trouble has come from the ever-increasing complexity of the commercial facts of
the credit economy. Certainly in the last forty years, these facts have, like the proverbial
hare, outrun the tortoise-like capability of courts to deal with them." Oldfather, Floor Plan
Financing Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 U. KAN. L. REv. 571, 574 (1966).
For a recent example of a court's application of the first-in-time rule without an un-
derstanding of Code refinements, see Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121,
15 U.C.C. Rep. 1035 (Utah 1974). In that case, involving a dispute between two purchase
money secured parties over home furnishings, the court essentially ignored the Article
Nine rules on purchase money security interests. Instead, it summarily based its holding on
this statement: "The general rule is that as between security interests in the same property,
the one prior in time ordinarily takes preference over a later one." 526 P.2d at 1125, 15
U.C.C. Rep. at 1040 (footnote omitted). Such conclusory reasoning invites the same confu-
sion that characterized pre-Code priority conflicts. Indeed, the Valley Bank court granted
priority to the first security interest to attach. Because both security interests were per-
fected, that test was patently inapplicable. See U.C.C. § 9-312(4), (5)(b). The court also
failed to address such important issues as priority between conflicting purchase money
security interests (see notes 223-28 and accompanying text infra), and the effect of auto-
matic perfection of purchase money security interests in consumer goods (see U.C.C. §
9-302(1)(d)). Amazingly, since both security interests were purchase money security in-
terests in consumer goods, they perfected automatically. U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d). Hence, the
dates of attachment were the dates of perfection, and the dates of attachment determined
the priorities. Although it reached a correct result, the court was clearly oblivious to this
unusual path through the Code.
32 U.C.C. § 1-201(37) defines a "security interest"as
an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or perfor-
mance of an obligation. The retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods
notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer (Section 2-401) is. limited in
effect to a reservation of a "security interest". The term also includes any interest
of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper which is subject to Article 9....
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For the most part, its rules are strikingly straightforward. Yet im-
portant issues remain unresolved.
A. Basics and the Basic Rule
1. Competing Security Interests-The Scope of Section 9-312
Section 9-312 sets priorities among competing security in-
terests; it does not apply when only one secured creditor asserts an
interest in the debtor's property.3 3 If, for example, a buyer chal-
lenges a secured creditor claiming through the seller, he should
not look for help in section 9-3 12.
An important and illustrative "competing security interest"
issue involves priority disputes between the typical secured party,
such as a bank, and a contractor's surety.34 Is the surety a secured
party, and therefore subject to Article Nine's priority rules? Well,
yes and no.
Surety contracts normally provide for assignment of the con-
tractor's accounts to the surety upon default by the contractor, and
completion of performance by the surety. Although this condi-
tional right to accounts looks like a security interest, the Code
apparently exempts it from the rules of Article Nine. 35 Courts have
Gilmore asserts that acquiring a security interest is "as easy as rolling off a log." He is
quick to add, however, that "the security interest, once taken and perfected, is then cir-
cumscribed by [a] network of limitations . . . , most of all, by the elaborate structure of
the priority rules." 1 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 11.7, at 364.
33 See Coogan, "The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARV. L. REv. 477, 507 (1973). As U.C.C.
§ 1-201(37), set out in part at note 32 supra, suggests, it is often difficult to determine
whether certain relationships and transactions give rise to security interests. See, e.g.,
Nauman v. First Nat'l Bank, 50 Mich. App. 41, 212 N.W.2d 760, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 1191
(1973) (consignment as security interest). For a recent general treatment of unconventional
security devices, see 1 P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS, ch. 4A
(1965) (supplementary article prepared in 1974) [hereinafter cited as COOGAN, HOGAN, &
VAGTS].
3 4 See generally 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, ch. 36; WiTE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, §
22-5, at 769-71; Cushman, The Surety's Right of Equitable Priority to Contract Balances in Re-
lation to the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 TMP. L.Q. 239 (1966); Withers, Surety vs. Lender:
Priority of Claims to Contract Funds, 10 WASHBURN LJ. 356 (1971); Note, Equitable Subroga-
tion-Too Hardy a Plant To Be Uprooted by Article 9 of the UCC?, 32 U. PITT. L. REv. 580 (1971).
's U.C.C. § 9-104(f) makes Article Nine inapplicable to "a transfer of a right to payment
under a contract to an assignee who is also to do the performance under the contract..,.."
Gilmore argues that § 9-104(f) was not intended to apply to sureties, but only to
delegatees of the contractor's duties. Hence, he concludes that § 9-312(5) probably does
cover priority disputes between sureties and secured parties, but recommends use of such
"escapes" as subrogation theory and special proceeds rules to protect the surety against
the danger that, through failing to file, he would lose to the secured creditor under
844
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consistently held that the surety's right to accounts springs from
the equitable doctrine of subrogation, 36 which properly augments
Article Nine via section 1-103. 3 7 Hence, whether or not it has filed
or perfected, the surety will take priority as to the contractor's
accounts and contract rights over a properly perfected secured
creditor.
3 8
But the courts have danced a different step where the surety
obtains rights in the debtor's equipment contingent upon default.
This is a security interest, and section 9-312 controls.39
Be not deceived by this brief analysis. Professor Gilmore cau-
tions that "[d]espite more than sixty years of judicial analysis, the
bank-surety priority problem may today be further than ever from
a generally accepted solution.
' 40
§ 9-312(5)(a). See 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 36.7, at 973-78. It is also noteworthy that,
insofar as the surety's rights arise by operation of law through the subrogation doctrine, its
"security interest" is nonconsensual and therefore free of Article Nine restrictions by virtue
of § 9-102. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 22-5, at 770.
36 See cases cited in note 38 infra.
37 U.C.G. § 1-103 provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law
and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provi-
sions.
38 See National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Gas. Co., 411 F.2d 843, 6 U.C.C.
Rep. 441 (1st Cir. 1969); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. First State Bank, 208 Kan.
738, 494 P.2d 1149, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 682 (1972) (subrogation arises by operation of law);
Finance Co. of America v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 277 Md. 177, 181-85, 353
A.2d 249, 252-54, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 267, 271-74 (1976) (continued vitality of equitable sub-
rogation implicitly recognized under § 9-102; holding based in part on states' unanimous
refusal to adopt 1952 Code draft subordinating sureties); Stevlee Factors, Inc. v. State, 136
N.J. Super. 461, 346 A.2d 624, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 1319 (Ch. Div. 1974) (noting absence of
any case holding equitable subrogation doctrine displaced by Code); Mid-Continent Gas.
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 531 P.2d 1370, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 477 (Okla. 1975) (to
promote consistency among states, surety given priority despite failure to file); First
Hutchings-Sealy Natl Bank v. Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co., 532 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975). Contra, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. State Bldg. Auth., 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 717
(1961) (case controlled by § 9-312; subrogation theory rejected). See also American Fidelity
Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 1075 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (surety of public works
contract denied subrogation due to failure to comply with California stop-notice require-
ments). The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the special claim of
sureties. See Henningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404 (1908); Prairie
State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896) (surety obtained priority despite absence
of express assignment).
39 Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co. v. J.F. Brunken & Son, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 290, 12 U.C.C.
Rep. 388 (D.S.D. 1973) (equitable lien theory applicable only* to contract rights). For a
discussion of the Aetna case, see 27 VAND. L. REV. 389 (1974).
4" 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 36.1, at 949. Gilmore's conclusion strikes us as somewhat
inaccurate. The surety-versus-secured-party conflict has caused far more confusion among
commentators than courts.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:834
2. Priorities and Filing-A Pragmatic Introduction
The priority rules work hand-in-hand with the filing system,
and an understanding of each is necessary to appreciate the other.
With respect to filing, section 9-312 gives rise to two basic, practical
rules for anyone thinking of acquiring a security interest.41 These
rules should be emphasized at the outset:
(1) File.
(2) Check for previous filings.
42
To the uninitiated, these rules may appear inverted. Not so.
Filing does not create a security interest; a filing, with nothing
more, obligates no one to do anything.43 The moral: file fast-at
least as soon as a security agreement is in sight.44 First in time may
well mean first in right.
45
41 Indeed, these rules are not limited to those seeking to acquire a security interest.
Potential buyers and sellers as well must often proceed with caution. See, e.g., Rivan Die
Mold Corp. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 26 Ill. App. 3d 637, 325 N.E.2d 357, 17 U.C.C. Rep.
570 (1975) (A contracted to pay B's invoices directly to C; A exposed to double liability be-
cause of failure to check files and discover D's security interest in B's accounts).
42 An important corollary to this rule is: "Check the debtor"; that is, make sure the
debtor is in possession of the collateral. If he is not, chances are another creditor has
perfected by taking possession-if the collateral exists at all.
43 "[T]he document placed on file is not the relevant security agreement... but merely
a statement or notice that the parties intend to engage in a security transaction or in a
series of such transactions." 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 34.3, at 903. Although financing
statements have occasionally been held to constitute security agreements, courts generally
disfavor this construction. See, e.g., Barth Bros. v. Billings, 68 Wis. 2d 80, 87-90, 227
N.W.2d 673, 677-78, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 237, 242-44 (1975) (to qualify as security agreement,
financing statement must expressly indicate debtor's intention to create security interest).
The careful practitioner will avoid this potential pitfall by including a clause in the financ-
ing statement stating that the parties do not intend the financing statement to serve as a
security agreement.
14 The Code specifically allows the filing of a financing statement before the execution
of a security agreement (U.C.C. § 9-402(1)), although some parties may experience a "fear
of filing." For example, in James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 292 Minn. 277, 194
N.W.2d 775, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 11 (1972), a lessor lost purchase money priority because it
failed to file as to a lease later held to give rise to a security interest. Perhaps the lessor
feared that filing would provide evidence that its lease was intended as a security agree-
ment. See U.C.C. § 9-201(37). But see U.C.C. § 9-408 (filing by itself not evidence that lease
intended as security). But how would this matter? In any case, if the lessor had filed, it would
have received priority. As a nonfiling secured party, however, it got nothing. It is difficult
to imagine a situation in which an early filing could harm the filer, aside perhaps from
potentially adverse tax consequences and the cost and inconvenience that recording a fi-
nancing statement entails. See U.C.C. § 9-403(5).
45 In Transport Equip. Co. v. Guaranty State Bank, 518 F.2d 377, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 1
(10th Cir. 1975), A, a secured party, filed as to C's "body kits" at 1:57 p.m. on March 22. B,
another secured party, began to load the body kits onto its trucks sometime after 3:24 p.m.
the same day, so as to perfect by taking possession. Although the case, in our opinion, was
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But before entering into a security agreement, check the files.
In most cases, a previously filed financing statement covering in-
tended collateral guarantees subordinate status to a later-filing se-
cured creditor. Rush into filing, but not into contracting. This will
maximize the chances of gaining what all secured parties seek:
priority.
3. The First-to-Perfect-or-File Rule-Section 9-312(5)(a)
To appreciate practicalities, the practitioner must know the
law. Let us start with the general rule:
In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section
(including cases of purchase money security interests which do
not qualify for the special priorities set forth in subsection (3)
and (4) of this section), priority between conflicting security in-
terests in the same collateral shall be determined according to the
following rules:
(a) Conflicting security interests rank according to priority in
time of filing or perfection. Priority dates from the time a
filing is first made covering the collateral or the time the
security interest is first perfected, whichever is earlier, pro-
vided that there is no period thereafter when there is nei-
ther filing nor perfection.
46
Section 9-312(5)(a) defines "first in time." The basic rule is simple:
Among secured creditors, the first to perfect or file wins. The most
common application of this rule allows a perfected security interest
to take priority over an unperfected security interest.47 Between
wrongly decided (see notes 98-108 and accompanying text infra), it nonetheless illustrates
the dangers of delayed perfection.
46 U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a). Professors White and Summers correctly emphasize the impor-
tance of this section. "Subsection (5) is the million dollar residuary clause, and it governs
more priority disputes than all of the other subsections combined." WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 1, § 25-3, at 905. Accord, Balint, Section 9-312: Priorities Among Conflicting Secu-
rity Interests in the Same Collateral, 1975 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 311, 312. Actually, a majority of
post-1971 cases involve the purchase money priority rules of subsections 9-312(3) and (4).
But as § 9-312(5) makes clear, secured parties who fail to qualify for purchase money
priority tumble into § 9-312(5)(a), where they are generally defeated. For one of numerous
applications of this rule, see National Bank v. Dugger, 335 So. 2d 859, 19 U.C.C. Rep.
1396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (because priorities unaffected by lis pendens, first filer
prevails).
4"Section 9-301(l)(a) emphasizes this conclusion. Comment 2 to § 9-301 explains:
"The interests given priority under Section 9-312 and the other sections therein cited take
such priority in general even over a perfected security interest. A fortiori they take priority
over an unperfected security interest, and paragraph (1)(a) of this section so states."
Section 9-312(5) speaks of "conflicting security interests," not just conflicting perfected
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perfected secured parties, the first to perfect or file wins, even if
his security interest is second to attach;48 and the first to file takes
priority, even if his security interest is the second to be perfected. 49
Knowledge of a prior security interest is irrelevant to pri-
orityY1 Section 9-312(5)(a) is a pure race statute.5 1 The drafters'
security interests. Since an unperfected security interest is nonetheless a security interest,
and since a perfected secured party will always file or perfect before his unperfected
competitor, § 9-312 always favors perfected over unperfected security interests. Hence,
§ 9-301(l)(a) is merely a cross-reference, rather than a substantive provision.
11 S. Lotman & Son, Inc. v. Southeastern Financial Corp., 288 Ala. 547, 549, 263 So.
2d 499, 500, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 218, 219 (1972); Enterprises Now, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Dev.
Corp., 218 S.E.2d 309, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 1114 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (summary judgment
granted to first filer); 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 34.2, at 900. See also Mammoth Cave
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. York, 429 S.W.2d 26, 28, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 11, 14-15 (Ky. 1968) (reject-
ing estoppel argument based on alleged unjust enrichment).
49 U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 5; First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Atlas Credit Corp., 417
F.2d 1081, 1083-86, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1223, 1225-29 (10th Cir. 1969) (first filer given priority
despite "fast and loose dealings," and despite previous attachment of competitor's security
interest).
-1 First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Atlas Credit Corp., 417 F.2d 1081, 6 U.C.C. Rep.
1223 (10th Cir. 1969); In re Miller, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1042 (D. Ore., Bankr. Ct. 1974) (knowl-
edge irrelevant to priority over lapsed security interest); In re Smith, 326 F. Supp. 1311, 9
U.C.C. Rep. 549 (D. Minn. 1971) (citing plain language of § 9-312, weight of prior author-
ity, and lenders' reliance on statute); American Nat'l Bank v. Magor, 28 Colo. App. 522,
528, 476 P.2d 267, 270-71, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 304, 307 (1970) (knowledge and reliance on
ownership irrelevant to priority); Madison Nat'l Bank v. Newrath, 261 Md. 321, 333-34,
275 A.2d 495, 502, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 1153, 1159 (1971) (dictum); Bloom v. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463,
471, 234 A.2d 860, 863-64, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 821, 826-27 (1967) (estoppel, not mere knowl-
edge, required before first filer deprived of priority); Stearns Mfg. Co. v. National Bank &
Trust Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 189, 194 (Pa. C.P. 1972) (second filer can intentionally create
security interest despite knowledge of prior interest).
The court in Thompson v. United States, 408 F.2d 1075, 1083 n.13, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 20,
28 n. 13 (8th Cir. 1969), commented that "[glenerally, notice of a pre-existing, unperfected
lien is immaterial under the Code." The court's use of "generally" apparently refers to §
9-401(2) (see notes 84-88 and accompanying text infra) and certain provisions of § 9-301.
The 1972 amendments removed the knowledge requirement from § 9-301(1)(b), on the
ground that it was inconsistent with the "race" nature of the priority rules. See PERMANENT
EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, FINAL REPORT 78 (1971) [herein-
after cited as FINAL REPORT].
Gilmore toys with the notion of distinguishing knowledge at the time of attachment
from knowledge at the time of perfection as a possible interpretation of § 9-312(5). See 2
GILMORE, supra note 3, § 34.2, at 900-01. See also Comment, Knowledge and Priorities under
Article Nine: A Proposed Rule Change in the "Race of Diligent Creditors," 47 U. COLO. L. REV.
467, 469-70 n.12 (1976). Yet even Gilmore concedes that "the apparent meaning of § 9-
312(5) is that there is no good faith limitation and that knowledge at any time is irrele-
vant." 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 34.2, at 901. See In re Smith, 326 F. Supp. 1311, 1314, 9
U.C.C. Rep. 549, 553 (D. Minn. 1971) (rejecting Gilmore's distinction).
51 A "pure race" rule grants priority to the first party to file or perfect. A "race-notice"
rule grants priority to the first party to file or perfect, unless he has notice of another
party's security interest. The pure race rule is simpler and more predictable, reduces litiga-
tion, and if litigation arises, obviates the need for evidence concerning state of mind. On
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choice of "pure racing" is in keeping with the Code's goal of sim-
plifying, clarifying, and modernizing commercial law.5 2 Results un-
der a pure race rule and race-notice rule seldom differ, because
the first to file almost always lacks knowledge of a previous security
interest. Hence, the predictability that section 9-312(5)(a) ensures
more than offsets the few inequities it produces. This principle is
perhaps best appreciated in the context of all of Article Nine:
The fundamental purpose of Art. 9 of the code is to make the
process of perfecting a security interest easy, simple, and certain.
It was intended to be a complete reversal of prior chattel security
law and to rid the unaware of the traps of requirement of
specific types of acknowledgments, technical affidavits of consid-
eration, selection of specific proper forms, and other pitfalls that
were not uncommon. The code very simply and briefly provides
for a notice-filing procedure with a minimum of information
required to be publicized in a filed financing statement. All that
is required is a minimal description, and it may be by type or
kind. The statement need not necessarily contain detail as to
collateral, nor any statement of quantity, size, description or
specifications, or serial numbers. No preciseness is required with
respect to whether the collateral exists at the time of filing or is
to be acquired thereafter, and no statement of charges, payment
schedule, or maturity date need be included in the statement.
The first to file shall prevail. Although there are a few exceptions, they
are very clearly and definitely stated.
53
In short, the general rule is simple and straightforward. Yet
courts still manage to misapply it.
54
the other hand, two arguments can be made in favor of a race-notice rule. First, since the
purpose of filing is to put others on notice, it makes little sense to require filing if notice
has already been given. Second, equity suggests that a party with notice should not be
allowed to outmaneuver another merely because of the latter's error. "[O]ne imagines
prospective lenders searching the records with the intent of capitalizing on the innocent
filing mistakes of others." Comment, supra note 50, at 468 n.8.
52 See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a).
53 James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 292 Minn. 277, 295, 194 N.W.2d 775,
786, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 11, 28 (1972) (emphasis added).
11 For example, in Leasing Serv. Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 19 U.G.C.
Rep. 252 (D.N.J. 1976), the court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, found that
although A filed first as to all of C's after-acquired collateral, priority could not be deter-
mined until the court examined B's later-filed financing statement. Id. at 264. Although the
court held that A had priority as to property acquired by C prior to B's filing, it reasoned
that if B's financing statement also included an after-acquired property clause, A's and B's
security interests in property acquired by C after B's filing would perfect simultaneously.
The court characterized this as a "thorny issue." Id. But the court's "thorny issue" turns out
to be a paper tiger. If both parties perfect by filing, the first to file takes priority regardless
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The 1972 amendments to the Code altered the language
of section 9-312 .5 Formerly two rules did the work of section
9-312(5)(a):
In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section
...priority between conflicting security interests in the same
collateral shall be determined as follows:
(a) in the order of filing if both are perfected by filing,
regardless of which security interest attached first under
Section 9-204(1) and whether it attached before or after fil-
ing;
(b) in the order of perfection unless both are perfected by
filing, regardless of which security interest attached first
under Section 9-204(1) and, in the case of a filed security
interest, whether it attached before or after filing .... 51
The new, unified rule works one change in priorities. Con-
sider this sequence of events: A files; B perfects in a manner other
than filing; A perfects. Under former law, section 9-312(5)(b) con-
trolled because one security interest was not perfected by filing.
Therefore B, the first to perfect, took priority. But under the new
first-to-perfect-or-file rule, A, the first to file, wins. Hence, the
amendment expands the already sweeping rights of the first filer.
57
At least four policy reasons support the change:
(1) Certainty. Under the former rule the first filer could not
be sure of his status during the period between filing and perfec-
tion. Yet the very purpose of the filing system is to eliminate the
need for subsequent checking once a creditor records a financ-
ing statement.
58
of time of perfection. The content of B's financing statement was irrelevant; A, the first to
file, should have prevailed.
-5 Article Nine received the lion's share of the 1972 amendments; the alteration of
§ 9-312, however, was primarily cosmetic. WHITE & SUMERS, supra note 1, § 25-4, at 913.
sr U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a)-(b) (1962 version).
5' Commenting on former § 9-312, Professors White and Summers observed: "Because
the draftsmen chose to permit perfection by possession and by other non-filing acts, they
could not simply give priority to the first to file. However, they went as far as possible in
that direction and 9-312(5)(a) is the result ...." WHITE & SUMM'IERS, supra note 1, § 25-4, at
907. The remark is something of an exaggeration, since the new version of § 9-312, as
demonstrated, goes even further than its predecessor in protecting the first filer. In fair-
ness to Professors White and Summers, it must be pointed out that they were among the
first to discuss this effect of the 1972 amendment. See WHITE & SUNIERS, supra note 1,
§ 25-4, at 912. See also Bernstein & Fleisher, The Revisions of Article 9 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code-An Overview, 54 CHii. B. REc. 318, 329 n.II (1973).
. "s "The justification for the rule lies in the necessity of protecting the filing sys-
tem-that is, of allowing the secured party who has first filed to make subsequent advances
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(2) Consistency. If B had perfected by filing, he would not take
priority over A. Why should the result differ merely because B
employs a different method of perfection? Under former section
9-312(5), the force of the first-to-file rule was diminished because
an alert subsequent creditor could sometimes circumvent it.
(3) Notice. The present rule does not prejudice B. Because a
financing statement has been recorded, he can protect himself fully
by checking the files.59 As a matter of policy, it is difficult to distin-
guish this situation from that in which A has already filed and
perfected. In both cases, B has at least constructive notice of A's
interest, or expected interest, in the property. Upon discovering
the financing statement, he should look further into the debtor's
arrangements, intentions, and desires.
(4) Policing. The present rule reduces the possibility of collu-
sion between the debtor and B .61 Moreover, by increasing the in-
centive of creditors to examine the files, it reduces the chances of
the debtor obtaining value from two innocent creditors, neither of
whom intend to obtain a subordinate security interest.
4. Competing Unperfected Security Interests-Section 9-312(5)(b)
Section 9-312(5)(b) fills a tiny gap left by the general rule.
With laudable terseness, it provides for priority among unper-
fected security interests:
So long as conflicting security interests are unperfected, the first
to attach has priority.
6 '
As the Comment explains, this subsection gets little business:
Subsection (5)(b) adds the thought that so long as neither of the
interests is perfected, the one which first attached (i.e., under the
advance first made) has priority. The last mentioned rule may be
thought to be of merely theoretical interest, since it is hard to
imagine a situation where the case would come into litigation
without either [party] having perfected his interest.
62
The Comment's prediction is borne out by the case law. Only one
reported post-1971 case even flirts with the notion of applying
without each time having, as a condition of protection, to check for filings later than his."
U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 5.
59 See Coogan, supra note 33, at 508.
60 See 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 34.5, at 9 14-15.
61 U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(b).
62 U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 5.
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section 9-312(5)(b).6 3 The subsection's extended vacation results
largely from the fact that a secured creditor may perfect his secu-
rity interest by taking possession of the collateral in foreclosure.
64
Of course, the taking of possession by one secured party is what
generally leads to court fights over priorities. 65
B. Exceptions to the First-to-Perfect-or-File Rule
Exceptions-and supposed exceptions-riddle the first-to-per-
fect-or-file rule. Some emerge from section 9-312. Others hide in
the crannies of Article Nine.
1. Security Interests in Crops-Section 9-312(2)
As impotent as section 9-312(5)(b) is section 9-312(2):
A perfected security interest in crops for new value given to
enable the debtor to produce the crops during the production
season and given not more than three months before the crops
63 In Engelsma v. Superior Prods. Mfg. Co., 298 Minn. 77, 212 N.W.2d 884, 13 U.C.C.
Rep. 944 (1973) (per curiam), the trial court held for A, whose security agreement covered
property sold to C, over B, whose security agreement covered property brought onto C's
premises. The lower court found that neither party had perfected, and that A's security
interest had attached first, i.e., upon sale rather than upon delivery of the collateral. Id. at
80-81, 212 N.W.2d at 886, 13 U.C.C. Rep. at 946-47 (appellate court's summary of trial
court's opinion). The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, relying on pre-Code law. Unable
to resist a reference to Article Nine, however, the court went on to point out that even if
the Code applied, priority belonged to A. The court found that A had perfected its security
interest through repossession, and was entitled to priority under the first-to-perfect rule.
Id. at 80, 212 N.W.2d at 886, 13 U.C.C. Rep. at 947. But the court conceded that under its
own or the lower court's theoy, A was entitled to priority. Id. at 80-81, 212 N.W.2d at 886, 13
U.C.C. Rep. at 947. Hence, the only reported use since 1971 of the first-to-attach rule
came in the form of "alternative dictum."
64 In re Char, 4 SEC. TRANS GurDE (CCH) 52,373 (S.D.N.Y., Bankr. Ct. 1974) (sum-
mary of opinion); James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 292 Minn. 277, 194 N.W.2d
775, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 11 (1972); Barry v. Bank of New Hampshire, 113 N.H. 158, 304 A.2d
879, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 732 (1973). See U.C.C. § 9-305. Note that possession of the collateral
by the secured party may serve as a perfecting act (U.C.C. §9-305), an "attaching act"
(U.C.C. § 9-203), or both. But to substitute for a security agreement, possession must be
"pursuant to agreement." U.C.C. § 9-203(1). Therefore, repossession without agreement
will not result in attachment. No agreement is necessary for possessory perfection, but one
court has suggested, somewhat obscurely, that perfection will not result if the secured
party repossesses "wrongfully." Engelsma v. Superior Prods. Mfg. Co., 298 Minn. 77, 80
n.2, 212 N.W.2d 884, 886 n.2, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 944, 947 n.2 (1973).
65 Gilmore suggests that § 9-312(5)(b) might control where one or both parties file
improperly. 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 34.1, at 895 n.3 (citing Plaza Corp. v. Alban Trac-
tor Co., 219 Md. 570, 151 A.2d 170 (1959), a pre-Code example). As a practical matter, in
such cases one party will normally repossess. For a case in which § 9-312(5)(b) was held to
control, see Johnson v. Dempsey, 117 Ga. App. 722, 161 S.E.2d 889, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 394
(1968) (unperfected security interest that attached first given priority; repossession not dis-
cussed).
ARTICLE NINE PRIORITY RULES
become growing crops by planting or otherwise takes priority
over an earlier perfected security interest to the extent that such
earlier interest secures obligations due more than six months
before the crops become growing crops by planting or otherwise,
even though the person giving new value had knowledge of the
earlier security interest.
6 6
The subsection smacks of purchase money theory.6 7 But the qual-
ification that such a "purchase money" security interest in crops
dislodges a prior interest only if the prior interest secures debts
more than six months overdue saps the section of vitality. 68 Again,
at least since 1971, no reported case applies this subsection.
69
2. Lapse of Perfection--Section 9-403(2)
Consider again the last sentence of section 9-312(5)(a):
Priority dates from the time a filing is first made covering the
collateral or the time the security interest is first perfected,
whichever is earlier, provided that there is no period thereafter when
there is neither filing nor perfection.7 11
A financing statement has but a five-year lifespan. Under section
9-403(2), the effectiveness of a filed financing statement lapses on
the expiration of the five-year period unless a continuation state-
ment is filed prior to lapse. Assume A files in 1970; B files as to the
same property in 1972; and the debtor goes broke in 1976. IfA has
not filed a continuation statement or maintained continuous per-
fection in some other manner, B gets the collateral.7 1 For A, there
Gr U.C.C. § 9-312(2).
67 Coates, Financing the Farmer, PRAC. LAW., Nov. 1974, at 45, 55. It has been suggested
that security interests in crops that satisfy the requirements of § 9-107 may qualify for
purchase money priority under § 9-312(4). 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 32.5, at 869 n.4.
However, § 9-312(2) appears to be exclusive. Id.
68 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-6, at 923; Coates, supra note 67, at 55. Gil-
more calls § 9-312(2) "one of the Code's dead-letter provisions." 2 GILMORE, supra note 3,
§ 32.5, at 870.
69 A handful of cases have held § 9-312(2) inapplicable. E.g., In re Bounds, 4 SEC.
TRANS. GUIDE (CCH) V 52,748 (W.D. Okla., Bankr. Ct. 1976) (summary of opinion) (be-
cause prior claims not due more than six months before crops began growing, priorities
not affected by § 9-312(2)).
7 U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (emphasis added).
71 U.C.C. § 9-403, Comment 3, specifically provides for this result:
[I]f A and B both make non-purchase money advances against the same collateral,
and both perfect security interests by filing, A who files first is entitled to priority
under Section 9-312(5). But if no continuation statement is filed, A's filing may
lapse first. So long as B's interest remains perfected thereafter, he is entitled to
priority over A's unperfected interest.
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has been a period "when there is neither filing nor perfection."
Although A was first to perfect or file, B prevails.
7 2
Perfection may also lapse if collateral is moved into another
state. Under section 9-103(3)(e), a security interest in property
brought into the second state expires four months after arrival.
Thus a first-filed financing statement may provide priority for only
four short months. 73 If the four-month period passes without con-
tinuation in the second state, a second-perfected party takes prior-
ity even if he has knowledge of the first filing, or if the property is
later returned to the state where the first filing occurred.74 Lapse
of perfection of a security interest in proceeds resulting from fail-
ure to comply with the continuation provisions of section 9-306(3)
may also pave the way to priority for a later-filing creditor.
3. Subordination by Agreement--Section 9-316
Secured creditors may alter Code priorities by agreement. Sec-
tion 9-316 provides:
Gilmore, calling § 9-403(2) "cryptically ambiguous," argues that the Comment is wrong. He
equates the Comment's rule with a "game of roulette," and argues that priorities should be
fixed at the time the second security interest is perfected. Gilmore quotes language from
the 1952 Code supporting his position and states that, according to his recollection, its
deletion in the 1956 version resulted from "a curious typographical error." 1 GILMORE,
supra note 3, § 21.6, at 588-90.
Gilmore's position seems strained, although in fairness it should be pointed out that
Gilmore made these comments before the 1972 amendments added language to § 9-312(5)
specifically referring to lapse. See I GILMORE, supra note 3, § 21.6, at 592. But even as a
statement of policy, Gilmore's argument appears deficient. Loss of priority is an appro-
priate penalty for one who fails to comply with the Code's filing provisions. Courts have
universally construed the Code in accordance with the Comment. See cases cited in note 72
infra.
72 See In re Barnes, 4 SEC. TRANS. GUIDE (CCH) 52,392 (D. Me., Bankr. Ct. 1974)
(summary of opinion) (filing of continuation statement at wrong office resulted in lapse
and subordination to bankruptcy trustee); United States v. Squires, 378 F. Supp. 798, 15
U.C.C. Rep. 718 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (buyer given priority over secured party with lapsed
financing statement); Stearns Mfg. Co. v. National Bank & Trust Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 189,
194 (Pa. C.P. 1972) (second filer can intentionally create valid security interest). Compare
Eastern Ind. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Farmers State Bank, 31 Ohio App. 2d 252, 287 N.E.2d
824, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 664 (1972) (creditor still obligated to file continuation statement de-
spite vesting of debtor's property in bankruptcy trustee; filing of second financing state-
ment rather than continuation statement failed to maintain continuous perfection) with In
re South County Motel Corp., 4 SEC. TRANS. GUIDE (CCH) 52,789 (D.R.I., Bankr. Ct. July
6, 1976) (filing of continuation statement unnecessary after bankruptcy petition filed; pro-
ceedings provide necessary notice).
7'3 See In re Welker, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 169 (W.D. Pa., Bankr. Ct. 1964) (lack of knowledge
of debtor's departure irrelevant to lapse resulting from failure to refile in second state;
perfection lapsed after five months); U.C.C. § 9-103, Comment 7.
11 In re Miller, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1042 (D. Ore., Bankr. Ct. 1974) (perfection not revived
by return of property to state of first filing after four-month lapse).
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Nothing in this Article prevents subordination by agreement
by any person entitled to priority.
7 5
Subordination agreements may be oral, 76 although naturally this
exacerbates problems of proof. Moreover, subordination agree-
ments may arise out of a course of dealing. 7 7 In certain circum-
stances, a secured creditor who is not a party to the subordination
agreement may obtain its benefit by invoking estoppel or third
party beneficiary theory. 78 On the other hand, a creditor cannot
lose priority under an agreement to which he is not a party. 79 Like
all contracts, subordination agreements must be carefully drafted.
False assumptions and lack of caution may result in an unexpected
reversal of priorities." Moreover, section 9-316 subordination
agreements are subject to traditional contract defenses. 8 '
Subordination agreements may produce interesting results.
For example, in General Electric Credit Corp. v. Pennsylvania Bank &
Trust Co.,8 2 the court held that although a second creditor's security
interest had become unperfected through lapse, his subordination
agreement still entitled him to priority. Suppose, in such a case,
both parties were competing with a trustee in bankruptcy. Possible
result: trustee takes priority over the perfected security interest.8 3
75 U.C.C. § 9-316.
11 Hillman's Equip., Inc. v. Central Realty, Inc., 144 Ind. App. 18, 24, 242 N.E.2d 522,
525-26, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1160, 1164 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 253 Ind. 48, 246 N.E.2d
383 (1969); Williams v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 482 P.2d 595, 597, 8 U.C.C. Rep.
679, 682 (Okla. 1971).
77 Percival Constr. Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc., 532 F.2d 166, 172, 19
U.C.C. Rep. 244, 250 (10th Cir. 1976). See Williams v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 482
P.2d 595, 597, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 679, 682 (Okla. 1971); U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
78 See In re Thorner Mfg. Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. 595, 602 (E.D. Pa., Bankr. Ct. 1967)
(under contract between debtor and first filer allowing second filer to obtain subordination
agreement, second filer prevailed, although no actual subordination agreement obtained).
79 U.C.C. § 9-316, Comment.
"' See, e.g., First Security Bank v. Wright, 521 P.2d 563, 566, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 808, 811
(Utah 1974) (subordination agreement covering farmer's sugar beet crop rendered ineffec-
tive when farmer produced grain).
"I Percival Constr. Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc., 532 F.2d 166, 172, 19
U.C.C. Rep. 244, 250 (10th Cir. 1976).
82 56 Pa. D. & C.2d 472, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 858 (1972).
83 See In re Smith, 326 F. Supp. 1311, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 549 (D. Minn. 1971) (court as-
sumed trustee's subrogation to priority of unperfected secured creditor under Bankruptcy
Act). Section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § l10e (1970), arguably allows the
trustee to step into the shoes of the unperfected creditor. Professors White and Summers
disagree with this interpretation of § 70e, at least where the trustee seeks to be subrogated
to the rights of one perfected creditor over another perfected creditor under § 9-312(5).
See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 24-8, at 891-92. They reason in part that the bank-
ruptcy trustee should not be subrogated to the rights of a creditor whom the trustee can-
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4. Knowledge of Improper Filing--Section 9-401(2)
Section 9-401(2) provides an important exception to the first-
to-perfect-or-file rule. That section provides:
A filing which is made in good faith in an improper place or
not in all of the places required by this section is nevertheless
effective with regard to any collateral as to which the filing com-
plied with the requirements of this Article and is also effective
with regard to collateral covered by the financing statement
against any person who has knowledge of the contents of such
financing statement.
8 4
This rule mitigates the rigor of section 9-312 as a pure-race
statute.8 5 The key to section 9-401(2) is "knowledge of the con-
tents," a slippery phrase that has given courts some difficulty.
Recent cases indicate a movement toward equating knowledge
that a security interest exists with "knowledge of the contents of
[the] financing statement. ' 86 Although some suggest that such a
view would swallow the pure-race rule of section 9-312(5),87 one
requirement of section 9-401 militates against this possibility. To
swing section 9-401 into operation, a prior filing is necessary.
Hence, notice of a previous, but unfiled, security interest has no
effect on section 9-312 priorities. The fact that most unperfected
security interests result from failure to file rather than improper
filing limits the effect of section 9-401(2).88
not defeat. Id. at 892. This may distinguish the case in which the trustee seeks subrogation
through an unperfected secured party. Of course, if § 70e allows subrogation to the rights
of an unperfected secured party, it applies in all cases where an unperfected secured party
takes priority over a perfected competitor. See text accompanying note 197 infra. For a
thorough discussion of this issue, see Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy as a Secured Cred-
itor Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 1419 (1967). See generally notes
329-30 and accompanying text infra.
84 U.C.C. § 9-401(2).
85 Of course, where a financing statement is improperly filed, and the competing se-
cured party lacks knowledge of its contents, the later filer wins under § 9-312(5). "First to
file" in such a case means "first to file properly." Mountain Credit v. Michiana Lumber &
Supply, Inc., 31 Colo. App. 112, 114, 498 P.2d 967, 968-69 (1972) (first-to-file rule con-
templates proper filings).
56 See In re Davidoff, 351 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (rejecting "novel theory"
that secured party must learn of improper filing, or see copy of misfiled financing state-
ment, before subordination under § 9-401(2)); Franklin Nat'l Inv. Corp. v. American Swiss
Parts Co., 42 Mich. App. 211, 201 N.W.2d 673 (1972) (notice of financing arrangement
constituted knowledge of financing statement's contents). But see In re Enark Indus., Inc.,
19 U.C.C. Rep. 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1976) (actual knowledge of financing state-
ment's contents required for subordination). See generally Comment, supra note 50, at 478-8 1.
s7 See Comment, supra note 50, at 481.
58 For a discussion of developments under § 9-401(2) and some suggested changes, see
Comment, supra note 50, at 472-87.
[Vol. 62:834
1977] ARTICLE NINE PRIORITY RULES
5. Good Faith and Supplementary Law---Sections 1-103 and 1-203
The Comment to section 1-203 states: "This section sets forth
a basic principle running throughout this Act. The principle in-
volved is that in commercial transactions good faith is required in
the performance and enforcement of all agreements or duties. ' 89
This good faith principle applies to secured transactions. 9" Al-
though the principle has rarely been invoked in priority disputes, it
has altered section 9-312 results where a debtor's violation of a
competing security agreement resulted in priority for a party
closely related to the debtor. 91 However, the good faith require-
ment does not alter the pure-race rule of section 9-312.92
Like good faith, principles of supplementary law, such as es-
toppe 93 and waiver, 94 may prevent blind adherence to section
9-312. 91 In section 9-312 cases, however, courts have been slow to
embrace these theories in light of the section's clear language and
the Code's avowed purpose of furthering certainty in commercial
transactions. 96 Litigants have also challenged section 9-312 results
89 U.C.C. § 1-203, Comment. Section 1-203 provides:
Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement.
" Central Soya Co. v. Bundrick, 137 Ga. App. 63, 66, 222 S.E.2d 852, 855, 19 U.C.C.
Rep. 300, 303 (1975) (principles of estoppel and good faith underlie entire Code, including
Article Nine). "Fraud is fraud, no matter how cunningly contrived, and a good faith lim-
itation can always be-in appropriate cases should always be-read into a statute." 2
GILMORE, supra note 3, § 34.5, at 915.
" See Thompson v. United States, 408 F.2d 1075, 1084, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 20, 28 (8th Cir.
1969) (execution of security agreement between family corporation and defaulting family
partnership, despite trust agreement barring partnership's transfer of rights in property
without first creditor's permission, constituted bad faith). But see also Bruer v. Sanford At.
Nat'l Bank, 247 So. 2d 764, 766, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 109, 112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (under
§ 9-311, debtor specifically authorized to create subsequent security interest despite con-
trary provision in earlier security agreement).
92 1n re Smith, 326 F. Supp. 1311, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 549 (D. Minn. 1971).
'3 See Bloom v. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 471, 234 A.2d 860, 864, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 821, 827
(1967) (prior but unsecured creditor unable to establish grounds for estoppel). See also
cases cited in note 96 infra.
94 Loss of priority through consensual subordination has been couched in terms of
waiver. See In re Thorner Mfg. Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. 595 (E.D. Pa., Bankr. Ct. 1967).
95 The Code's supplementary law provision is § 1-103, set out in note 37 supra. For an
example of its application in the priority context, see French Lumber Co. v. Commercial
Realty & Fin. Co., 346 Mass. 716, 195 N.E.2d 507 (1964) (A defaults on obligations to first
filer and second filer; B, who pays off debt to first filer, and files third, later takes priority
over second filer because subrogation doctrine supplements Code under § 1-103). See also
In re Johnson, 4 SEC. TRANS. GUIDE (CCH) 52,294 (D. Neb., Bankr. Ct. 1973) (summary
of opinion) (although Article Nine governs transaction, bankruptcy court may liberally
apply equitable remedies, including those found in Article Two's unconscionability provi-
sion, § 2-302).
9 For cases in which estoppel is discussed but rejected on the facts, see Hillman's
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as simply inequitable, but courts have unwaveringly rebuffed such
attempts to avoid clear Code commands.
97
6. Prohibiting "Relation Back"-Section 9-305
A, without obtaining a security agreement, files as to C's St.
Bernard. C remains in possession. B obtains a security agreement
covering C's St. Bernard and files. A then takes possession of C's
St. Bernard, thus perfecting his security interest. These are the
essential-though much simplified-facts of Transport Equipment
Co. v. Guaranty State Bank, 98 in which the Tenth Circuit, relying on
section 9-305, granted priority to B, the second filer. Although the
court's analysis is murky, it ultimately rests on "the non-retro-
activity rule of [section] 9-305."19
The court's reasoning goes like this: A had not perfected until
he took possession. Therefore he "perfected by possession," and is
defeated by the third sentence of section 9-305:
A security interest is perfected by possession from the time pos-
session is taken without relation back and continues only so long
as possession is retained, unless otherwise specified in this
Article.""'
But "Alps on Alps arise"""' from the court's simple syllogism.
First, did A in fact "perfect by possession"? Assume that in-
stead of A taking possession, A and C executed a security agree-
ment. At this point A's security interest would have attached," 2
and would have become perfected.' 3 In a sense, the security in-
Equip., Inc. v. Central Realty, Inc., 144 Ind. App. 18, 25, 242 N.E.2d 522, 526, 5 U.C.C.
Rep. 1160, 1165 (1968) (summary judgment ordered despite estoppel argument), rev'd on
other grounds, 253 Ind. 48, 246 N.E.2d 383 (1969); Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
York, 429 S.W.2d 26, 28, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 11, 14-15 (Ky. 1968) (estoppel argument based on
unjust enrichment rejected as potentially destructive of certainty in commercial transac-
tions); Manufacturers Acceptance Corp. v. Penning's Sales, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 501, 510,
487 P.2d 1053, 1058, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 797, 804 (1971) (insufficient facts presented on estop-
pel theory).
97 See National Bank & Trust Co. v. Moody Ford, Inc., 149 Ind. App. 479, 484-85, 273
N.E.2d 757, 760, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 1276, 1280 (1971) (acceptance of equity argument would
constitute 'judicial erasure" of Code provisions); Evans Prods. Co. v. Jorgenson, 245 Ore.
362, 372, 421 P.2d 978, 983, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1099, 1106-07 (1966) (application of equitable
unjust enrichment doctrine in place of Code rules rejected as impairing Code's effective-
ness).
98518 F.2d 377, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 1 (10th Cir. 1975).
99 Id. at 382, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 8.
1(" U.C.C. § 9-305.
101 A. POPE, AN ESSAY ON CRITICISM line 232, at 15 (London 1711).
:
0 2 See U.C.C. § 9-201.
103 See U.C.C. § 9-303.
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terest would be perfected by attachment, but only because attach-
ment is a prerequisite of perfection. The key step on the road to
perfection is filing (or another perfecting act), for it is filing (or
another perfecting act) that differentiates the perfected security
interest from the run-of-the-mill attached security interest. In
short, the word "by" in section 9-305 is a word of requirement, not
of time. It does not matter when the security interest was perfected.
What matters is how. In Transport Equipment, possession was a
necessary act of attachment, but not a necessary act of perfection,
since a financing statement was already on file. Section 9-305 con-
templates and deals with perfection by possession, not attachment
by possession.11
4
But even assuming that A's security interest was perfected by
possession and that perfection therefore dates from the "time
possession is taken," this does not necessarily mean that section
9-312(5) does not apply. After all, the first-to-perfect-or-file rule
covers exactly those situations in which the first filer's perfection
follows perfection by another.'" 5 Hence, the Transport Equipment
court must have relied on those loaded words of section 9-305,
"without relation back. ' 10 6 The court apparently concluded that
section 9-305 prohibits relation back of attachment time to filing
time. This reading of the "relation back" language is incorrect. As
Comment 3 to section 9-305 makes clear, the Code's draftsmen
intended this passage to prevent relation back of a security interest
perfected by possession to the time the original security agreement
was executed, not relation back of possession to the time of
filing.117 In Transport Equipment, however, the security interest was
not perfected by possession, and no security agreement was ever
executed.
The Transport Equipment decision not only reflects shoddy
statutory interpretation; it also undercuts the basic policy of notice
filing. B had access to the files. He therefore had, or should have
1"4 The caption of § 9-305, "When Possession by Secured Party Perfects Security In-
terest Without Filing," strongly supports this conclusion. Section 1-109 makes section cap-
tions part of the Code.
"*See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
106 It is significant that the court, in rejecting the first filer's arguments, italicized the
words "relation back": "This section further provides that there can be no relation back of
the perfection date when perfection is obtained through possession." 518 F.2d at 382, 17
U.C.C. Rep. at 7 (emphasis in original).
107 U.G.G. § 9-305, Comment 3, states: "The third sentence of the section rejects the
'equitable pledge' theory of relation back, under which the taking possession [sic] was
deemed to relate back to the date of the original security agreement."
1977]
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had, notice of A's prior claim. A must be able to rely on his filing.
That is the essence of Article Nine.
108
7. Imperfections in the Debtor's Title
Assume A enters into a security agreement with C, covering all
of C's after-acquired accounts. A files properly. B then enters into a
security agreement with D covering all of D's accounts. B later files.
D transfers his accounts to C, and both conveniently go bankrupt.
Who gets the accounts, A orB?' 9
A literal reading of section 9-312(5) suggests that A should
win. After all, these are "conflicting security interests in the same
collateral." A filed first, and that's that.
But the explorer must hike the jungles of Article Nine in
search of an exception. First, he encounters section 9-306(2), which
assures him that B's security interest continues in the collateral
if the sale was unauthorized."" Unfortunately, section 9-306(2)
leaves unanswered the priority question. What does it matter if the
creditor still has a security interest? That only gets him into section
9-312(5), not past it. Section 9-201 looks more promising:
Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security agree-
ment is effective according to its terms between the parties,
against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors .... "I
If A's security agreement is good "against creditors," why should it
not operate against B? It does--"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
this Act." This proviso opens a door through which section 9-312 is
ready to burst. The Comment makes clear that it can: "Exceptions
to this general rule arise where . . . this Article subordinates the
108 See U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 5, set out in part in note 58 supra.
109 For a case involving similar facts, see First Security Bank v. Zions First Nat'l Bank,
537 P.2d 1024, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 858 (Utah 1975), in which the court summarily concluded
that calculators and calculator parts were not subject to the security interest of the trans-
feree's creditor, even though the security interest covered all after-acquired inventory. The
opinion is short on facts. Most importantly, it fails to disclose clearly the transferee's in-
tended use of the calculators. The court's statement, however, that the transferee "was
engaged in the marketing of the products," (id. at 1026, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 860) suggests
that the calculators were inventory in the transferee's hands. If they were, the security
interest of the transferee's creditor at least arguably attached to them (but only arguably
because of the shelter principle argument discussed below, see notes 113-14 and accom-
panying text infra). The opinion, however, does not discuss this point.
.", It would be highly unusual for an accounts financer to authorize the transfer of all
the debtor's accounts. The cautious lender will make the extent of any authorization clear
in the security agreement.
"' U.C.C. § 9-201.
[Vol. 62:834
ARTICLE NINE PRIORITY RULES
security interest because it has not been perfected (Section 9-301)
or for other reasons (see Section 9-312 on priorities). . . .112
Alas, Article Nine has confounded the searcher. But before
him lie Articles One and Two. Section 2-403 embodies the "shel-
ter principle": a purchaser acquires all the rights that his trans-
feror has power to give." 3 The term "purchaser" includes one
who acquires an interest in property through the creation of a se-
curity interest." 4 Therefore the shelter principle argument goes
like this: Because C, the buyer, took subject to B's security inter-
est, the interest he transferred to A, his creditor, was limited by B's
prior rights.
But section 2-403 does not control. First, it applies only to
purchasers of goods. Our hypothetical accounts receivable clearly
fall outside that category." 5 Second, if section 2-403 applies at all,
it applies only by negative implication. The section states that a
purchaser acquires all title held by his transferor. This does not
preclude the possibility that he acquires more." 6 Third, Article
Two deals with sales of goods, Article Nine with secured transac-
tions. A's "purchase" looks more like one of the latter. Indeed,
section 2-403 itself suggests that our explorer should avoid Article
Two.
17
Of course, Article One runs through Article Nine, and its
"supplementary law" provision, section 1-103, may inject the shel-
ter principle into our hypothetical conflict."18 But again, that sec-
tion begins with a disclaimer:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the prin-
ciples of law and equity. . . shall supplement its provisons. 19
The clear language of section 9-312 appears to be preemptive.1
211
112 U.C.C. § 9-201, Comment.
1,
3 
See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-1, at 900-01.
114 2 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
2.2902, at 657 (1964). See U.C.C. § 1-201(32)-(33).
,15 U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(h).
11" See Oldfather, supra note 31, at 583-84.
117 U.C.C. § 2-403(4) provides:
The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed by
the [Article] on Secured Transactions (Article 9) ....
See generally U.C.C. § 2-402(3)(a).
1"8 WHITE & SUMIMERS, supra note 1, § 25-1, at 900-01.
19 U.C.C. § 1-103 (emphasis added).
120 Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 524 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1975) (rejecting bank's argument that lender's security interest in certificate of de-




But the fearless forge on. A direct assault on section 9-312 is
needed, and the commentators have supplied one. The attack fo-
cuses on the word "priority." The word has been interpreted to
mean priority between security interests created by a single debtor.12'
This interpretation avoids the intuitively undesirable outcome sug-
gested by the hypothetical. Proponents of this view 12 2 also observe
that the eight examples set out in the Comments to section 9-312
all portray conflicts involving but a single debtor.12 3 Most impor-
tantly, this interpretation provides a commercially sensible and just
result. A certainly would not, or at least should not, advance funds
expecting to acquire a superior interest in property encumbered
prior to transfer. He can contractually insist that such property not
be acquired by C or that C obtain the previous creditor's authoriza-
tion, at least when buying from an insolvent or near-insolvent
seller. But B, who carefully checked for prior filings, can hardly
plan for or prevent this development. Checking the files does not
protect him, as it should in a notice filing system. The transfer saps
his security interest of its strength. Clearly this will discourage se-
cured lending.
Yet the language of section 9-312(5) seems clear and control-
ling. Moreover, if section 9-312 is restricted to single-debtor prior-
ity disputes, the word "priority" must take on different meanings
in different sections of Article Nine. 24 The absence of a dual-
debtor hypothetical in the Comments' eight examples is hardly
surprising, and certainly an inaccurate gauge of the drafters' inten-
tions, since most priority disputes in fact arise where competing
security interests are created by the same debtor. Most importantly,
the statute does not qualify the word "priority," a term not re-
stricted in common usage to single-debtor priority disputes. 125 Al-
though the courts have not specifically addressed this issue, they
121 See Oldfather, supra note 31, at 583; Skilton, Security Interests in After-Acquired Prop-
erty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 926, 948.
122 See Oldfather, supra note 31, at 583.
123 See U.C.C. § 9-312, Comments 5-8.
124 "If this [interpretation of § 9-312(5)] means that the word 'priority' has a broader
meaning in some contexts than it does in others, my reply is that it has to. My suggestion is
that some statutory clarification would seem to be called for." Oldfather, supra note 31, at
583-84 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
121 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1357 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) provides the following definition
of "priority":
Precedence; going before. A legal preference or precedence. When two per-
sons have similar rights in respect of the same subject-matter, but one is entitled
to exercise his right to the exclusion of the other, he is said to have priority.
"Priority" is not defined in the Code.
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have occasionally relied on section 9-312 to settle conflicts between
security interests created by different debtors. 126
126See National Bank of Commerce v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 446 P.2d 277,
282, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 947, 953 (Okla. 1968) (§ 9-312 determined priorities although compet-
ing security interests created by different, debtors; § 9-307 inapplicable because second
debtor not a buyer in ordinary course of business). Compare International Harvester Credit
Corp. v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 125 Ga. App. 477, 479, 188 S.E.2d 110, 112-13
(1972) (priority granted under § 9-312(4), although security interests created by different
debtors) with International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Financial Servs. Co., 133
Ga. App. 488, 492 n.1, 211 S.E.2d 430, 433 n.1 (1974) (stating that court in Commercial
Credit should have applied § 9-306(5)(b), rather than § 9-312(4)).
For an analysis of other problems arising when multiple debtors create security in-
terests in the same collateral, see Skilton, Buyer in Ordinary Course of Business Under Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code (and Related Matters), 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1, 76-88. Skilton
concludes that the shelter provided by § 9-307 to the buyer in ordinary course extends to
the secured party who finances the buyer's purchase. He apparendy bases this conclusion
on authority suggesting that § 9-307 completely cuts off the prior security interest upon
transfer. See Crystal State Bank v. Columbia Heights State Bank, 295 Minn. 181, 185, 203
N.W.2d 389, 391-92, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 922, 925-26 (1973) (seller's security interest "released"
upon sale to buyer in ordinary course, giving buyer's creditor priority over seller's inven-
tory financer). The language of § 9-307 and case law interpreting it, however, make clear
that the section is only a priority rule, and that the inventory financer's security interest
persists notwithstanding unauthorized sale. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2). The following imaginary
conversation suggests the policy considerations relevant to resolving this priorities problem:
Edgar: Where a sale is made to a buyer in ordinary course, surely the law should favor
his creditor over the seller's inventory financer even if the inventory lender was the first to
file. A contrary rule will discourage consumer lending or at least increase the cost of bor-
rowing. Section 9-307 is designed to help buyers, particularly consumers. Your recom-
mended rule penalizes the consumer. Moreover, it is certainly unusual-indeed, unfair-
for the buyer's creditor to bear a loss caused by the defalcations of a seller with whom the
buyer's financer has had no dealings. Let's place the risk on the seller's financer. After all,
he is in the best position to monitor and control the seller's activities.
Betsy: Just a minute. The Code is not as simple-minded as you think. Certainly the
inventory financer will generally be the first to file. But the Code adequately protects the
consumer lender with its purchase money priority provisions. Under § 9-302, the con-
sumer lender need not even file to perfect his security interest.
Edgar: Although the purchase money priority rules might help sometimes, they lack
the clout necessary to protect consumer lenders consistently. If both creditors hold pur-
chase money security interests, the first to perfect or file prevails (see notes 223-28 and
accompanying text infra), and that will normally be the inventory financer. Conflicts be-
tween purchase money security interests are likely to recur in this context since the security
interests are created by different debtors. Besides, inventory financers will generally be in a
better position to bear the loss. The inability to repossess a car will certainly fall more heavily
on Tiny's Credit Union than on GMAC. Furthermore, GMAC may well have a security in-
terest continuing in the proceeds arising from the sale. Let's not give it the kitchen sink too.
Betsy: Edgar, you're stirring up a tempest in a teapot. This priority conflict will arise so
infrequently, it's hardly worth discussing. Do you realize what has to happen for this ques-
tion to arise? First, both the inventory financer and the consumer lender will have to hold
purchase money security interests. Second, the seller and buyer will have to default simul-
taneously. If only the buyer defaults, the inventory financer has no recourse against the
item sold, because the obligation owed him by the seller is not in default. Third, the inven-
tory financer will have to go after the collateral, which in the case of many consumer goods
probably won't be worth his bother. This conflict will arise so infrequently that consumer
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8. Future Advances-An Attempted Exception
Future advances have produced almost nothing but headaches
for courts construing section 9-312. On Day One, A makes an
advance to C, takes a security interest in C's bicycle, and files a
financing statement. On Day Two, B makes an advance to C, takes
a security interest in the same bicycle, and files. On Day Three, A
makes another advance to C, executing a second security agree-
ment that again covers the bicycle. No new financing statement is
filed. A's second advance-an advance based on the initial financ-
ing statement-is a future advance.12 7 If A defaults on his obliga-
tions, who gets the bike? Does it matter whether A's original se-
curity agreement or financing statement allows or requires future
advances? Does it matter whether C pays off the initial debt before
A makes his second advance?
The struggle to answer these questions begins with Coin-O-
Matic Service Co. v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. 128 In that case, a
lower Rhode Island court held that the original lender's second
loan did not "relate back" to the initial financing statement because
the original security agreement did not specifically provide for the
later advances.' 29 The leading case disputing Coin-O-Matic is In re
Rivet, 3" in which the Eastern District of Michigan gave priority to a
future advance lender over an intervening creditor, even though
the original security agreement did not provide for future
advances.' 3 ' Although most courts have adopted the Rivet view, 32
lenders won't give it a thought. And if now and then one becomes paranoid, he can always
check the files and refuse to extend credit, or try to obtain a subordination agreement. So
let's keep life simple. The Code says the first to perfect or file should win. Judicial varia-
tion of clear Code rules only increases commercial uncertainty, which is exactly what the
Code was designed to prevent.
127 Future advance arrangements are generally more advantageous than one-shot lend-
ing for both creditor and debtor. By reducing his initial outlay, the lender reduces the
chances of a catastrophic loss. He can monitor both the debtor's success and the collateral
itself over a period of time, and gauge his advances accordingly. Moreover, the lender may
not have sufficient funds on hand to make one large loan. As for the debtor, future ad-
vance financing allows him to postpone interest payments until he is actually in need of
funds.
128 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1112 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1966).
129 Id. at 1120.
130 299 F. Supp. 374, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 460 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
131 Id. at 380, 6 U.C.C. Rep. at 467.
132 See In re Gilchrist Co., 4 SEc. TRANS. GUIDE (CCH) V 52,620 (E.D. Pa., Bankr. Ct.
1975) (summary of opinion); Household Fin. Corp. v. Bank Comm'r, 248 Md. 233, 235
A.2d 732 (1967); James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 292 Minn. 277, 291-92, 194
N.W.2d 775, 784, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 11, 25-26 (1972); Index Store Fixture Co. v. Farmers'
Trust Co., 536 S.W.2d 902, 904-05, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 284, 286-88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). The
court in Talcott stated:
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Coin-O-Matic has attracted a modest following. 133
Fans of Coin-O-Matic argue that the Rivet rule unduly restricts
the debtor's ability to obtain additional funds. No creditor, they
urge, will make an advance where a prior creditor can "take away"
his priority by making a future advance covered by a previously
filed financing statement. 134 They argue that the Rivet rule effec-
The better view holds that, where originally a security agreement is executed, an
indebtedness created, and a financing statement describing the collateral filed, fol-
lowed at a later date by another advance made pursuant to a subsequent security
agreement covering the same collateral, the lender has a perfected security in-
terest in the collateral not only for the original debt but also for the later advance.
292 Minn. at 291-92, 194 N.W.2d at 784, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 25-26.
"' The Code's Review Committee cites In re Merriman, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 234 (S.D. Ohio,
Bankr. Ct. 1967) as following Coin-O-Matic. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 226.
In Merriman the court refused to give the future advance lender priority, but only
because the debtor continuously owed him money. 4 U.C.C. Rep. at 236. More recent cases
have also retreated from giving future-advance security interests the sweeping priority ad-
vocated by the Review Committee. See Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 401 F.
Supp. 316, 325 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (requiring reperfection of each new security interest if
parties intend to deal on single loan basis); In re HGS Technical Assocs., Inc., 4 SEC.
TRANS. GUIDE (CCH) 52,435, at 67,563 (E.D. Tenn., Bankr. Ct. 1974) (summary of opin-
ion) (future advance lender granted priority, but emphasis placed on parties' contempla-
tion of subsequent loans). Furthermore, In re Hagler, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1285, 1288-89 (E.D.
Tenn., Bankr. Ct. 1972), swallows Coin-O-Matic lock, stock, and barrel. Hence, characteriza-
tions of Coin-O-Matic as "a minority of one," WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-4, at
908, and "an aberration with all other reported cases reaching the 'correct' result," Balint,
supra note 46, at 313 n.16, are exaggerations.
Safe Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Berman, 393 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1968), although
apparently inapposite, points up the uncertainty in this area. That case involved the exis-
tence of a valid security agreement authorizing additional advances so as to comply with
what is now § 9-204(3), not the "relation back" of an acknowledged security agreement to a
previously filed financing statement. Safe Deposit Bank, however, affirmatively cites the
lower court decision in In re Rivet, 4 INSTAL. CREDIT GUIDE (CCH) 97,858 (E.D. Mich.,
Bankr. Ct. 1967), rev'd, 299 F. Supp. 374, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 460 (E.D. Mich. 1969), in which
the referee adopted the reasoning of Coin-O-Matic. 393 F.2d at 403.
Rivet and Safe Deposit Bank underscore the confusion surrounding the phrase "future
advances." Although generally used to describe advances intended to be covered by an
earlier financing statement (as in Rivet and Coin-O-Matic), the phrase is also used to de-
scribe advances based on an earlier security agreement, where no new agreement is exe-
cuted (as in Safe Deposit Bank). In the latter situation, under § 9-204(3) (and the interpreta-
tive language of Comment 5 to that section), the security agreement must specifically pro-
vide for later advances. This difference in usage accounts for the difference in result be-
tween Rivet and Safe Deposit Bank, and may also explain why the court in Coin-O-Matic
reached an incorrect result.
134 One writer has summarized this argument as follows:
A subsequent creditor will be most reluctant to lend funds on an agreement that
takes security in a previously encumbered asset. As long as the original creditor
has even one dollar remaining in the asset, it is possible for him to loan up to the
full loan value of the collateral and preempt any creditor who takes a junior se-
curity in the same collateral.
Note, Priorities of "Future Advances" Under Previously Perfected Security Interests and Article 9 of
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tively ties the debtor to one creditor, who can then gouge his help-
less customer by collecting hefty interest rates. In addition, they
argue that giving priority to the future advance lender reduces the
"loan value" of an asset. Although the debtor may have substantial
equity in an asset, no one will take it as security. In short, the
debtor is at the mercy of his initial creditor.
135
This just isn't so in the real world, say Coin-O-Matic critics. "[I]t
is a rare banker who will lend against the same collateral which
secures a prior loan; in our experience the commercial practice is
for the second lender to pay off the first and so take a first priority
as to all of the collateral.113 6 Critics also argue that the Coin-O-Matic
result undermines the notice-filing philosophy of Article Nine.
Consider this passage from a leading future advances case:
The whole purpose of notice filing would be nullified if a
finincing statement had to be filed whenever a new transaction
took place between a secured party and a debtor. Once a financ-
ing statement is on file describing property by type, the entire
world is warned, not only that the secured party may already
have a security interest in the property of that type . . . , but that
it may later acquire a perfected security interest in property of
the same type acquired by the debtor in the future.
37
Moreover, other provisions of Article Nine mitigate whatever
harshness future advance priority may produce. The Code allows a
debtor to terminate a financing statement when no future com-
mitment or existing obligation is covered by the collateral, 38 and
limits the time during which a financing statement is effective.' 39
the U.C.C., 58 MARQ. L. REv. 759, 766 (1975). This argument's bark is worse than its bite.
The second lender need only pay off the remaining one-dollar debt, obtain a termination
statement, and walk away with priority.
1I" For a commentary supporting Coin-O-Matic, which sets out these arguments at
greater length and with surer enthusiasm, see Note, supra note 134.
13' WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-4, at 908.
137 James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 292 Minn. 277, 290, 194 N.W.2d 775,
783, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 11, 24 (1972).
138 U.C.C. § 9-404(1). See Coogan, supra note 33, at 509-10.
13' See U.C.C. § 9-304(2). Gilmore has stated:
Article 9, unlike the earlier notice filing statutes, does provide a mechanism
whereby a debtor can have a financing statement removed from the files when
there are no outstanding obligations and no commitment by the secured party to
make future advances. Apart from agreements which commit the lender in ad-
vance, the debtor is not,.therefore, chained in perpetuity to the first filer: if he
wants to switch to a new source of financing, he can do so, on condition of paying
the first man off.
2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 34.4, at 908 (footnotes omitted).
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The purchase money priority rules may also provide an alternate
source of funds in certain circumstances.
41
The U.C.C. Review Committee was appalled by Coin-O-Matic:
"The Committee considered drafting a provision emphasizing its
disagreement with the Coin-o-Matic [sic] line of cases, but con-
cluded that the existing Code is clear enough, and should not be
disturbed just to overrule some lower court cases.' 41 The Commit-
tee reasoned that section 9-402(1), which expressly allows the filing
of a financing statement before the execution of a security agree-
ment, protects security interests covering future advances. 142 Com-
ment 5 to section 9-204(3), 14 3 cited in Coin-O-Matic, refers to the
operation of security agreements-not financing statements.1
44
Therefore, section 9-204(3) does not bar relation back of future
advances to the date of filing.'
45
One of the Code's 1972 amendments was section 9-312(7):
If future advances are made while a security interest is
perfected by filing or the taking of possession, the security in-
terest has the same priority for purposes of subsection (5) with
respect to the future advances as it does with respect to the first
advance .... 146
Although this passage was designed for the limited purpose of
establishing priorities between the future advancer and an inter-
vening pledgee, 147 it seems to solve most future advance priority
problems. Perhaps the drafters drew better than they knew.
The one future advances question left unsettled by section
9-312(7) arises when the initial advance is fully satisfied before
140 See text accompanying note 160 infra.
14 1 FINAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 227.
142 See id. at 226. Filing is intended to give notice of existing or future security interests
in specific collateral. It is not intended to relate to a specific security agreement. In re
Wilson, [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] SEc. TitANs. GUIDE (CCH) 52,215 (E.D. Tenn.,
Bankr. Ct. 1973) (summary of opinion) (single financing statement may support multiple
security agreements); Coogan, supra note 33, at 509.
143 Until 1972, and at the time Coin-O-Matic was decided, the relevant language of the
present Comment 5 was located in Comment 8.
""' See note 133 supra.
145 U.C.C. § 9-204, Comment 5 states: "Under subsection (3) collateral may secure
future as well as present advances when the security agreement so provides." (Emphasis added.)
But the same Comment redundantly emphasizes that § 9-204(3) has nothing to do with
filing. In fairness to the Coin-O-Matic court, it should be noted that this language was not
added to the Comment until 1972. Comment 5 thus provides a classic example of how the
Comments can be manipulated to create an ex post facto "legislative history." Such Com-
ments should carry limited weight in deciphering legislative intent.
146 U.C.C. § 9-312(7).
147 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 227.
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future advances are made. 148 In re Hagler,149 decided by Bank-
ruptcy Judge Clive W. Bare, involves precisely this issue. A has a
security interest in C's furniture, which has been perfected by fil-
ing. The security agreement expressly provides for extensions or
renewals of the original debt. B makes a loan to C, taking a security
interest in C's furniture. While filing, B discovers A's financing
statement. Understandably disturbed, B sends A a check for the
remainder of the debt. However, neither B nor C requests that A
terminate his financing statement. A makes subsequent advances to
C, relying on this earlier financing statement. Naturally, C goes
broke. The issue is who gets the furniture, and who gets stuck.
Judge Bare gave priority to B, relying on section 9-404, a
non-Code Tennessee statute, Coin-O-Matic, and his perception of
the equities. He concluded (1) that A had a duty to file a termina-
tion statement,15' and (2) that under the Code A was not entitled to
priority despite C's failure to terminate the financing statement,
emphasizing that A and C did not initially contemplate future
advances. 151
Under strictly a Code analysis (and Judge Bare speaks mostly
of the U.C.C.), the case is wrongly decided. Section 9-404 requires
that the secured party provide a termination statement "on written
demand by the debtor." Here -the debtor made no such request.
Absent termination, section 9-402(1) controls, and the filing re-
mains fully effective notwithstanding delayed attachment. The Re-
view Committee specifically addressed this problem. In discussing
Coin-O-Matic, it stated:
The Committee disapproves this line of cases, and believes that
an appropriate financing statement may perfect security interests
securing advances made under agreements not contemplated at
the time of the filing of the financing statement, even if the ad-
vances then contemplated have been fully paid in the interim.'
52
Even the equities did not cut as sharply in favor of the inter-
vening lender as Judge Bare suggested. The future advance lend-
er, backed by clear Code provisions, relied on his previously filed
14s Because a security interest must secure an obligation, when the debt has been en-
tirely paid off the security interest ceases to exist. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37), set out in part in
note 32 supra. Hence, § 9-312(7) will not apply.
1 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1285 (E.D. Tenn., Bankr. Ct. 1972).
i51 Id. at 1288.
151 Id. at 1289.
152 FINAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 226 (emphasis added).
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financing statement in making his second advance. 153 Moreover,
the second secured party could have easily obtained a termination
statement and avoided litigation altogether. Granting him priority
rewards his lack of diligence. As the Rivet court pointed out:
Because of the priority given to the first person to file a financ-
ing statement under the first-to-file rule of section 9312(5)(a), a
second lender must always proceed cautiously before he does any
financing of the debtor if there is already a financing statement
on file covering the collateral in which he is interested. If there is
such a prior filing, the second lender should do one of the fol-
lowing things:
(a) Insist that the record be cleared by the filing of a termi-
nation statement as to the financing statement which is on file. If
there is, in fact, no outstanding indebtedness between the first
lender and debtor, the debtor can demand such a termination
statement (§ 9404). The second lender should not simply rely on
the fact that he is satisfied that there is no actual loan outstand-
ing between the first lender and debtor for so long as the first fi-
nancing statement remains on file any subsequent advance made
by the first lender to debtor would be fatal to second lender's
rights under the first-to-file priority rule (§ 9312(5)(a)).
154
The future of future advances seems bright. The Code and
the Commissioners stand firmly behind them, regardless of
whether the debtor and lender contemplate additional advances
when. their dealings begin. But if the past is any guide to the
future, courts may well seek to avoid the occasionally harsh conse-
quences that unbending rules produce. If so, the practitioner must
emphasize not only the statutory scheme establishing the priority
of future advances, but the policies supporting it as well.
C. Purchase Money Security Interests-Special Priorities
Section 9-312 bestows special privileges on the purchase
money security interest, a phrase defined in section 9-107:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to
the extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure
all or part of its price; or
15' See 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 1286.
154In re Rivet, 299 F. Supp. 374, 379, 6 U.G.C. Rep. 460, 466 (E.D. Mich. 1969)
(quoting commentary of Professor Steinheimer).
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(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring
an obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire
rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact so
used.1
55
Section 9-312 gives purchase money security interests prior-
ity over prior perfected security interests if certain requirements
are met.156 Where a purchase money secured party fails to leap
through the statutory hoops, he will lose to a prior perfected party
claiming under an after-acquired property clause.1 57 Although the
statutory requirements lack complexity and the cost of noncom-
pliance is high, cases abound in which a purchase money secured
party loses priority by failing to take the simple steps prescribed in
subsections 9-312(3) and (4).158
The prejudice in favor of purchase money priority results par-
tially from longstanding pre-Code recognition. Conditional sales
agreements, in which the purchase money secured party could as-
sure himself of priority by retaining title, were an integral part
of pre-Code financing.' 59 More importantly, the special status of
purchase money security interests continues to provide an alternate
source of funds when a perfected creditor holding a security in-
terest in the debtor's after-acquired property refuses to extend
further credit. In this way, the purchase money exception facili-
tates commerce and reduces the potential unfairness created by
155 U.C.C. § 9-107.
156 Of course, a purchase money security interest cannot arise unless there is first a
security interest. Courts occasionally overlook this fact. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Smoker,
153 Ind. App. 71, 89, 286 N.E.2d 203, 214, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 10, 25 (unperfected purchase
money security interest found, although no valid security agreement executed), rehearing
denied, 153 Ind. App. 89, 287 N.E.2d 788 (1972).
157 E.g., National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., 346 Mass. 255, 258, 191
N.E.2d 471, 473, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 460, 462-63 (1963); Fan-Gil Corp. v. American Hosp.
Supply Corp., 49 Mich. App. 106, 110, 211 N.W.2d 561, 563, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 733, 735-36
(1973). See U.C.C. § 9-312(5).
158E.g., Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Esslair Endsley Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep.
176 (W.D. Mich. 1971); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. McCarthy, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1139 (Mass.
App. Div. 1975); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 526
(Minn. 1976); James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Natl Bank, 292 Minn. 277, 194 N.W.2d 775,
10 U.C.C. Rep. 11 (1972); Barry v. Bank of New Hampshire, 113 N.H. 158, 304 A.2d 879,
12 U.C.C. Rep. 732 (1973); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Lumbercraft East, Inc.,
13 U.C.C. Rep. 144 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973); National Cash Register Co. v. Mishkin's 125 St.,
Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 386, 317 N.Y.S.2d 436, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 411 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1970); Peoples
Bank v. Pied Piper Retreat, Inc., 209 S.E.2d 573, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1398 (W. Va. 1974).
159 U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 3. For a detailed discussion of pre-Code financing, see
Coogan, supra note 3, at 840-44.
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monopolization of credit. 61 1 Unlike the common law,' 6 ' the Code
broadly validates security interests in after-acquired property. 62
Special priorities for purchase money security interests balance this
development by limiting opportunities for abuse and providing
alternate avenues for the debtor in need of additional financing.
1. Lenders and Purchase Money Security Interests-Section 9-107
As section 9-107 makes clear, both sellers and lenders may
acquire purchase money security interests. Subsection (b), pertain-
ing to lenders, raises some difficult issues bearing on the determi-
nation of priorities.
First, this subsection requires that a lender's advance "enable"
the debtor to acquire rights in collateral.' 63 Gilmore argues that
after-the-fact advances may satisfy this requirement-that is, if a
bank makes advances against purchased goods to a buyer who uses
the advances to pay off the debt incurred through the purchase,
the bank has enabled the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral:
If the loan transaction appears to be closely allied to the pur-
chase transaction, that should suffice. The evident intent of para-
graph (b) is to free the purchase-money concept from artificial
limitations; rigid adherence to particular formalities and se-
quences should not be required.
6 4
Just such an argument was made-and rejected-in North
Platte State Bank v. Production Credit Association.' 65 Buyer purchased
cows on open account. Two months after taking possession, he
160 The purchase money preference also protects sellers and lenders who might other-
wise fear having their priority "taken away" by a future advance lender. See text accom-
panying notes 134 & 140 supra.
161 American Nat'l Bank v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 269 So. 2d 726, 731,
11 U.C.C. Rep. 682, 689 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (mortgage in after-acquired property void at
common law), rev'd, 296 So. 2d 32, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 19 (Fla. 1974). See also U.C.C. § 9-312,
Comment 3; 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 28.1, at 746.
162 See U.C.C. § 9-204(1). Comment 1 to § 9-204 explains:
Subsection (1) makes clear that a security interest arising by virtue of an
after-acquired property clause has equal status with a security interest in collateral
in which the debtor has rights at the time value is given under the security agree-
ment. That is to say: the security interest in after-acquired property is not merely
an "equitable" interest; no further action by the secured party-such as the taking
of a supplemental agreement covering the new collateral-is required.
16 3 Cf. In re Waltman, 4 SEC. TgRANs. GUIDE (CCH) 52,766 (S.D. Ala., Bankr. Ct.
1975) (security interests covering after-acquired property as well as collateral that advance
enabled debtor to buy held not purchase money security interests).
164 2 GILtoRE, supra note 3, § 29.2, at 782. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-5,
at 915.
165 189 Neb. 44, 200 N.W.2d 1, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1336 (1972) (alternate holding).
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obtained a loan from a bank and used it to pay off the seller. The
court held that the loan did not "enable" the debtor to obtain
"rights in or the use of collateral.' 66 Because the buyer had title
and possession, he already held all the rights he could possibly
have in the collateral. The bank's advance only enabled him to pay
a debt.' 67 Arguably, the North Platte result unduly emphasizes loca-
tion of title, the importance of which is substantially diluted by the
Code.'
68
Under section 9-107, value advanced for the acquisition of
collateral must be "in fact so used." The commentators emphasize
that lenders should draw checks payable to the seller to insure
compliance with this requirement. 69 Even this stratagem, however,
may not guarantee purchase money status, because the debtor may




2. Finding the Proper Purchase Money Rule-Section 9-109
Purchase money priority conflicts always raise a preliminary
question: Which subsection of section 9-312 applies? The answer
hinges on whether the collateral is inventory. If it is, subsection (3)
swings into operation. If it is not, subsection (4) controls.
Section 9-109 defines the various types of collateral. 17 1 Al-
'
66 Id. at 51-52, 200 N.W.2d at 6, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 1344. For a case interpreting
"rights in or the use of collateral," see Ingram v. Ozark Prod. Credit Ass'n, 468 F.2d 564,
11 U.C.C. Rep. 605 (5th Cir. 1972) ("rights in or use of collateral" not acquired as to
offspring of leased sows).
167 189 Neb. at 52, 200 N.W.2d at 6, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 1344.
168 U.C.C. § 9-202 provides:
Each provision of this Article with regard to rights, obligations and remedies
applies whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor.
See U.C.C. § 1-201(37), set out in part in note 32 supra.
169 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 29.2, at 781-82; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-5,
at 915.
0 E.g., Welcome Credit Union v. Capitol Bank & Trust Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 804
(Mass., Boston Mun. Ct. 1974) (D, who obtains check payable to seller from Bank 1 se-
cured by Car 1, negotiates check to seller, receiving cash and $1,000 credit; D receives
second check from Bank 2 secured by Car 2, which D buys with second check and $1,000
credit; held: Bank I does not have purchase money security interest in Car 2).
1I U.C.C. § 9-109 provides:
Goods are
(I) "consumer goods" if they are used or bought for use primarily for personal,
family or household purposes;
(2) "equipment" if they are used or bought for use primarily in business (includ-
ing farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-profit organization or a
governmental subdivision or agency or if the goods are not included in the defini-
tions of inventory, farm products or consumer goods;
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though distinguishing collateral is usually not difficult, problems
may arise.172 The status of collateral may change through transfer.
For example, cattle in a farmer's barn are farm products. In a
slaughterhouse they constitute inventory. 173 Hence, if the farmer
sells his cattle to the slaughterhouse on credit, and wishes to ac-
quire purchase money priority, he must meet the requirements of
section 9-312(3). As a practical matter, if it is unclear whether
collateral is inventory, caution counsels taking the few extra steps
necessary to comply with these requirements. It won't hurt, and it
may help immensely.
3. Purchase Money Security Interests in Inventory-Section 9-312(3)
What steps must be taken when the purchase money security
interest covers inventory? Section 9-312(3) lays them out:
A perfected purchase money security interest in inventory
has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same inven-
tory and also has priority in identifiable cash proceeds received
on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer if
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the
time the debtor receives possession of the inventory; and
(b) the purchase money secured party gives notification in
writing to the holder of the conflicting security interest if the
holder had filed a financing statement covering the same
types of inventory (i) before the date of the filing made by
the purchase money secured party, or (ii) before the begin-
(3) "farm products" if they are crops or livestock or supplies used or produced in
farming operations or if they are products of crops or livestock in their unmanu-
factured states (such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk and eggs), and
if they are in the possession of a debtor engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or
other farming operations. If goods are farm products they are neither equipment
nor inventory;
(4) "inventory" if they are held by a person who holds them for sale or lease or to
be furnished under contracts of se-vice or if he has so furnished them, or if they
are raw materials, work in process or materials used or consumed in a business.
Inventory of a person is not to be classified as his equipment.
172 See, e.g., In re Hein's Nursery, Inc., 4 SEc. TRANS. GUIDE (CCH) 52,837 (S.D.
Fla. 1976) (summary of opinion) (relying on "principal use" analysis, court categorized
nursery's potted plants as inventory rather than farm products), rev'g 4 SEc. TRANs. GUIDE
(CCH) 52,687 (S.D. Fla., Bankr. Ct. 1975) (summary of opinion).
1
7 3 See First State Bank v. Maxfield, 485 F.2d 71, 74 (10th Cir. 1973) (where debtor
both raised and traded cattle, cattle held for trade constituted inventory rather than farm
products); First Nat'l Bank v. Smoker, 153 Ind. App. 71, 81, 286 N.E.2d 203, 209, 11
U.C.C. Rep. 10, 19 (1972) (upon sale to packer, cattle no longer constituted farm products,
but rather inventory). Cf. United States v. Mid-States Sales Co., 336 F. Supp. 1099, 1102,
10 U.C.C. Rep. 703, 708 (D. Neb. 1971) (dairy cattle added to farmer's herd not inventory;
filing within 10-day grace period therefore gave seller purchase money priority).
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ning of the 21 day period where the purchase money se-
curity interest is temporarily perfected without filing or pos-
session (subsection (5) of Section 9-304); and
(c) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the
notification within five years before the debtor receives pos-
session of the inventory; and
(d) the notification states that the person giving the notice
has or expects to acquire a purchase money security interest
in inventory of the debtor, describing such inventory by item
or type.
1 74
If his security interest is in inventory, the purchase money
secured party must perfect before his debtor receives possession of
the collateral. 175 This maximizes the probability that other parties,
particularly buyers not in the ordinary course of business, will dis-
cover the prior interest.1
76
The key, however, to purchase money priority under section
9-312(3) is notice, although notification need only be given to pre-
viously perfected secured parties who perfected by filing. 177 Prior
to 1972, section 9-312(3) did not specifically require notice in
writing, and at least one court held that oral notification was suffi-
cient.' 78 The statute now explicitly requires written notice.' 79 Like a
financing statement, notification is effective for five years-an-
other result of the 1972 amendments .
8 0
At least two significant notice issues remain, however, both of
which were addressed in the pre-amendment case of Fedders Finan-
cial Corp. v. Chiarelli Brothers.'s In Fedders, a financing company
claiming priority through a purchase money security interest in the
174 U.C.C. § 9-312(3).
17 For discussion of the difficult question of when a "debtor receives possession," see
notes 229-65 and accompanying text infra.
176 See U.C.C. § 9-307.
177 "Revised subsection 9-312(3) thus clarifies, among other things, (a) that a secured
party need not notify another secured party who is known to the holder of the purchase
money security interest, but who has not filed a financing statement . Bernstein &
Fleisher, supra note 57, at 322 (emphasis in original).
17' See GAG Credit Corp. v. Small Bus. Admin., 323 F. Supp. 795, 798 (W.D. Mo.
1971) (notification by telephone satisfied 1962 version of § 9-312(3)).
179 U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b).
180 U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(c). The burden of proof regarding compliance with the notice
provisions of § 9-312(3) apparently rests on the purchase money secured party. See Doug-
las-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Esslair Endsley Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. 176, 191 (W.D.
Mich. 1971), in which the court concluded: "There is no evidence nor claim before the
court that the Bank complied with the notice provisions of § 9312(3). Therefore, the
priority provision of [§ 9-312(3)] is of no benefit to the Bank."
"" 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 224, 289 A.2d 169, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 880 (1972).
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debtor's air conditioner inventory had provided the following
notification to a prior perfected bank:
Fedders Financial Corporation has, or expects to acquire, pur-
chase money security interest in certain inventory of [Chiarelli],
and the proceeds therefrom, which inventory consists of: air
conditioners, dehumidifiers, convectors, unit heaters, heating
equipment, ranges, refrigerators, washers, ironers, dryers, dish-
washers, sewing machines and other domestic and commercial
appliances or the like and accessories and replacement parts for
any such merchandise, and the proceeds thereof 18 2
The court correctly concluded that section 9-110183 required only a
reasonable identification of the goods, and that the notification's
explicit reference to "air conditioners" satisfied this require-
ment. 1 4 As the Comment to section 9-110 points out:
The test of sufficiency of a description laid down by this section
is that the description do the job assigned to it-that it make
possible the identification of the thing described. Under this rule
courts should refuse to follow the holdings, often found in the
older chattel mortgage cases, that descriptions are insufficient
unless they are of the most exact and detailed nature, the so-
called "serial number" test.1'
The purpose of description coincides with that of notification:
to warn the secured party not to lend against certain collateral, at
least until he has taken appropriate precautions. 1 86 "Overdescrip-
tion" is harmless. It merely puts the prior lender on greater guard
than "serial number" notification. The lender is not prohibited
from making additional advances against later-acquired inventory;
he need only assure himself that it has not been newly encum-
182 Id. at 230, 289 A.2d at 172, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 884.
183 U.C.C. § 9-110 provides:
For the purposes of this Article any description of personal property or real estate
is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is de-
scribed.
184 221 Pa. Super. Ct. at 230, 289 A.2d at 172, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 884-85.
185 U.C.C. § 9-110, Comment.
186 U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 3, states:
A fraudulent debtor may apply to the secured party for advances even though he
has already given a security interest in the inventory to another secured party.
The notification requirement protects the inventory financer in such a situation: if
he has received notification, he will presumably not make an advance; if he has
not received notification (or if the other interest does not qualify as a purchase
money interest), any advance he may make will have priority.
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bered. Of course, debtors should be careful lest such sweeping
notices scare off their original inventory financers.
The reasonable-notice rule complements the other require-
ments of section 9-312(3). Exact description of collateral may not
be possible until the debtor comes into possession. But if the se-
cured creditor is to obtain purchase money priority, perfection,
which generally requires filing, must occur before possession,'
87
and notification must precede filing.' 88 Hence, the reasonable-
notice rule allows creation of a purchase money security interest
where specific description prior to possession is impossible or im-
practicable. Moreover, the reasonableness test avoids defeat on
technicalities, such as incorrect recording of serial numbers. 8 9 It
eliminates the need for frequent notification-a potential nuisance
for both prior and purchase money creditors. Finally, it recognizes
the purchase money creditor's desire for flexibility and his impa-
tience with needless technicality.
Fedders also raised and resolved a second issue: whether the
purchase money secured party must provide notice before acquir-
ing each of several purchase money security interests. In Fedders,
air conditioners financed by the financing company were periodi-
cally shipped to the debtor, Chiarelli. Although notice was given on
December 22, 1966, several air conditioners were not sent until
sixteen months later, at which time the purchase money lender's
security interest in those air conditioners attached. The court flatly
rejected the argument that the Code required notice prior to each
delivery:
The Code contains no provision which would require a
separate notification each time goods are shipped to a dealer. It
is apparent, however, from comment 3 to § 9-312 that the reason
for notification of other creditors is to allow them to avoid a
fraudulent debtor who "may apply to the secured party for ad-
vances even though he has already given a security interest in the
inventory to another secured party". Once appellant was in-
187 U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(a).
188 U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b)(i).
18 9 See In re Reiser, 4 SEC. TRANS. GUIDE (CCH) 52,832 (W.D. Wis., Bankr. Ct., Oct.
28, 1976) (summary of opinion) (one-digit error in financing statement's serial number not
fatal when cows otherwise accurately described); Adams v. Nuffer, 4 SEC. TRANS. GUIDE
(CCH) 52,822 (Utah 1976) (under liberal Code approach, financing statement not invali-
dated by incorrect recording of serial number). But see In re Arragon Indus., Inc., 4 SEC.
TRANS. GUIDE (CCH) 52,520 (S.D. Fla., Bankr. Ct. 1973) (summary of opinion) (incorrect
recording of serial numbers resulted in insufficient description and lost priority; court
cited risk of "heading off" further inquiry by later creditors).
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formed of the relationship between appellee [the financing
company] and Chiarelli, it certainly could have ascertained the
nature and status of that relationship from appellee and pro-
tected itself against a fraudulent debtor. Furthermore, appellant
has not made any allegation that it gave new value to Chiarelli
after December 22, 1966.19'
The court's reasoning is sound. 191 The single-notice rule eliminates
administrative problems for the purchase money secured party,
while putting the original lender on guard as to the status of sub-
sequent advances. Written notice minimizes the chances of forgot-
ten notice. The five-year lifespan of notification, an innovation of
the 1972 amendments, also supports the court's conclusion. Since a
single notice concerning a single transaction remains effective for
five years, it is difficult to see why the same notification should lose
effect before that period has elapsed merely because it covers a
series of transactions.
92
Although the Fedders court points out that the prior perfected
party made no advances against the after-acquired property, this
factor should be irrelevant. The purpose of the notice requirement
is to give fair warning to the prior perfected lender. If he nonethe-
less chooses to make additional advances, that is his business-and
perhaps his loss.
4. Purchase Money Security Interests in Noninventory-
Section 9-312(4)
Section 9-312(4) gives special treatment to noninventory pur-
chase money security interests:
A purchase money security interest in collateral other than
inventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the
same collateral or its proceeds if the purchase money security
interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of
the collateral or within ten days thereafter. 193
It is important to note the differences in the Code's treatment of
inventory and noninventory purchase money security interests.
"' 221 Pa. Super. Ct. at 231, 289 A.2d at 173, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 885.
191 Gilmore, commenting on former § 9-312, agrees with the Fedders court. 2 GILMORE,
supra note 3, § 29.3, at 788-89.
192 At least one commentator finds the five-year notice rule dispositive of this issue. See
Balint, supra note 46, at 316. The Review Committee apparently agrees. See FINAL REPORT,
supra note 50, at 113. Even if this view is correct, the issue remains important in jurisdic-
tions where the 1972 amendments are not in force.
193 U.C.C. § 9-312(4).
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The first distinction emerges from the opening words of the
two applicable provisions. While section 9-312(3) protects the "per-
fected purchase money security interest," section 9-312(4) omits
the word "perfected." Of course, section 9-312(4) goes on to re-
quire perfection within ten days after the debtor comes into posses-
sion of the collateral. But the omission and the lapse provision, 19 4
coupled with a literal reading of section 9-312, suggest one extra-
ordinary outcome.
Consider these facts: A lends C $10,000. C's later-acquired
lawn mowers secure the debt, which is to be paid back over the
next ten years. A promptly and properly files.
One year later B sells a lawn mower to C for $7,000 and takes
a purchase money security interest. The debt is to be paid over the
next nine years. B executes a security agreement and files a financ-
ing statement before C receives possession. Deciding to play it safe,
B also supplies A with sufficient notice to satisfy section 9-312(3).
At the end of five years, A files a continuation statement, main-
taining uninterrupted perfection. B, however, forgets about the
five-year limit, and fails to refile. In the eighth year, C defaults. In-
credibly, who gets the lawn mower depends upon what type of
collateral the lawn mower turns out to be.
195
Assume C is a lawn mower dealer. The mower in his hands is
inventory, and section 9-312(3) applies. In the seventh year B does
not have a "perfected security interest in inventory." Therefore,
even though he complied with section 9-312(3)'s notice and perfec-
tion requirements, B loses to A.
But what if C is a professional lawn cutter? The mower be-
comes equipment, and section 9-312(4) applies. That subsection
does not require that B's purchase money security interest be per-
fected. B meets the requirements of section 9-312(4) and takes
priority, much to the chagrin of his perplexed, perfected com-
petitor. 1
96
No doubt the omission of "perfected" in section 9-312(4) re-
sulted from a slip of the drafter's pen. The Comment ignores the
194 See notes 70-74 and accompanying text supra.
195 Section 9-109, set out in note 171 supra, provides the statutory categories for clas-
sifying goods as inventory, equipment, consumer goods, or farm products.
196 A hybrid hypothetical can also be constructed: Assume that C holds the world's
greatest collection of lawn mowers. He doesn't sell them. He doesn't use them. He only
looks at them. His lawn mowers are consumer goods, and § 9-312(4) controls. But in this
case B's security interest perfected automatically (U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d)), and remains per-
fected despite B's failure to refile. Hence, B takes priority without reliance on the strange
omission in § 9-312(4).
[Vol. 62:834
ARTICLE NINE PRIORITY RULES
distinction, and policy frowns on the result. Of course, only a
bizarre pattern of facts will give rise to this equally bizarre
outcome.' 97 But aside from the exceptions provided by sections
9-401 and 9-316, this is perhaps the only case in which the Code
subordinates a perfected security interest to an unperfected
challenger.
198
A second basis for distinction between subsections (3) and (4) is
the latter's omission of a notice requirement. Comment 3 explains:
"Since an arrangement for periodic advances against incoming
property is unusual outside the inventory field, no notification re-
quirement is included in subsection (4)."199
Third, section 9-312(4) provides a ten-day grace period follow-
ing the debtor's receipt of possession during which the purchase
money secured party may perfect and take priority. The grace
period represents a compromise among conflicting considera-
tions. 2"1 The possibility that another creditor may rely on the debt-
or's possessory rights in making future advances or in executing
a security agreement favors prompt perfection, perhaps before
possession. Furthermore, buyers not in the ordinary course of
business may rely on the absence of a filed financing statement. 1'
But debtors seldom sell noninventory-not, at least, within ten days
after taking possession. This fact of commercial life limits the need
to protect unsuspecting buyers.20 2 A pre-possession perfection re-
quirement might needlessly disrupt sales by forcing sellers to delay
delivery. Moreover, creditors leery of a competing purchase money
security interest can guard against disaster simply by waiting until
ten days after delivery to make advances against collateral in the
debtor's possession.
The fourth and most important distinction between subsec-
197 As the discussion suggests, lapse of perfection will bring about this strange result
under § 9-312(4). Section 9-312(3), although requiring perfection, also fails to deal with
lapse. Consider these facts: In 1970, A obtains a security interest in C's after-acquired
property and properly perfects. In 1971, B sells and delivers inventory to C, and obtains a
timely perfected purchase money security interest. A files a continuation statement in 1975;
B does not file a continuation statement in 1976, and his perfection lapses. In 1977, C
defaults. B takes possession of the inventory, thus re-perfecting his security interest. Admit-
tedly, these facts are outrageously bizarre, but it is arguable that B takes priority because,
unlike § 9-312(5), § 9-312(3) does not expressly require continuous perfection.
198 For the bankruptcy implications of this unusual outcome, see note 83 supra, and
notes 329-30 and accompanying text infra.
199 U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 3.2 " See 26 CASE W. RES. L. Rv. 708, 718-19 (1976).
201 See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-307.
202 See Coogan, supra note 3, at 863 n.93.
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tions (3) and (4) is their varying treatment of proceeds. While sec-
tion 9-312(4) extends purchase money priority to proceeds arising
from a sale of the collateral, section 9-312(3) limits its application to
"identifiable cash proceeds received on or before the delivery
of the inventory to a buyer." In short, section 9-312(4) extends
purchase money protection to accounts, while section 9-312(3) does
not. This distinction is rooted in business practice. Most accounts
are generated through the sale of inventory. Granting purchase
money priority to inventory proceeds would therefore discourage
accounts lending, a method of financing much more common and
workable than lending against inventory. 20 3 "Hence, the principal
value of a purchase money security interest in inventory will be in
those situations where the supplier will be able to reclaim unsold
inventory in the event of debtor's default. '20 4 Noninventory, such
as equipment or consumer goods, seldom produces accounts. Be-
cause the general rule extends priority to proceeds of collateral,
20 5
and account financers infrequently rely on accounts arising from
the sale of noninventory, 20 6 section 9-312(4) extends purchase
money priority to proceeds arising from noninventory.
20 7
203 See Balint, supra note 46, at 317 n.41:
Accounts receivable financing has been replacing inventory financing. A purchase
money priority in inventory would be difficult to trace into accounts if the af-
fected inventory were only part of the goods sold. In addition, accounts financing
is intricate -and not easily or safely terminated on the receipt of the purchase mon-
ey lender's notice.
Consider also these comments sent to the authors by the president of a middle-sized mid-
western bank:
The reason why banks prefer to loan on receivables is probably two-fold. One is
the liquidiy of the loan. In case the balloon goes up we can sit back and let the
receivables come in and pay off the note. . . .Taking over inventory is time-
consuming-and a problem in public relations with possible suits from other cred-
itors who are usually local customers of the bank. Also, as you know, to move
inventory we have to turn the key in the door of the business and this creates
problems and hardships for the employees. All of our credits-which rely princi-
pally on the inventory-are loans made where the inventory is fully marketable,
i.e., new automobiles, oil, paper.
Letter from Gus A. Zuehlke to Dan Coenen (Nov. 10, 1976) (emphasis in original). See
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-4, at 909; Coogan, supra note 33, at 517.
204 Balint, supra note 46, at 318.
205 U.C.C. § 9-306. See generally U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 4.
206 See U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 3.
207 The 1972 amendment of § 9-306 works at least one change in proceeds priorities
for the holder of a purchase money security interest. Suppose A lends money to C, a
farmer, to buy cattle. A perfects by filing within 10 days, but does not check the box on the
form financing statement referring to proceeds. B, a prior filer with a security interest in
C's after-acquired cattle, takes possession of the cattle upon C's default. The cattle are
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D. Purchase Money Security Interests--Special Problems
Subsections 9-312(3) and (4) have produced some of the most
heated issues in Article Nine litigation. The most important are
explored below.
1. Equity and the After-Acquired Property Clause
The place is Florida. The year, 1972. A majority of the state
district court has just awarded a first-filing bank a defaulting
debtor's farm equipment over a purchase money seller who failed
to perfect his security interest within section 9-312(4)'s ten-day
grace period. The speaker is Judge Rawls. "The law is an ass," he
exclaims. 20 8 Accusing his colleagues in the majority of "unduly em-
phasizing the formalistic language of the Uniform Commercial
Code," he argues that the bank's after-acquired property interest is
limited to the buyer's equity in the collateral. 20 9 Nonplussed, he
asks: "How did the bank acquire as security for its debt property
that the debtor did not even own?"2 10
Two years later, in International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Ameri-
can National Bank, 2 1 the Florida Supreme Court answered Judge
Rawls by agreeing that a security interest in after-acquired prop-
erty is indeed limited to the buyer's equity.
212
In an opinion fraught with generalizations, the higher court
cited "contractual constitutional requirements," "avoidance of un-
just enrichment," "logical and traditional equitable reasons," and "a
windfall not favored by the code" to support its conclusion.2 1 3 A
reader of the opinion can only conclude with Judge Rawls that at
times the law is indeed an ass.21 4
auctioned, producing cash proceeds. Under the pre-1972 Code, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court awarded priority to B, reasoning that A's perfection lapsed, 10 days after the cattle
were sold. Barth Bros. v. Billings, 68 Wis. 2d 80, 92-93, 227 N.W.2d 673, 679-80, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 237, 246 (1975) (alternate holding). Under the new Code, however, perfection
continues if "a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds are
identifiable cash proceeds." U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b). Hence, A's purchase money security in-
terest in C's cattle would continue as a perfected security interest in the proceeds arising
from sale. Moreover, new § 9-312(4) grants purchase money priority in collateral or its
proceeds. Hence, A wins under the new Code.
208 American Nat'l Bank v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 269 So.2d 726, 731,
11 U.C.C. Rep. 682, 690 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (concurring and dissenting opinion), rev'd,
296 So. 2d 32, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 19 (Fla. 1974).
209 269 So. 2d at 731-32, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 690.
210 Id. at 732, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 690.
211 296 So. 2d 32, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 19 (Fla. 1974).
212 Id. at 34-35, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 23-24.
213Id.
214 "It is not acceptable in these times for courts, any courts, to thwart the expressed
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Running through the court's opinion is a patent aversion to
Article Nine's rejection of title theory. But the court carried things
much too far.215 The Code nowhere suggests that for purposes of
after-acquired property clauses, property equals equity.21 6 Com-
ment 2 to section 9-204 states: "This Article validates a security
interest in the debtor's existing and future assets." '2
17
The majority opinion in International Harvester has received a
rash of criticism, 218 including a stinging dissent.219 The case stands
alone in restricting security interests in after-acquired property,
and numerous other courts have held to the contrary, at least by
implication. 22" As one practical commentator has stated: "Warning
to secured sellers: Don't count on the Florida decision to attract a
following. Be sure to comply timewise and otherwise with section
9-312(3) or section 9-312(4), as the case may be, to obtain special
priority, in case there are prior filers as to the type of collateral. '22 '
2. Competing Purchase Money Security Interests
A wants to buy a $2,000 tractor. B lends him $1,000. The next
day A buys the tractor from C, making a down payment of the
$1,000 he received from B, and agreeing to pay C the remaining
$1,000 over the next two years. The day before A obtains posses-
sion, B files. C files twelve minutes later. A goes bankrupt, and the
tractor is sold for $1,000. It is clear that both B and C have priority
over any previously perfected security interest in A's after-acquired
property.2 22 But between B and C, who--if either-has priority?
2 23
purposes of a modern commercial law. The Uniform Commercial Code is too important to
the economy of our country for judicial disagreement with its aims to be manifested in
clearly wrong decisions." R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 15 (1973). See Mammoth Gave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. York, 429
S.W.2d 26, 28, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 11, 14 (Ky. 1968) (failure to apply Code as written will lead
to commercial confusion).
215 The Code plainly rejects the notion that location of title is controlling (see U.C.C.
§ 9-202, set out in note 168 supra), and requires only that the debtor have "rights in the
collateral," rather than title to the property, for a security interest to attach. U.C.C.
§ 9-203(1)(c).
216 For a leading tax case addressing the same definitional dispute, see Crane v. Com-
missioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1947).
217 U.C.C. § 9-204, Comment 2 (emphasis added).
21' See 26 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 708 (1976); 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 150 (1975); 5 MENI.
ST. U.L. REV. 133 (1974). See generally 7 U.C.C. L.J. 191 (1974).
219 296 So. 2d at 35, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 25.
220 See cases cited in 296 -So. 2d at 45, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 39; cases cited in note 158
supra.
21 Skilton, supra note 121, at 950 (emphasis in original).
222 U.C.C. § 9-312(4).
221 For a slight variation on this theme, see 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 456 (1970). For another
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White and Summers tersely conclude that section 9-312(5)
controls, and that B therefore prevails.
If Bank lends the downpayment, seller lends the rest and each
file within ten days, both (and therefore neither) are "entitled to
the special priority" in subsection (4). Although one might argue
that such creditors should share pro rata and neither receive
priority, we believe that the proper rule is to go to the subsection
(5) residuary clause and award priority to the winner there.
224
At least one court agrees.225
Although the Code's language seems to require this ap-
proach,226 sound policy favors pro rata distribution between com-
peting purchase money creditors. 2 7 A pro rata rule would elimi-
nate the need for a race to the courthouse between two secured
parties who gave credit at about the same time. It would reduce
the uncertainty of purchase money creditors, and encourage co-
operation between them. It would reduce the debtor's opportu-
example of how competing purchase money security interests might arise, see Comment,
Section 9-312 of the Uniform Commercial Code-Resolution of Existing Problems--the Redraft by the
Review Committee for Article 9, 19 WAYNE L. REv. 1223, 1236-37 (1973) (buyer trades in first
creditor's noninventory collateral; first creditor claims new collateral as proceeds). For a
general treatment of conflicting purchase money security interests, see IA COOGAN, Ho-
GAN, & VAGTS, supra note 33, § 19.02[3][a], at 1980-83, § 19.04[3][b), at 1999-2001.
224 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-5, at 920.
225 See Framingham U.A.W. Credit Union v. Dick Russell Pontiac, Inc., 41 Mass. App.
Dec. 146, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 252 (1969). Although Framingham clearly held that § 9-312(5)
settles priority disputes between competing purchase money security interests, the court
reached an incorrect result on the facts. The collateral in this case was an automobile.
Since Massachusetts does not require filing to perfect security interests in automobiles
(contra, U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d)), and since security interests in consumer goods perfect au-
tomatically (id.), the security interests of both the lender and the seller became perfected
when the debtor received rights in the collateral. (The purchase money lender executed a
security agreement before the buyer and the seller entered into their conditional sales
contract.) Hence, the security interests were perfected simultaneously, and the collateral
should have been prorated between both purchase money creditors. Professors White and
Summers agree with the Framingham result, arguing that the lender's security interest did
not attach until the buyer acquired title. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-5, at 920
n.40. But location of title is irrelevant to the acquisition of a security interest. U.C.C.
§ 9-202. The Code requires only that the debtor have rights in the collateral. U.C.C.
§ 9-203(1)(c). At the same time that the debtor in Framingham acquired rights to which the
seller's security interest attached, the bank's security interest attached as well.
226 See U.C.C. § 9-312(5), set out in text accompanying note 46 supra.
227 Significantly, the Code fails to provide for pro rata distribution of collateral when
competing secured parties have equal priority, although the commentators agree that pro
rata distribution is the answer to the equal priority problem. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 3,
§ 34.5, at 913. See also 22 BAYLOR L. REv. 456, 460-61 (1970) (U.C.C. § 9-314(2) deemed
relevant by analogy). Moreover, the term "pro rata" requires definition. Surely equity
favors proration based on the balance due each creditor, rather than on the extent of each
initial contribution. See id. at 461-62.
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nities to engage in fraud. Indeed, it would advance the under-
lying purpose of the purchase money priority rules: to furnish the
moneyless debtor with property to put up as collateral in borrow-
ing additional funds. Under a strict application of section 9-312(5),
if C discovered B's prior filing, he would, no doubt, refuse to sell. A
would then find himself right where he started, with no tractor and
nowhere to get funds. 22 8 At worst, the skeptic retorts, this result
will eliminate dual-creditor purchase money financing. But dual
financing between lender and seller is a useful and common com-
mercial practice. For creditors, it spreads the risk of loss. For debt-
ors, it may provide the only available method of financing.
3. Purchase Money Priority-Debtors and Possession
Under subsections 9-312(3) and (4), effective perfection of a
purchase money security interest hinges on when the "debtor re-
ceives possession." These three words have sparked the hottest
controversy under section 9-312 in recent years. For purposes of
the section, when does a "debtor" receive "possession"? The word
"debtor" is defined in section 9-105(l)(d):
"Debtor" means the person who owes payment or other perfor-
mance of the obligation secured, whether or not he owns or has
rights in the collateral .... 229
The Code does not define "possession," perhaps because its
meaning varies in different contexts. 23" As normally used in the
Code and at common law, however, the term implies physical con-
trol of property.2 31 The degree of control necessary for possession
228 Consider the observation made by the court in Framingham:
This result is in accord with common sense in that the plaintiff credit union
could not possibly obtain an interest in the collateral supposedly securing its loan
unless and until defendant, the owner, was willing to put an interest in the collat-
eral in [the buyer's] hands under the conditional sale. This presumably it would
not be willing to do without retaining an interest in the collateral superior to all
other interests therein. Obviously, it would not part with the collateral, if by so
doing it was vesting in another party a security interest superior to its own,
41 Mass. App. Dec. at 152, 7 U.C.C. Rep. at 255-56.
229 U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(d).
23" "Possession" may have different meanings in different sections of the Code. For
example, a seller may have physical control of property, but if his possession precedes
relinquishment of the property to the debtor, it is doubtful whether his security interest is
perfected through possession. See U.C.C. § 9-305. The key to § 9-305 is the demonstration
of "ostensible ownership which indicates the perfected security interest to other potential
creditors." In re Automated Bookbinding Servs., Inc., 471 F.2d 546, 554, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
897, 908 (4th Cir. 1972).
231 "[A] person who is in possession of a chattel is one who ... has physical control of
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depends on the nature of the collateral. 23 2
The "debtor receives possession" question first arose in Brodie
Hotel Supply, Inc. v. United States.233 A sold restaurant equipment to
B, A's lessee,2 34 who shortly thereafter went bankrupt. A recovered
the property, but left it in the restaurant. C, with A's permission,
reopened the restaurant. For five months A and C negotiated a
purchase price for the restaurant equipment. Meanwhile, D lent
money to C, took a security interest in the restaurant equipment,
and promptly filed a financing statement. A and C then agreed
upon a purchase price for the equipment, and executed a sale and
security agreement. A filed within ten days of execution. The court
a chattel with the intent to exercise such control in his behalf, or otherwise than as a
servant on behalf of another .... ." RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 1, Comment 2, at 6
(1941). For examples of cases applying the physical control definition to § 9-312(4), see In
re Automated Bookbinding Servs., Inc., 471 F.2d 546, 551-53, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 897, 906-07
(4th Cir. 1972) (quoting 2 GxLmoPE, supra note 3, § 29.3, at 787); North Platte State Bank v.
Production Credit Ass'n, 189 Neb. 44, 50, 200 N.W.2d 1, 5, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1336, 1342
(1972); Barth Bros. v. Billings, 68 Wis. 2d 80, 90-91, 227 N.W.2d 673, 678-79, 17 U.C.C.
Rep. 237, 244-45 (1975). See also IA COOGAN, HOGAN, & VAGTS, supra note 33, § 19.02(3][a],
at 1979, where the authors comment:
The time at which the debtor receives possession starts the running of the
ten-day grace period for perfection. Problems will undoubtedly arise as to when
the debtor "receives possession" of the collateral. The Code does not offer a
specific definition of the term, but there are indications that actual delivery to the
buyer or to a third party is crucial. It is important to realize that this priority rule
turns on the more easily ascertained time of receipt of possession and not upon
the time the debtor obtains "rights" in the collateral.
131 Consider Barth Bros. v. Billings, 68 Wis. 2d 80, 227 N.W.2d 673, 17 U.C.C. Rep.
237 (1975), in which the trial court ruled that a creditor did not perfect by taking posses-
sion because "'he didn't go out there in the barn and corral all his cows into a separate
portion of the yard. They were still all running together. I don't know how you-to take
possession he would have had to segregate his cows, I would think.'" Id. at 90-91, 227
N.W.2d at 679, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 245 (quoting trial court). The Supreme Court of Wis-
consin agreed. See Transport Equip. Co. v. Guaranty State Bank, 518 F.2d 377, 381, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 1, 6 (10th Cir. 1975) (mere presence of employees at warehouse not posses-
sion where collateral could be loaded on trucks; case distinguished where secured party
holds key to locked building); In re Bialk, 4 SEC. TRANS. GUIDE (CCH) 52,330 (W.D.
Mich., Bankr. Ct. 1974) (summary of opinion) (creditor's possession of keys to safe deposit
box not sufficient for possessory perfection of security interest in box's contents). Dun-
ham's Music House, Inc. v. Asheville Theatres, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 242, 247, 178 S.E.2d 124,
127 (1970) (lessor-creditor perfected by taking possession of leased building containing
collateral); Production Credit Ass'n v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 4 SEC. TRANS. GUIDE (CCH)
52,558 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1975) (summary of opinion) (where debtor filed more than 10 days
after receiving first two items of equipment, but before receiving two other items, debtor
did not "receive possession" until arrival of all items, because first two could not be used
without second two).
233 431 F.2d 1316, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 113 (9th Cir. 1970).
234 The opinion does not expressly state that B was A's lessee. However, B's control
over the restaurant suggests that this relationship existed.
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granted purchase money priority to A, reasoning that there was no
"obligation secured" by the collateral until execution of the sales
contract and security agreement. 35 Therefore, C was not a
"debtor" until the security agreement came into being. A had ten
days after execution of the security agreement, rather than ten
days after C's taking of possession, to perfect and take priority.
In re Automated Bookbinding Services, Inc.2 3 6 involved similar
facts, but produced a different result. A contracted to sell book-
binders to B, and executed a security agreement. The contract re-
quired A to install and test the machines. A filed within ten days of
installation, but more than ten days after delivery of the machine
parts.
Both the district court and the court of appeals focused on the
"possession" issue.
The district court granted A purchase money priority over C,
who held a security interest in B's equipment, ruling that B did not
obtain possession until A tendered delivery. Tender of delivery,
the court reasoned, could not take place until installation was
completed.23 7
The court of appeals reversed, giving three reasons. First, it
rejected the tender of delivery rationale as a sales concept inappli-
cable to secured creditors.238 Second, the court argued that adopt-
ing the tender theory would allow secured creditors to avoid filing
altogether:
Secured parties are required, in most cases, to file a financ-
ing statement in order to perfect their security interest. To de-
fine "possession" as requiring completion of tender of delivery
terms would permit a secured creditor to delay performance of a
tender of delivery term, and thereby avoid the filing require-
ment indefinitely.
2 39
235 431 F.2d at 1319, 8 U.C.C. Rep. at 116. Under the court's reasoning it appears that
both a sales contract and a security agreement must be executed before the buyer becomes
a "debtor" within the meaning of § 9-105(1)(d), since the buyer's "obligation" does not
come into existence until the sales contract is made, and that obligation will not be "se-
cured" until execution of the security agreement. As a practical matter, parties usually in-
corporate both agreements into one document, commonly referred to as a conditional
sales agreement.
236 471 F.2d 546, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 897 (4th Cir.), rev'g 336 F. Supp. 1128, 10 U.C.C.
Rep. 209 (D. Md. 1972).
237 336 F. Supp. at 1134-35, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 218.
238 471 F.2d at 553, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 907.
23 9 Id.
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Finally, the court reasoned that the lower court's interpretation
would undermine the Code's purpose of providing "a precise
guide for commercial transactions under which businessmen may
predict with confidence the results of their dealings. 2 4 1 The court
feared that a second creditor, upon finding the debtor in posses-
sion of property without a financing statement on file, might lend
against the machinery in ignorance of the seller's competing in-
terest.
Despite the looming presence of the same policy problems in
Brodie, the court distinguished that case as one in which the debtor
was in possession before the goods were sold and the security
agreement was executed. 241 Hence, the Bookbinding court did not
discuss the "debtor" issue.
242
But the next important case, James Talcott, Inc. v. Associates
Capital Co., 243 does. In that case, A delivered equipment to B on
February 17. On February 25, A and B executed a lease-option
agreement. On March 3, A filed. The court refused to give A
purchase money priority. Although the court addressed the debtor
issue, it sidestepped a direct confrontation with the underlying
weakness of the Brodie analysis by holding that B was a "debtor" in
"possession" more than ten days before A filed. Forced to distin-
guish Brodie, the court pointed to the February 25 lease-option
agreement, which specifically stated that B's lease began on Feb-
ruary 17. Hence, the court reasoned, B was a "debtor" as of that
date.
244
This distinction points up the fragility of Brodie. The court's
reasoning in Talcott compels the conclusion that, in order to obtain
purchase money priority, A would merely have had to write into the
2 40 Id. at 552, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 905.
24! Id. at 553 n. 14, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 907 n. 14.
242 Arguably the buyer in Bookbinding-as in Brodie-was not a "debtor" when it ob-
tained possession. Clearly the seller's installation of the machinery was a condition prece-
dent to the buyer's obligation to pay, since the seller's invoice specifically required payment
after installation. See also U.C.C. § 2-507. The interesting issue this raises is whether under
these circumstances the buyer "owes payment or other performance"-a requirement of
becoming a debtor under § 9-105(1)(d). Until the seller installed the machinery the buyer
had no present duty to pay. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 250(a) (1932). It is unclear
whether a buyer whose obligation has not yet matured "owes payment or other perfor-
mance" under § 9-105(1)(d) (emphasis added). A more fitting characterization may be that
the buyer in such a case only might owe payment. This issue is not addressed in Book-
binding.
243 491 F.2d 879, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 202 (6th Cir. 1974).
244 Id. at 883, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 207.
1977]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
lease that B's obligation arose not on February 17, but on February
25. Form conquers substance, and the result turns on a mere
technicality. Hence, the manner in which the court distinguished
Brodie does nothing to reduce uncertainty for subsequent lenders
-a purpose which the Talcott court espoused in reaching its
conclusion.245
In re Ultra Precision Industries, Inc.24n blends the facts of Book-
binding and Brodie. As in Bookbinding, the seller shipped compli-
cated equipment requiring installation to a buyer who demanded a
reasonable testing period. In addition, the sale was conditioned on
the buyer arranging for outside financing, apparently to guarantee
that the buyer would have sufficient funds to pay off his debts to
the seller as they became due. After the acquisition of credit and
the completion of testing, the buyer and seller executed a security
agreement. Seller's assignee filed within ten days of execution, but
more than a month after the buyer received possession of the
parts.
The court, addressing only the "debtor" issue, granted the
seller purchase money priority. It distinguished Bookbinding just
as Bookbinding distinguished Brodie, arguing that in the present
case the debtor had possession of the goods prior to sale and execu-
tion of the security agreement. 247 Again, the distinction is unsatisfy-
ing because it makes the date on which a document is signed the
sole controlling factor in determining priorities.248
The problems raised by the Brodie-Ultra Precision. line of cases
are serious. A creditor can frustrate the purpose of section 9-312's
time limits merely by postponing execution of a security agree-
ment. The third-party lender has no way of discovering the po-
tentially preemptive "inchoate" security interest of the purchase
money creditor.249 Accordingly, the Brodie rule invites collusion or
fraud where a debtor is desperate for funds.2 50 It encourages the
245 Id. at 882-83, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 206.
246 503 F.2d 414, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 281 (9th Cir. 1974).
2 47 Id. at 418, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 285.
248 In granting purchase money priority, the Ultra Precision court emphasized the ab-
sence of adverse reliance on the buyer's possession of the collateral. Id. at 418, 15 U.C.C.
Rep. at 286. However, in light of the Ultra Precision court's heavy reliance on Brodie, and in
light of the terms (i.e., "good faith," "estoppel") in which the court couched its concern, it
is highly doubtful that additional advances by the nonpurchase money secured party, ab-
sent bad faith on the part of the purchase money secured creditor, would have affected in
any way the result reached in the case.
249 See Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Protection for the Purchase Money Secured Party
Under Section 9-312, 49 N.C.L. REV. 849, 852-53 (1971); 48 TEMP. L.Q. 1025, 1026 (1975).
250 The Brodie decision, like that in Ultra Precision Industries, makes the commence-
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very evil that Article Nine's perfection and priority provisions were
designed to eradicate: secret security interests.
Litigators and commentators, uncomfortable with Brodie's re-
sults, have urged a different interpretation of the word "debtor" in
section 9-312. Some have argued that the "obligation secured" re-
ferred to in section 9-105(1)(d) does not mean the obligation owed
to the purchase money secured party. Priority disputes arise be-
cause another "obligation secured" exists, albeit owed to another
creditor. It has been argued that although a security agreement has
not been executed with the purchase money creditor, the person
receiving purchase money credit is nonetheless a "debtor" because
of his relationship with the prior lender.2 51 This argument was
specifically rejected in Ultra Precision: "To us, the word 'debtor'
in § 9312(4) means the debtor of the seller or holder of the 'pur-
chase money security interest in the collateral' (the thing sold).12 5
2
Others have argued that for purposes of section 9-312,
"debtor" simply does not mean "debtor"-not, at least, in the sec-
tion 9-105(1)(d) sense. Rather, they say, the drafters slipped in the
word "debtor" simply as a matter of convenience, and it should be
read to include the debtor-to-be. 53 The emphasis, it is suggested,
should be on possession. It has been pointed out that the word
"debtor" is used loosely in other sections of Article Nine.254 More-
ment of the ten day grace period dependent upon the time a sales agreement is
entered into, a variable that lies within the exclusive control of the parties ot [sic]
the agreement. A third party lender who makes advances in reliance on his bor-
rower's ownership of the collateral is, in Brodie, cast aside. This result creates a
clear potential for abuse, since a financially pressed purchaser might be driven to
postpone the execution of a sales agreement -after taking physical possession in
order to induce a third party lender to accept the delivered goods as collateral for
new value. The purchaser's seller should have no cause for alarm since the pre-
ferred status of a purchase money security interest is assured if the seller files
within ten days of the ultimate execution of the sales agreement.
48 TEMp. L.Q. 1025, 1031 (1975).
2 5 Id. at 1028-29.
252 503 F.2d at 417, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 284. Accord, North Platte State Bank v. Produc-
tion Credit Ass'n, 189 Neb. 44, 53, 200 N.W.2d 1, 6, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1336, 1344-45 (1972).
253 Note, supra note 249, at 853.
25' Thus, the term "debtor," although specifically defined in section 9-105(1)(d) of
the Code, is used outside that definition as necessary to identify the parties. For
example, if the section 9-105(I)(d) definition were read into section 9-402(1)
where a financing statement, signed by the "debtor" and "secured party," must be
filed prior to execution of the security agreement, a blantant inconsistency is re-
vealed: since there is no security agreement, there can be no "debtor" or "secured
party." Under such circumstances it is more reasonable to assume the term "debt-
or" is being used as a procedural convenience to identify the parties more easily.
20 WAYNE L REv. 1407, 1410 (1974) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
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over, section 9-105 requires observance of its definitional provi-
sions "unless the context otherwise requires." A broad reading of
this language, 255 coupled with the overriding notice-filing philoso-
phy of Article Nine, suggests the plausibility of this position. But
proper interpretation of the Code requires adherence to defini-
tional provisions. Courts may therefore hesitate to embrace this ar-
gument, and none has done so to date.
Still other attacks have been launched against Brodie. Critics
have argued that purchase money creditors can easily file before
transfer of possession, regardless of whether a security agreement
is eventually executed. 256 Section 9-312, however, requires per-
fection-not just filing-before the grace period ends. Hence, ex-
ecution of a security agreement, as well as filing, is necessary to
meet the statutory requirements. Where no security agreement is
foreseen at the time possession is transferred, changing the mean-
ing of "debtor" will eliminate purchase money protection for cer-
tain deserving sellers and lenders. 257 Moreover, requiring exe-
cution of a security agreement before transfer of possession (or
within ten days thereafter) seems needlessly demanding, especially
in cases where the purchase price is undetermined, and a sale
might never occur. It will be impossible to create a security interest
where no obligation exists, 258 as in the case where a buyer takes
goods on a trial basis.
These problems indicate a need for amendment. First, the
"debtor" concept should be banished from section 9-312. Second,
subsections (3) and (4) should be rewritten to require perfection or
filing within the statutory time limits. These two changes will ac-
complish the goals unsuccessfully sought by the present purchase
money provisions.
Filing will put others on notice of the purchase money security
interest without requiring of the purchase money creditor the in-
ordinately impractical or downright impossible. It is filing-not
execution of a security agreement-that protects existing and po-
255 In light of Article Nine's near-banishment of secret security interests and the
Code's proclaimed purpose of modernizing commercial law (U.C.C. § 1-102(2)), a strong
argument can be made that the "context" of § 9-312(3) and (4) requires rejection of the
definition of "debtor" in § 9-105(1)(d).
256 See Note, supra note 249, at 852. See generally 48 TeMp. L.Q. 1025, 1031 (1975).
2-1 See Fan-Gil Corp. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 49 Mich. App. 106, 211 N.W.2d
561, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 733 (1973), discussed in notes 262-64 and accompanying text infra.
258 A security interest must secure an obligation. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37), set out in part
in note 32 supra; note 235 supra.
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tential creditors. The Code recognizes this in the nonpurchase
money context by specifically allowing filing before attachment,259
and by basing priority on the date of filing.26 0
Eliminating the "debtor" issue will refocus the statute on pos-
session, rather than on the easily manipulated time at which the
sale is consummated and the security agreement executed. To-
gether these reforms will protect third-party creditors by insuring
notice and limiting the opportunities for fraud. Additionally, they
will give the purchase money creditor adequate flexibility. The
proposed amendment will neither allow secret security interests
nor handcuff purchase money financers. In short, it will advance
the aims of Article Nine.261
Of course, problems will persist. Consider the facts of Fan-Gil
Corp. v. American Hospital Supply Corp.26 2 A doctor works for a hos-
pital for many years, during which time he keeps his own equip-
ment at the hospital. The hospital fails to pay the doctor's wages.
The doctor decides to quit, and the hospital agrees to buy his equip-
ment.2 63 Under the proposed amendment, the doctor cannot ob-
tain a purchase money security interest because he failed to file
before transfer of possession. The distinction between Fan-Gil and
the Brodie-Ultra Precision line of cases is that, at the time the doctor
transferred possession, he had no intention of ever selling his
equipment to the hospital.264 An exception could surely be carved
259 U.C.C. § 9-402(1).
260 U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).
261 A revised § 9-312(4) might read:
A purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory takes
priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral or its proceeds if
the person holding the purchase money security interest files or perfects by the
time the person acquiring rights in the collateral receives possession or within ten
days thereafter.
262 49 Mich. App. 106, 211 N.W.2d 561, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 733 (1973).
263 The actual Fan-Gil decision addresses neither the debtor nor the possession issue.
Instead the court concluded that the purchase money lender takes priority because his
security interest was perfected within 10 days after attachment. See id. at 112, 211 N.W.2d
at 564, 13 U.C.C. Rep. at 737. This reasoning sorely misconstrues the statute, unless the
court's unarticulated premise is that until the security agreement attached there was no
"obligation secured" and correspondingly no "debtor." For an analysis of the case in this
light, see 20 WAYNE L. REV. 1407 (1974).
264 In Ultra Precision the sellers envisioned an eventual sale. Because the terms of sale
were apparently agreed upon, it would have been easy for the seller to perfect its security
interest prior to transfer of possession. The security agreement, like the sale contract in




out to cover this relatively rare situation.265
Arguments suggesting Brodie's failings are strong on policy,
but weak on Code language. To date, courts have deferred to the
latter. Be it the courts' fault or the Code's, the Brodie line of cases
fails to provide sensible and certain rules for sellers and lenders.
The problem, it appears, can only be solved through amendment.
III
THE ARTICLE NINE SECURED PARTY VERSUS
NON-ARTICLE-NINE INTERESTS
A. Lien Creditors--Section 9-301
Section 9-301 sets forth the rights of an unperfected secured
creditor against other creditors with claims to the collateral. Recent
cases indicate that courts apply section 9-301 mechanically, but
often have difficulty determining whether a creditor is secured
and/or perfected.266 Although a secured creditor's claim is superior
to that of an unsecured creditor without a lien,267 the secured
creditor runs the risk of being subordinated to other creditors if he
fails to perfect his interest.268 The interest of an unperfected, se-
cured creditor is not void; it is merely inferior.269
Section 9-301(1)(a) subordinates unperfected security interests
to interests entitled to priority under section 9-312. Thus, a per-
fected security interest takes priority over an unperfected interest
even if the unperfected interest was created earlier and was known
to the perfected creditor when he attached and perfected his
interest.
70
A lien creditor who levies against the collateral before the
perfection of a competing security interest, will obtain priority
over the secured creditor under section 9-301(1)(b). 271 Thus, a se-
262 The Fan-Gil problem is more likely to arise when possession is initially transferred
pursuant to a genuine lease, with the parties later agreeing to a sale.
266 See, e.g., United States v. Squires, 378 F. Supp. 798 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Sherburne
Corp. v. Carter, 133 Vt. 411, 340 A.2d 82 (1975).
267 See U.C.C. § 9-201.
268 See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1), 9-312.
219 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 114, 2.2901, at 656.
270
1 d. See Percival Constr. Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 882
(W.D. Okla. 1973), modified, 532 F.2d 166, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 244 (10th Cir. 1976); Central
Soya Co. v. Bundrick, 137 Ga. App. 63, 222 S.E.2d 852 (1975). See also note 47 and accom-
panying text supra.
271 See, e.g., General Lithographing Co. v. Sight & Sound Projectors, Inc., 128 Ga.
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cured creditor who delays in perfecting his interest may be cut off
by a lien creditor. But if the secured creditor is a purchase money
secured creditor, he has ten days after the debtor receives the
collateral within which to perfect his interest.272
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Central Penn National
Bank273 illustrates the analysis of priorities under section 9-301. In
that case, creditors of Miller attempted to collect their debts out of
commissions that Massachusetts Mutual owed to Miller on an
agency contract. The creditors included Central Penn National
Bank (Central Penn), Industrial Valley Bank (IVB), Mercantile Fi-
nancial Corp. (Mercantile), Franklin National Bank (Franklin Na-
tional), Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. (Marine Midland), and
Isadore and Dorothy Mokrin (Izzy and Dot).274 In June 1963, Cen-
tral Penn perfected a security interest in Miller's commissions. IVB
took a security interest in Miller's commissions in May 1964, but
did not perfect. Mercantile entered a judgment by confession
against Miller, and served a writ of execution on Massachusetts
Mutual in January 1966. In February 1966, Franklin National sued
Miller on a note, and obtained a temporary restraining order bar-
ring Massachusetts Mutual from assigning or transferring any
amounts due to Miller under the agency contract. Marine Midland
entered a judgment by confession against Miller in June 1966, but
did not execute it. Izzy and Dot entered a similar judgment against
Miller, and served a writ of execution on Massachusetts Mutual
in March 1967. Massachusetts Mutual filed an interpleader ac-
tion to resolve these conflicting claims to the commissions it owed
to Miller.
The court held that Central Penn was entitled to first priority
App. 304, 196 S.E.2d 479, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 200 (1973); Vittert Constr. & Inv. Co. v. Wall
Covering Contractors, Inc., 473 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Package Mach. Co. v.
Cosden Oil & Chem. Co., 51 App. Div. 2d 771, 380 N.Y.S.2d 248 (2d Dep't 1976); Clark
Oil & Ref. Co. v. Liddicoat, 65 Wis. 2d 612, 223 N.W.2d 530 (1974); WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 1, § 25-2, at 902.
272 U.C.C. § 9-301(2) provides:
If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money security interest
before or within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral, he
takes priority over the rights of a transferee in bulk or of a lien creditor which
arise between the time the security interest attaches and the time of filing.
This is an exception to the first-in-time rule. 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 114, 2.2902, at
658.
273 372 F. Supp. 1027, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 212 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affd menm., 510 F.2d 969, id.
at 970 (3d Cir. 1975).
274 When asked if "Izzy and Dot" was an acceptable reference to the Mokrins, Izzy said
"I don't care." Telephone conversation with Isadore Mokrin, April 7, 1977.
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because "a perfected security interest takes priority over an unper-
fected security interest and 'cannot be defeated in insolvency pro-
ceedings or in general by creditors.' ",275 Mercantile, Franklin Na-
tional, and Izzy and Dot came next in priority as lien creditors
under the 1962 version of section 9-301(1)(b), 7 6 That section pro-
vides that "an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the
rights of ... a person who becomes a lien creditor without knowl-
edge of the security interest and before it is perfected. '277 Mercan-
tile and Izzy and Dot secured their status as lien creditors by levy-
ing against the property in compliance with section 9-301(3).27 s
Franklin National, on the other hand, obtained a temporary re-
straining order precluding any payments by Massachusetts Mutual
to Miller until a certain amount was accumulated for the benefit
of Franklin National or for any creditors with priority over Frank-
lin National.279 This procedure was challenged as inadequate to
give Franklin National the status of a lien creditor for purposes of
section 9-301(l)(b). The court rejected this argument, however,
implicitly characterizing Franklin National's interest as falling
under section 9-301's saving clause for "lien[s] . . . , lev[ies] or the
like."' 28 0 "Section 9-301 reserves lien creditor status for those cred-
itors who acquire a lien by invoking the judicial process. Despite
the conditional nature of Franklin's lien, it suffices to qualify that
claimant as a 'lien creditor' as of [the date the resraining order was
obtained]. "281
The unperfected secured creditor, IVB, challenged the su-
periority of the lien creditors on the ground that they knew of
IVB's prior interest when they secured their judgments. IVB ar-
gued that the lien creditors bore the burden of proving their
ignorance of its security interest. The court dismissed this
argument,282 referring to the 1972 amendments' elimination of the
knowledge requirement as support for its conclusion that the bur-
275 372 F. Supp. at 1042, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 216, quoting U.C.C. § 9-301, Comment 1.
276 372 F. Supp. at 1042-43, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 216-18.
277 U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1962 version). The 1972 version of this section eliminates the
lack-of-knowledge requirement.
278 U.C.C. § 9-301(3) provides in part:
A "lien creditor" means a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property
involved by attachment, levy or the like ....
279 372 F. Supp. at 1043, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 217.
280 U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (emphasis added).
281 372 F. Supp. at 1043, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 217.
282 See id., 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 217-18.
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den of proof was on IVB. 283 Having failed to meet that burden,
IVB was subordinated to all the lien creditors.
In the race for priority, Marine Midland brought up the rear.
Although it had a judgment against Miller, it failed to resort to the
simple enforcement procedure required to attach a judgment
creditor's interest in particular collateral. 28 4 Thus, Marine Midland
qualified neither as a secured creditor nor as a lien creditor, and
was consequently subordinated to all competitors. The court
pointed out that "not all judgment creditors' are 'lien creditors.' A
lien arises only after the judgment is enforced through the judicial
process-by 'writ of execution, attachment, levy or the like.' "285
B. Equitable Interests
Conflicts between Article Nine creditors and holders of judi-
cially imposed equitable interests pose awkward priority problems.
Such disputes often fall beyond the scope of Article Nine's priority
rules.28 6 In searching for neutral principles of decision, however,
courts have attempted to squeeze these disputes into the Code's
priority rules.287 The following discussion deals with the proper
resolution of priority conflicts between Code creditors and the
beneficiaries of two types of equitable interests-the "equitable lien
or mortgage" and the "constructive trust.
28 8
Unfortunately, these interests have often been lumped to-
gether and referred to generically as "equitable liens. '289 Different
policies, however, underlie each interest; therefore the priority
rules applicable to each should vary. The phrase "equitable lien or
mortgage," as used herein, refers to the court-imposed lien arising
283 Id. at 1043-44 n.7, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 218 n.7.
284 See U.C.C. § 9-301(3), set out in part in note 278 supra.
285 372 F. Supp. at 1044, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 218.
288 When an Article Nine secured creditor is involved, and Code rules arguably apply,
§ 1-103 makes it clear that equitable interests, which are not displaced by particular Code
provisions, should be governed by equitable principles. See U.C.C. §§ 1-103, 9-102(1). In
general, Article Nine does not apply to liens or similar interests in personal property that
arise by operation of law, with the exception of those liens covered by § 9-310. See U.C.C.
§ 9-104(b),(c); WHITE & SUMaiRs, supra note 1, § 22-2, at 757-58.
2
'
7 See Warren Tool Co. v. Stephenson, 11 Mich. App. 274, 161 N.W.2d 133, 5 U.C.C.
Rep. 1017 (1968); Chattanooga Brick & Tile, Inc. v. Agnew, - Tenn. App. -, -
S.W.2d -, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 1063 (1976); Meadows v. 4ierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 16
U.C.C. Rep. 515 (Tex. 1975). Each of these cases applied Code rules in situations involving
equitable liens.
288 Analysis has been confused by the many uses of the term "equitable lien." See 1
GILMORE, supra note 3, § 7.2, at 198-200.
2 9See id.; 4J. POMIEROY, EQUrrY JUIUSPRUDENCE §§ 1233-1234, at 691-95 (5th ed. 1941).
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when parties who intend to create a security interest fail to comply
with the formalities required by Article Nine.29" The "constructive
trust" arises when a transferee has acquired property fraudulently,




The drafters of Article Nine sought to eliminate equitable liens
because they undermined the basic Code policies of furthering
certainty in commercial transactions and abolishing secret secu-
rity ageements. 292 The Comment to section 9-203 manifests the
drafters' hostility to equitable liens. 293 Nevertheless, the equitable
lien has managed to survive the Code.294 In Chattanooga Brick &
Tile, Inc. v. Agnew,295 the Tennessee Court of Appeals subordinated
a competing interest to an equitable lien based on a subcontractor's
oral promise to satisfy a debt out of retainages. The court was
misguided. Enforcement of secret oral agreements against other
290 [E]very express executory agreement in writing, whereby the contracting
party sufficiently indicates an intention to make some particular property . . . a
security for debt or other obligation, or whereby the party promises to convey or
assign or transfer the property as security, creates an equitable lien upon the
property so indicated, which is enforceable against the property in the hands ...
of the original contractor, . . . his heirs .... assignees, and purchasers or encum-
brancers with notice. Under like circumstances, a merely verbal agreement may
create a similar lien upon personal property.
4 J. PormRoY, supra note 289, § 1235, at 696 (footnote omitted). See also U.C.C. § 9-203,
Comment 5.
291 See generally 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 289, § 1044, at 93-94; RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITtrrION § 160 (1937).
292 See U.C.C. § 9-203, Comment 5, set out in note 293 infra. The bankruptcy rule on
equitable liens provides a useful model for determining the appropriate treatment of
equitable liens in other contexts. Section 60a(6) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.SC. § 96(a)(6)
(1970), sets forth the rule: "The recognition of equitable liens where available means of
perfecting legal liens have not been employed is declared to be contrary to the policy of
this section."
292 U.C.C. § 9-203, Comment 5, states:
Unless the secured party is in possession of the collateral, his security interest,
absent a writing which satisfies [section 9-203(1)(a)] is not enforceable even against
the debtor, and cannot be made so on any theory of equitable mortgage or the
like .... More harm than good would result from allowing creditors to establish a
secured status by parol evidence after they have neglected the simple formality of
obtaining a signed writing.
294 See 1 GILMIORE, supra note 3, § 11.5, at 345, in which the author notes that the
Code's attempt to eliminate all equitable mortgages had "overshot the mark." For an ex-
ample of judicial affirmation of equitable liens when a writing is involved, see Warren Tool
Co. v. Stephenson, 11 Mich. App. 274, 161 N.W.2d 133, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1017 (1968).
2S_ Tenn. App. S.W.2d - , 18 U.C.C. Rep. 1063 (1976).
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creditors subverts section 9-203, the Code's priority rules,2 9 6 and
fundamental Article Nine policy.
2. Constructive Trusts
Not all equitable interests that may exist in a secured party's
collateral are as disfavored as the equitable lien arising out of an
unwritten agreement; 297 the constructive trust requires a different
analysis. The constructive trust imposed on property or proceeds
in favor of a defrauded transferor has nothing to do with secured
transactions or trust law. The parties to a constructive trust cer-
tainly do not intend to create a trust relationship. 298 The de-
frauded constructive beneficiary has no opportunity to enter into a
security agreement with the debtor-trustee, and no way to perfect
his interest.
The special circumstances that result in raising a constructive
trust are beyond the realm of the Code,29 9 and Code priority rules
should not provide more than a policy guide in resolving disputes
between the constructive beneficiary and the Article Nine secured
creditor .3 '"' The recent Texas case of Meadows v. Bierschwale311' illus-
trates the weakness of using Code priority rules.
In that case, Bierschwale sold an apartment complex to Oakes
in exchange for third-party notes payable to Oakes. Before
Bierschwale realized that the notes were worthless, Oakes sold the
complex to Goldman, a bona fide purchaser. In an action by
Bierschwale against Oakes, the trial court found that Oakes had
296 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-312 (priority determined by date of perfection or attachment).
297 Gilmore suggests that courts should continue to enforce certain equitable interests
that result from dealings among nonprofessionals. 1 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 11.1, at
336-37. See note 300 infra.29 8 4J. POMEROY, supra note 289, § 1044, at 94.
299 Section 2-702(2), which gives sellers the right to reclaim goods if the buyer misrep-
resents his solvency, can be viewed as endorsing the constructive trust remedy in limited
circumstances. The seller reclaiming under this provision may find himself in a priority
dispute with a secured creditor or a trustee in bankruptcy. Part of the considerable litera-
ture on this subject is set out in note 314 infra.
300 Gilmore recognizes these limitations:
Article 9, for all its comprehensiveness, is a statute drafted to regulate certain
well-known or institutionalized types of financing transactions .... [A] transaction
which sets out to be one of those types should conform to the Article 9 rules or
fall by the wayside. But beyond the area of institutionalized transaction, there
stretches a no-man's land, in which strange creatures do strange things. For these
strange things there are no rules; it makes no sense to measure them against the
rules which professionals have developed for professional transactions.
1 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 11.1, at 336-37.
301 516 S.W.2d 125, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 515 (Tex. 1974).
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fraudulently misrepresented the value of the notes, and therefore
declared a constructive trust in the proceeds of Oakes' sale in favor
of Bierschwale. This resulted in a priority dispute between
Bierschwale and Smith, Oakes' secured creditor. Finding that im-
proper filing prevented perfection of Smith's security interest,
3112
the Texas Supreme Court characterized the constructive ben-
eficiary as a section 9-301(3) lien creditor, and invoked section
9-301(1)(b) to give Bierschwale priority. 
303
Although the result is justifiable, the court's reasoning is unac-
ceptable. It is unlikely that the Code's drafters intended section
9-301 to apply to constructive trusts. In our opinion, viewing a
constructive trust as an "attachment, levy or the like" strains that
language to the breaking point.30 4 Attachment and levy are
methods of cashing in on court-imposed remedies; the constructive
trust, on the other hand, is itself a remedy, rather than a me-
chanism for enforcement. In addition to this difference in the na-
ture of their interests, equating beneficiaries of constructive trusts
with section 9-301 lien creditors leads to undesirable priority re-
sults. Since a constructive trust arises at the time of the fraud,
30 5
under section 9-301(1)(b) the beneficiary would take priority over
any security interest attaching or perfecting after the fraudulent
transfer.3 0
"6
When notice is unavailable and competing secured creditors
321d. at 133, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 519.
3"3 Bierschwale is a lien creditor by virtue of his equitable right to a constructive
trust on the Goldman proceeds. Section 9.301(c) [U.C.C. § 9-301(3)]. The con-
structive trust arises when legal title passes, in the instant case when the apartment
complex was transferred to Oakes. . . . When the property subject to a construc-
tive trust is transferred, a constructive trust fastens on the proceeds ...
Bierschwale's right arose prior to and without knowledge of Smith's right. There-
fore, Bierschwale's claim to the proceeds . . . takes precedence over the claim of
Smith.
Id. at 133, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 519. The lower court also held that § 9-301 controlled.
Bierschwale v. Oakes, 497 S.W.2d 506, 525, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 365, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973).
304 Other cases have refused to broaden § 9-301(3)'s definition of lien creditor. In
Gamble v. Hinds, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1021, 89 Cal. Rptr. 341, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 3 (1970), the
court refused to read "lien creditor" expansively, noting that if the legislature had in-
tended such a reading it should have been more specific. Id. at 1026, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 344,
8 U.C.C. Rep. at 9. A federal district court has held that a judgment creditor was not a
"lien creditor" until he sought to enforce his judgment. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Central Penn Bank, 372 F. Supp. 1027, 1044, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 212, 218 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd
mem., 510 F.2d 969, id. at 970 (3d Cir. 1975).
3 5 See 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 289, § 1044, at 96.
306 See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).
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are innocent third parties, giving the beneficiary priority seems
extreme. A judicial lien itself gives those who would subsequently
extend credit notice of the lienor's interest. But no notice is given
when a constructive trust is involved. Until the beneficiary discov-
ers the fraud, even he will be unaware that the trust has arisen. If
the secured creditor perfects his interest after the fraud but before
the declaration of the constructive trust, and he has no knowledge
of any foul play, there is no satisfying reason to subordinate
him. 3 0
7
Both the perfected secured creditor and the beneficiary are
innocent parties. One is favored by the policy of protecting victims
of fraud, while the other represents the diligent creditor who took
all steps necessary to perfect his interest and had no notice of any
prior claims against the debtor. Between these equally innocent
parties, the question is not really one of priorities, but one of al-
locating risks. The law generally places the risk of loss on the party
better able to avoid the loss or protect himself against it. In most
cases, this will be the beneficiary. As the victim of the fraud, he had
the closest dealings with the defrauder.3 08 He was therefore in the
best position to take precautions. As a party to the fraudulent
transaction, he may have had an opportunity to avoid the fraud, an
opportunity the secured creditor certainly never had. The secured
party holding a valid, perfected interest has done all he could. This
may or may not be true of the beneficiary.
Beyond this allocation of risk, equitable concerns provide little
assistance. Code rules, although not controlling, provide further
principles for the risk-allocation analysis. Code policy favoring
commercial certainty lines up on the side of protecting perfected
secured parties. Disfavoring such a party would cast doubt on just
how perfect the perfected security interest is. This could only dis-
courage secured lending. Article Nine represents a willingness to
implement certainty-centered pure-race rules at the expense of the
3"7See 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 289, § 1058b, at 97. Pomeroy notes that the policy of
the constructive trust doctrine is to make the beneficiary whole at the expense of the con-
structive trustee, not innocent third parties, such as bona fide purchasers. Third parties
without notice therefore generally take free of the trust. Moreover, the beneficiary still has
a cause of action against the defrauding trustee for damages. Id.
3 8 Similarly, in other situations, the Code imposes the loss on the party in greatest
proximity to the wrongdoer. See, e.g., note 648 and accompanying text infra. If the con-
tending parties were equally innocent, courts of equity generally imposed the loss on the
party who suffered it. See, e.g., Holly v. Missionary Soc'y, 180 U.S. 284, 295 (1900) ("equity




fairness value underlying race-notice systems,3U 9 and equity gener-
ally protects innocent third-party transferees. Courts should refuse
to undermine these policies absent clearly superior considerations
favoring the beneficiary.
The beneficiary's position in relation to unperfected secured
creditors without notice is more problematic. Although the prox-
imity-to-the-fraud argument remains, a secured creditor who fails
to perfect before he receives notice of the fraud has not finished
the race of the diligent creditor. The force of the commercial cer-
tainty argument is accordingly diminished. Beyond this, the Code,
by subordinating unperfected security interests to general creditors
who obtain judicial liens, promotes filing and notice in general.
The same systemic argument supports subordinating the unper-
fected security interest to the constructive trust.
C. The Trustee in Bankruptcy
The objectives of Article Nine's priority rules provide a con-
trast with those of the Bankruptcy Act.3 t1 Rather than rewarding
the diligent, the Bankruptcy Act's basic goal is equal treatment of
the bankrupt's creditors.3 1' The interface between state debtor-
creditor law and federal bankruptcy law is thus bound to generate
conflicts. Those conflicts are minimized, however, by the Bank-
ruptcy Act's heavy reliance on state law. This not only reduces
conflicts between state and federal law, but also implies that the
Code will frequently govern or influence creditor priorities in bank-
ruptcy court.
A caveat is in order. The interplay between Article Nine's
priority rules and the Bankruptcy Act will not be explored here
with the same thoroughness as the priority issues arising under
Article Nine. The wealth of recent scholarly work, the pendency of
bankruptcy reform,312 and the scarcity of recent reported decisions
all militate against a detailed examination of conflicts between Arti-
cle Nine secured parties and bankruptcy trustees.
31 3
3"9 See notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
31,, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 1200 (1970).
"I See Bankruptcy Act § 65, 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1970).
312 For a comprehensive examination of the effect of the proposed bankruptcy acts on
trustee vs. secured party priorities, see Note, The Proposed Bankruptcy Acts-Chapter IV, Part 6:
Reshaping the Trustee's Sword, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 257 (1976).
313 In lieu of an extensive analysis, we have attempted to provide in the footnotes to
this section an exhaustive compilation of the important scholarly work from the past de-
cade dealing with the treatment of secured parties in bankruptcy courts. See generally 3 W.
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To prevent the preferential treatment of creditors, the Bank-
ruptcy Act gives the trustee in bankruptcy broad powers to avoid
priorities granted to certain creditors under state law. 14 The most
potent weapon in the trustee's arsenal is section 70c of the Bank-
ruptcy Act,31 5 the so-called "strong-arm clause." This provision
gives the trustee the status of a hypothetical lien creditor as defined
by state law-i.e., Code section 9-301(3).316 This enables the trustee
to invalidate any security interest that remains unperfected when
the bankruptcy petition is filed.317 To the extent that the trustee is
an ideal lien creditor under the Act,31 8 section 70c comes into clear
conflict with the 1962 version of Code section 9-301(1)(b). 319 The
latter provision can be read as depriving the trustee of priority if
all actual creditors had knowledge of the unperfected security
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, ch. 13 (1974); 1 COOGAN, HOGAN, & VAGTS, supra note 33,
chs. 9, 9A, 10 (1963); 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, ch. 45; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, ch.
24; Miller & Goldstein, Pitfalls and Rights of Bank Creditors under the Bankruptcy Act, 93
BANKING L.J. 637, 637-45; Newman, The Uniform Commercial Code in the Bankruptcy
Environment, PRAC. LAW., Jan. 1969, at 67; Note, supra note 312.
314 See Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 67a, 67c, 67d, 70c, 70e, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 107(a), 107(c),
107(d), 10(c), 110(e) (1970).
Another type of priority conflict pits the trustee against a seller reclaiming goods
under Code § 2-702(2) rather than an Article Nine secured party. See Ashe, Reclamation
Under U.C.C.-An Exercise in Futility, Defrauded Seller v. Trustee in Bankruptcy, 43 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 78 (1969); Ashe, The Bankruptcy Act Vis-a-vis the Uniform Commercial Code Part One
-Reclamation Remedies, 75 CoM. L.J. 31 (1970); Bjornstad, Reclamation of Goods by Unsecured
Sellers in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 357 (1975); Henson, Reclamation Rights of
Sellers under Section 2-702, 21 N.Y.L.F. 41 (1975); Kennedy, The Interest of a Reclaiming Seller
under Article 2 of the Code, 30 Bus. LAW. 833 (1975); Newman, supra note 313, at 77-79; 75
ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 381 (1975); 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 835 (1975); 33 Mo. L. REV. 262
(1968); 53 N.C.L. REV. 169 (1974); 29 OKLA. L. REV. 223 (1976); 7 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 702
(1976); 50 TUL. L. REV. 961 (1976); 35 U. PTT. L. REV. 922 (1974) (discussing In re
Federal's, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1973)); 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 446, 459-66
(1968); 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1001 (1975) (discussing In re Good Deal Supermarkets,
Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. 624 (D.N.J. 1974)).
315 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
3" For discussion of § 70c, see 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL § 13.001 (1974); 2
GILMORE, supra note 3, § 45.3.2; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 24-3; Hiller, Secured
Transactions in Bankruptcy Administration, 41 PA. B.A.Q. 147, 157 (1970) (bankruptcy trustee
versus unperfected security interest); Note, supra note 312, at 283-84 (trustee's power
under present law and under proposed amendment); 50 B.U.L. REV. 483 (1970) (bank-
ruptcy trustee as lien creditor versug automatically perfected purchase money security in-
terest). See generally Henson, Some Thoughts on Lien Creditors Under Article 9, 1974 U. ILL.
L.F. 237 (1974) (concluding that Article Nine has strengthened strong-arm clause).
3 17 See Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
318 See Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970); Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l
Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961); Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962)
(for trustee to take position of creditor with lien at date of bankruptcy under earlier ver-
sion of § 70c, creditor of this type must actually have existed).
319 Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected security interest
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interest.320 Several cases have suggested this result.321 But others
have held that creditors' actual knowledge is irrelevant to the
trustee's priority. In In re Callahan Motors, Inc.,322 for example, the
court held that, despite knowledge by all creditors, section 70c left
the trustee with a "federally created status as a lien creditor without
notice.
323
Section 7 0e 324 places the trustee in the shoes of an unsecured
creditor with a provable claim.32 5 Along with section 67a,32 6 section
70e subrogates the trustee to the claims of certain lien creditors,
and thus may enable the trustee to subordinate Article Nine
interests. 327 With respect to this 70e-67a attack, it remains unclear
is subordinate to the rights of
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor without knowledge ofthe security interest and
before it is perfected ....
U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1962 version) (emphasis added).
320 The trustee's own knowledge of the unperfected security interest does not affect
his priority. In re Haugabook Auto Co., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. RP. (CCH)
64,103 (M.D. Ga. 1971) (summary of opinion) (trustee's actual knowledge of unperfected
security interest irrelevant to priority under § 70c). Accord, In re Babcock Box Co., 200 F.
Supp. 80, 82 (D. Mass. 1961). The proposed revision of § 70c specifically provides that the
trustee's own knowledge, or the knowledge of any or all creditors, is irrelevant to trustee
priority. Note, supra note 312, at 283-84. See also Comment, Toward Commercial Reasonable-
ness: An Examination of Some of the Conflicts Between Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
and the Bankruptcy Act, 19 SY.ACUSE L. REV. 939, 953-57 (1968) (arguing that trustee should
prevail even if all creditors have knowledge of unperfected security interest).
321 See, e.g., In re Komfo Prods. Corp., 247 F. Supp. 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (remanded
to determine creditors' knowledge); City of Vermillion v. Stan Houston Equip., 341 F. Supp.
707, 712, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1246, 1251 (D.S.D. 1972) (trustee held not to have had knowledge,
since not all creditors had actual knowledge); In re Webb, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 394, 400 (S.D.
Tex., Bankr. Ct. 1973) (trustee held without knowledge because not all creditors had knowl-
edge). See also In re Dennis Mitchell Indus., Inc., 419 F.2d 349, 354 (3d Cir. 1969) (question
not reached).
322 396 F. Supp. 785 (D.N.J., Bankr. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 538 F.2d 76 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied sub nom. Sterns v. Princeton Bank & Trust Co., 97 S. Ct. 507 (1976).
Accord, In re Buschmann, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 260, 263 (E.D. Wis., Bankr. Ct. 1967) (dictum)
(knowledge on part of one or all creditors does not defeat rights of trustee). For concurring
views, see 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.53, at 637, 70.62A[9], at 727-29 (14th ed.
1976); 1 COOGAN, HOGAN, & VAGTS, supra note 33, § 10.02[2], at 1057-59; WHITE & SUM-
MERS, supra note 1, § 24-3, at 868.
323 396 F. Supp. at 791.
324 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1970).
325 Id.
32 6 Id. § 107(a).
32 7 See 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 45.3.1, at 1290-92; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1,
§ 24-8, at 888-92; Gamble, Secured Transactions: The Perfected Security Interest Versus Compet-
ing Claims, 5 CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1974) (discussing "gap creditor" and trustee's
subrogation rights under §§ 70e & 67a). Section 67a invalidates liens obtained during the
four months preceding the filing of a bankruptcy petition if the debtor was insolvent when
the lien was obtained.
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whether the trustee may defeat a subordinate security interest in
toto, or only to the extent of the lienor's interest.328 Furthermore,
where other means are unavailing, the trustee may argue that the
language of section 70e allows him to subrogate himself to the
priority status of an actual secured creditor. If he were subrogated
to the rights of a secured creditor, the trustee could claim priority
over more junior secured creditors. Although the language of sec-
tion 70e favors this conclusion, it has not been widely adopted. 329
It has, however, given rise to sharp disagreement among the
commentators.
330
Sections 70e331 and 67d 332 permit the trustee to attack fraud-
ulent conveyances, including fraudulently acquired security inter-
ests.333 Under these sections the trustee is subrogated to the rights
of actual creditors who are the victims of a fraudulent transfer of
security.
334
A secured creditor may also lose to the trustee part or all of his
interest in the collateral under Bankruptcy Act section 60.
3 3
5
Under that section, the trustee may attack either direct payments
or the granting of a security interest to a creditor prior to
bankruptcy.3 36 Specifically, section 60 allows the trustee to avoid a
328 The controversy has arisen out of Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931), in which Justice
Holmes upheld the security interest's total defeat. See WHITE & SUMMERtS, supra note 1,
§ 24-8, at 890.
329 At least two cases suggest that the trustee may claim through a secured party. See
Abramson v. Boedecker, 379 F.2d 741, 748-49 (5th Cir.) (subrogation allowed under § 70e
to claims of secured party under pre-Code law), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006 (1967); In re
Smith, 326 F. Supp. 1311, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 549 (D. Minn. 1971) (dictum).
330 The leading writer on bankruptcy law favors subrogating the trustee to the rights
of a secured creditor. See 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.90[1], at 1034 (14th ed. 1976).
Contra, WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 24-8, at 891-92. See generally Kennedy, supra
note 83, at 1428-34 (extensively analyzing trustee subrogation rights under § 70e); 20 S.C.L.
REv. 311 (1968). For specific examples of how the trustee might profit from this broad
interpretation, see note 83 supra.
331 11 U.S.C. § I10(e) (1970).
3 Id. § 107(d).
333 See 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL §§ 13.002-.003 (1974); 1 COOGAN, HOGAN,
& VAGTS, supra note 33, § 9.03[3], at 984-91; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 24-9, at
892-97; Miller & Goldstein, supra note 313, at 642-45; Note, supra note 312, at 278-83
(avoiding fraudulent conveyances under present and proposed acts). See also Broude, 2o-
ward a New Fraudulent Conveyance: The Trustee in Bankruptcy and the Usurious Lender, 63 Nw.
U.L. REV. 331 (1968); Miller, Fraudulent Conveyances--Some Reflections on Section 70a(4) of the
Bankruptcy Act, 48 B.U.L. REV. 222 (1968).
3 34 See generally 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.78 (14th ed. 1976). See also Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (U.F.C.A.), 7 U.L.A. 423-600 (1970).
335 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
336 On voidable preferences in general, see 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL
§ 13.001(2) (1974); WHITE & SUMMERs, supra note 1, § 24-4, at 871-76.
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bankrupt's "transfer" for or on account of an antecedent debt to a
creditor within four months of bankruptcy, if the creditor had
reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent, and if the
creditor thereby received a greater percentage of his debt than
other creditors of the same class.3 37 Of the several questions raised
by the application of section 60 to Article Nine security interests,
three are particularly worth noting.
First, the perfection of a security interest is a "transfer" under
the Bankruptcy Act.3 38 Therefore, when a delayed perfection
occurs within the four months preceding bankruptcy, the transfer
will be on account of an antecedent debt, unless there is a grace
period within which to perfect. Perfection within a grace period
is deemed to have occurred at the time the debt arose, and thus
prevents the debt from being antecedent.33 9 Where state law pro-
vides no grace period during which a secured party may per-
fect and defeat an intervening lien creditor, section 60 gives the
secured creditor twenty-one days during which to perfect.3 40 In
our view, the Code states no general grace period, and therefore
the twenty-one-day rule should apply to perfection of Code sec-
urity interests. 34' Under section 9-301(2), however, a purchase
money security interest will be deemed perfected as of the date of
attachment if a financing statement is filed within ten days after
the debtor comes into possession of the property.3 42 As a result,
purchase money secured creditors may be subject to a greater risk
of defeat by the trustee under section 60 than non-purchase money
secured parties. The better view supports a twenty-one-day grace
period for all Code security interests.3 43 The proposed bankruptcy
3 See Bankruptcy Act § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970). On the transfer issue, see id.
§ 1(30), 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (definition of "transfer"); Gamble, supra note 327, at 12-16;
Miller & Goldstein, supra note 313, at 637-41; Newman, supra note 313, at 69-73. On the
antecedent-debt question, see, e.g., King, Some Thoughts on Article Nine of the U.C.C. and the
Bankruptcy Act, 72 CoM. L.J. 203 (1967); Comment, supra note 320, at 941-42. On the
definition of "class," see Note, "Class"--The Forgotten Element of Section 60(a)(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 11 ARz. L. REv. 360 (1969). For a collection of cases on the creditor's knowl-
edge of the debtor's insolvency, as indicated by the creditor's receipt of property in pay-
ment of the debt, see Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1050 (1963).
... See Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1970).
33 9.Id. § 60a(7)(I), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(7)(I) ("transfer shall be deemed to be made or
suffered at the time of the transfer").
3 4 0 
Id.
341 See U.C.C. § 9-301, Comment 5.
342 U.C.C. § 9-301(2).
343 Compare Henson, supra note 316, at 246 (recommending 21-day rule under § 67a(7)
for purchase money and non-purchase money security interests), with King, supra note 337,
at 207-08 (suggesting Code should be read as setting 0-day grace period under § 67a(7)).
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acts would solve this problem by amendment. 344
Second, trustees have tried to use section 60 to avoid security
interests that validly attach to goods acquired by the debtor after
the security agreement was filed. Debate over the status of these
so-called "floating liens" has raged, with the benefit of extensive
commentary and few cases.345 Although never expressly relied
See also Comment, supra note 320, at 950-52 (suggesting 0-day grace period represents
"strained reading" of Code).
At least three arguments can be made for a 21-day, rather than a 10-day, grace
period. First, § 60a(7) was designed to deal with statutes that provided for grace periods
following creation of a security interest. See, e.g., Uniform Sales Act § 5. The grace period
under Code § 9-301(3), however, begins running when the debtor obtains possession of the
collateral. Usually transfer of possession will not occur at the same time as attachment of
the security interest. Second, although transfer of possession is a "transfer" under Bank-
ruptcy Act § 1(30), we would argue that both transfers referred to in § 60a(7)(I) (i.e., the
transfer that relates back and the transfer to which it relates back) must be transfersfrom
the debtor. Section 60, after all, deals with the trustee's ability to recapture property trans-
ferred by the bankrupt prior to bankruptcy. Finally, if the 21-day grace period applies to
run-of-the-mill secured parties, as we believe it clearly does, it would be highly anomalous
if the purchase money secured party, Article Nine's favorite child, received less favorable
treatment.
In the only published case addressing this issue, In re Anderson, 4 SEC. TRANS. GUIDE
1 52,353 (N.D. Ala., Bankr. Ct. 1974) (summary of opinion), the court applied the 10-day
grace period, holding that absent contrary proof, the court was required to presume that
delivery occurred when the security agreement was executed. The case appears to be
wrongly decided, not only because the court applied the grace period of Code § 9-301(3),
but also because it presumed that delivery and attachment were simultaneous. Numerous
cases recognize that the burden of proving all the elements of a voidable preference is on
the trustee. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Brooks, 515 F.2d 741, 744 (6th Cir. 1975); Gentry v. Bodan,
347 F. Supp. 367, 371 (W.D. La. 1972).
344 See Note, supra note 312, at 263-66.345See 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL § 13.005[4], at 391-94 (1974); 1 COOGAN,
HOGAN, & VAGTS, supra note 33, § 9A.02, at 1006-23 (1975 article analyzing recent floating
lien cases); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 24-5; Ashe, Federal-State Conflicts of Law, Bank-
ruptcy Act Vis-A-Vis Uniform Commercial Code, 48 AM. BANKP L.J. 29 (1974) (attacking U.C.C.
§ 9-108 and "derogation of the Bankruptcy Act by judicial fiat"); Ashe, supra note 314,
75 Com. L.J. 31 (1970); Buser, Who's Who in Bankruptcy: The Secured Creditor, 9 IDAHO L. REV.
171, 179-82 (1973); Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 CoM. L.J. 269,
275-80 (1970) (security interests in after-acquired property as voidable preferences); Coun-
tryman, A Reply to Professor Moo, 47 Am. BANKR. L.J. 35, 35-39 (1973); Gamble, supra note
327, at 16-17; Healy, The Floating Lien Controversy in the Courts: Judicial Response to the Prefer-
ence Problem, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 265, 265 (1969); Henson, The Interpretation of the
Uniform Commercial Code: Article 9 in the Bankruptcy Courts, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 101, 113-18
(1967) (conflict between Bankruptcy Act § 60 and U.C.C. § 9-108); Hiller, supra note 316,
at 153-54 (U.C.C. § 9-108 and floating liens in bankruptcy); King, supra note 337, at
204-06 (predicting judicial refusal to uphold U.C.C. § 9-108); Maio, Secured Transactions, the
Code in the Bankruptcy Courts: Some Significant Conflicts of Policy, 85 BANKING L.J. 19, 28-36
(1968); Moo, The Secured Creditor in Bankruptcy, 47 Am. BANKR. L.J. 23, 28-34 (1973); Mor-
ris, Bankruptcy Law Reform: Preferences, Secret Liens and Floating Liens, 54 MINN. L. REV. 737
(1970) (including proposed amendments); Newman, supra note 313, at 73-76; Scult, Ac-
counts Receivable Financing: Operational Patterns Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 ARIz.
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upon, Code section 9-108, which attempts to protect floating liens
from trustee attack, has won the day.346 The cases have, with few
aberrations, upheld floating liens.347 Furthermore, both proposed
bankruptcy acts would resolve the conflict by upholding floating
liens against trustee attack. 48
Third, Code section 9-306(4) limits the commingled proceeds
claimable by a secured creditor if his debtor goes into bank-
ruptcy.3 49 Although the section's shift in proceeds interests is not
itself a preference,3 50 trustees have invoked section 60 to chal-
lenge secured creditors who, prior to bankruptcy, collect other-
L. REv. 1, 19-25 (1969); Skilton, supra note 121, at 955-1016 (detailed treatment of floating
liens as voidable preferences); Taylor, Section 60c of the Bankruptcy Act: Inadequate Protection
for the Running Account Creditor, 24 VAND. L. REv. 919, 925-28 (1971) (recommending revi-
sion of Bankruptcy Act § 60); Wyatt, The Floating Lien Under the U.C.C., 5 AMt. Bus. L.J.
293, 296-99 (1967); Symposium, Secured Financing Under Article Nine of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 19 S.C. L. REv. 681, 773 (1967); Note, Section 60 Voidable Preferences and the U.C.C.:
A Hypothetical, 9 GA. L. REv. 685 (1975) (challenging present theories supporting floating
liens); Comment, supra note 320, at 942-50 (analyzing theories supporting floating liens);
Comment, Some Problems Presented by the U.C.C. and the Bankruptcy Act, 29 U. PITT. L. REv.
446, 446-56 (1968) (analyzing entity and substitution theories); Note, After-Acquired Property
Security Interests in Bankruptcy: A Substitution of Collateral Defense of the U.C.C., 77 YALE LJ.
139 (1967) (defending substitution theory); 53 TEx. L. REv. 1343 (1975) (discussing E.F.
Corp. v. Smith, 496 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1974) (floating lien securing payment for future
services)); 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 678 (1968) (conflict between Code after-acquired property
provisions and Bankruptcy Act § 60; discussing Rosenburg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635
(D. Mass. 1967)); 32 WASH. & LEE L REV. 955 (1975) (discussing E.F. Corp. v. Smith, 496
F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1974)). Recent cases have generally upheld floating liens against trustee
attack. See, e.g., Holzman v. L.H.J. Enterprises, Inc., 476 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974); Owen v. McKesson & Robbins Drug Co., 349 F. Supp. 1327
(N.D. Fla. 1972).
346 U.C.C. § 9-108 provides:
Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation, releases a
perfected security interest, or otherwise gives new value which is to be secured in
whole or in part by after-acquired property his security interest in the after-
acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not as security
for an antecedent debt if the debtor acquires his rights in such collateral either in
the ordinary course of his business or under a contract of purchase made pur-
suant to the security agreement within a reasonable time after new value is given.
347 See, e.g., Wilkie v. Brooks, 515 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1975); Gentry v. Bodan, 347 F.
Supp. 367 (W.D. La. 1972).
348 1 COOGAN, HOGAN, & VAGTS, supra note 33, § 9A.03[4], at 1027-28; Kronman,
Treatment of Security Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the Proposed Bankruptcy Act, 124
U. PA. L. REv. 110 (1975); Skilton, supra note 121, at 999-1009 (proposed bankruptcy act
and voidable preferences); Note, supra note 345, 9 GA. L. REv. at 697-701 (setting forth
and criticizing proposed act's treatment of floating liens); Comment, Voidable Preferences: An
Analysis of the Proposed Revisions of Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 481.
34
9 See 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 45.9, at 1336-44 (discussing U.C.C. § 9-306(4));
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 24-6, at 883-88; Countryman, supra note 345, 75 Com.
L.J. at 270-75. See generally Gillombardo, The Treatment of Uniform Commercial Code Proceeds
in Bankruptcy: A Proposed Redraft of Section 9-306, 38 U. CiN. L. REv. 1 (1969).
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wise-attached "proceeds" excluded by section 9-306(4)(d). One
court has upheld this attack, reasoning that "the state law which
creates the security interest also limits its application to commin-
gled proceeds in the event of insolvency."
351
In addition to these avenues of attack, the trustee has "the
benefits of all defenses available to the bankrupt as against third
persons. ' 352 Hence, the trustee may challenge a claimant's security
interest as ineffective or unperfected through lack of compliance
With Code formalities, 353 or on traditional grounds of rescission,
such as fraud and unconscionability. 35 4 Similarly, the trustee may
invoke these doctrines to attack the existence or amount of the
underlying debt, thus avoiding security interest and priority issues
entirely.
355
D. Mechanic's and Artisan's Liens-Section 9-310
Priority under Article Nine generally depends on compliance
with formalities designed to provide potential creditors with notice
of outstanding interests. Yet the otherwise preeminent perfected
secured creditor, with or without notice, may find himself subordi-
nated by the simple possessory lien of a mechanic who supplies
goods or services with respect to collateral.3 56 In most jurisdictions,
'5' See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 24-6, at 887; Comment, supra note 320,
at 954-55. Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Julian, 383 F.2d 329, 334 (8th Cir. 1967) (substitution,
exchange, or renewal of securities does not constitute preference if debtor's estate not
diminished).
351 Fitzpatrick v. Philco Finance Corp., 491 F.2d 1288, 1291 (7th Cir. 1974) (noting
inequitable treatment of secured creditors).
352 Bankruptcy Act § 70c, I 1 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
353See In re Parkwood, Inc., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
64,183 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (summary of decision) (as hypothetical lien creditor, trustee could
challenge security agreement, although debtor estopped from mounting similar challenge).
Compare In re McClain, 447 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1971) (trustee, as ideal lien creditor under
Bankruptcy Act, could introduce parol evidence to attack security interest; applicable state
law parol evidence rule only bound parties to security agreement), cert. denied sub nom.
Utica Square Nat'l Bank v. Woodson, 405 U.S. 918 (1972), with In re Financial Computer
Sys., Inc., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 64,722 (9th Cir. 1973) (trust-
ee barred from introducing parol evidence proving lease a security interest).
354 See Ashe, Subordination of Claims-Equitable Principles Applied in Bankruptcy, 84
BANKING L.J. 778, 780-84 (1967); Gordon, Unconscionabiliy in Bankruptcy: The Federal Con-
tribution to Commercial Decency, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 741, 759-65 (1972); Whaley, Unconscionable
Claims and the Proposed Bankruptcy Act, 53 N.C.L. REV. 1237, 1245-57 (1975); Note, An Ap-
proach to Unconscionability in the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 229 (discussing
In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966)).
355 See, e.g., In re Worthley, I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1694 (N.D. Me. 1975) (usury defense
asserted by trustee).
356 See generally Miller, Liens Created by Operation of Law: A Look at Section 9-3 10 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 76 Com. L.J. 221 (1971); Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 1162 (1976).
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the secured creditor is powerless to guard against this lien unless
he retains possession of the collateral. Certain liens created by stat-
ute and case law receive this "super-priority" under section 9-310:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business fur-
nishes services or materials with respect to goods subject to a
security interest, a lien upon goods in the possession of such
person given by statute or rule of law for such materials or ser-
vices takes priority over a perfected security interest unless the
lien is statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise.357
1. The General Operation of Section 9-310
Section 9-310 generally operates simply. Assume S perfects a
security interest in D's tractor. D takes the tractor for repairs to R, a
tractor mechanic. After completing the repairs, R makes a reason-
able charge of $250. D fails to pay the bill and does not pick up the
tractor. D also defaults in his payments to S. If the state recognizes
a common-law mechanic's lien, 358 R takes priority over S to the
extent of R's lien, even if pre-Code case law subordinated the
mechanic. 35 9 If the mechanic's lien is statutory, R will take priority
over S unless the statute expressly provides otherwise.
2. Common-Law and Statutory Mechanic's Liens
Section 9-310 provides that non-Code statutes subordinating
the mechanic survive and control under the Code.360 In states that
recognize the common-law lien but in which the lien statute ex-
pressly subordinates the mechanic, the mechanic who furnishes
services or materials with respect to collateral should retain posses-
sion of the goods and base his claim on his common-law lien.36' By
using this stratagem, the mechanic can defeat the secured creditor
whose interest vis-A-vis the statutory lien is unassailable.
3 62
Although several states refused to recognize common-law liens
357 U.C.C. § 9-310.
358 Throughout this discussion, the phrases "common-law mechanic's lien" and "statu-
tory mechanic's lien" refer to the special possessory liens granted to those individuals, in-
cluding mechanics and artisans, who furnish services and materials with respect to collat-
eral.
359 U.C.C. § 9-3 10, Comment 2.
360 U.C.C. § 9-310. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 33, § 25 (1940).
361 See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Colwell Diesel Serv. & Garage Inc.,
302 A.2d 595, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 226 (Me. 1973) (common-law repairman's lien survived
enactment of statutory mechanic's lien).
362 See Murray, Security Interests in Inventory: Priorities and Problems, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv.
634, 685-86 (1971).
[Vol. 62:834
ARTICLE NINE PRIORITY RULES
after their enactment of mechanic's lien statutes, courts in some
jurisdictions have found that the liens co-exist.3 63 For example, in
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Colwell Diesel Service & Garage,
Inc.,364 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court employed an equitable
rationale in recognizing the common-law mechanic's lien despite
enactment of a mechanic's lien statute. The debtor in Colwell Diesel
bought a truck and gave a purchase money security interest to the
dealer, who perfected the interest and assigned it to GMAC. The
debtor took the truck to Colwell for repairs. When the debtor
failed to pay the repair bills, Colwell asserted a possessory
mechanic's lien, served notice, and attempted to enforce the statu-
tory lien. GMAC then replevied the truck. Declaring that prosecu-
tion of the statutory lien remedy was not a waiver of the common-
law lien,363 the court ruled that Colwell held a valid possessory
mechanic's lien on the truck.3 66 The court stated that "principles of
natural justice and commercial necessity" support the right to a
common-law mechanic's lien.3 67 "It is clear equity that a party, who
has enhanced the value of the property, by incorporating therein
his labor or materials, shall have security on the improved
property.
'36 8
As Colwell Diesel demonstrates, even where the statutory lien
363 See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Howell Bros. Truck & Auto Repair, Inc., 57 Ala.
App. 46, 49, 325 So. 2d 562, 565, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 798, 800-01 (1975) (court finds neither
statutory nor common-law lien applicable on facts); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Colwell Diesel Serv. & Garage, Inc., 302 A.2d 595, 599, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 226, 232-33 (Me.
1973) (common-law repairman's lien held to survive enactment of statutory mechanic's
lien); Ferrante Equip. Co. v. Foley Mach. Co., 49 N.J. 432, 436, 231 A.2d 208, 211 (1967)
(common-law artisan's lien survived enactment of statutory lien). Contra, Bond v. Dudley,
244 Ark. 568, 571, 426 S.W.2d 780, 781 (1968) (common-law lien superseded by statutory
lien). In Nickell v. Lambrecht, 29 Mich. App, 191, 185 N.W.2d 155 (1970), although the
state had a 50-year-old artisan's and garagekeeper's lien statute, a Michigan Court of Ap-
peals found that the common-law artisan's lien persisted. The court said: "[W]e think it a
sounder course to follow the lead of the courts of other jurisdictions, which, in general,
have decided this question in favor of the continued viability of the common law lien, than
ourselves to embark on a futile search for legislative intention." Id. at 197-98, 185 N.W.2d
at 158. Nickell involved a priority contest between the unpaid seller of an automobile and
the mechanic who had repaired it. Because the seller, who held title to the car under a
conditional sales contract, did not authorize the repairs, the mechanic failed to qualify
under the garageman's lien statute. Relying heavily on considerations of equity, however,
the court revived the common-law lien to give the mechanic the same status that he would
have had under the garageman's lien statute and § 9-310. Id. at 201, 185 N.W.2d at 160.
364 302 A.2d 595, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 226 (Me. 1973).
365 Id. at 597, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 229-30.
366 Id. at 601, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 234-35.
367 Id. at 596-97, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 228-29.
368 Id. at 597, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 229. Accord, Ferrante Equip. Co. v. Foley Mach. Co.,
49 N.J. 432, 438, 231 A.2d 208, 211 (1967).
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would subordinate the mechanic to the secured creditor, courts
may freely grant priority to "deserving" mechanics. In addition
to fostering uncertainty, this creates an unusual situation. On the
one hand, section 9-310 expressly grants priority to possessory
mechanic's lienors over secured creditors. On the other, it ex-
pressly allows states in their mechanic's lien statutes to subordinate
the mechanic's interest. Yet even if state legislatures choose to sub-
ordinate the mechanic, courts may apply section 9-310 to the
mechanic's advantage by recognizing and enforcing common-law
liens. The policy underlying mechanics' "super-priority" can be
summarized as follows: To the extent repairs increase the value of
collateral, they directly increase the "interest" the secured creditor
holds; hence, giving the secured creditor the benefit of improve-
ments made by the mechanic constitutes unjust enrichment.369
When state legislatures reject the general rule of section 9-310,
they reject as well this creditor-benefit rationale. Yet courts have
invoked this same rationale in recognizing the common-law lien.37 0
To avoid such judicial meddling, legislatures must eradicate by
statute all rules of law that grant special priority to the mechanic-
lienor. Then, and only then, will the legislative decision to override
section 9-310 be carried into effect.
3. The Scope of Section 9-310-What Liens Does It Protect?
Section 9-310 was designed to give priority to "liens securing
claims arising from work intended to enhance or preserve the
value of the collateral. ' 37 1 The possessory mechanic's lien, either
common-law or statutory, is the interest most often protected
under section 9-310.372 In addition to mechanic's liens, storage
liens have been held to take priority over security interests under
369 See 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 33.3, at 878; Note, Nonconsensual Liens Under Article
9, 76 YALE L.J. 1649, 1651 (1967).
37" See note 368 and accompanying text supra.
371 U.C.C. § 9-310, Comment 1.
372 Rules vary slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the following is a typical
formulation of the mechanic's lien:
A person who makes, alters, repairs or performs work or services of any na-
ture and description upon, or in any way enhances the value of an article of
personal property, at the request or with the consent of the owner, has a lien on
such article, while lawfully in possession thereof, for his reasonable charges for the
work done and materials furnished, and may retain possession thereof until such
charges are paid.
N.Y. LIEN LAW § 180 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
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section 9-310.313 These liens have been protected on the theory
that the services of storing and protecting the collateral may be as
valuable to the secured creditor as repairs made by a mechanic.
37 4
Despite this argument, however, several states have enacted stat-
utes subordinating storage liens while retaining section 9-310's
"super-priority" for mechanic's liens. 75 Custom in some jurisdic-
tions may support this distinction, but the positions of those who
repair and of those who store collateral are difficult to distinguish.
Both services benefit the secured creditor. Both would be severely
hampered if an examination of the public records were necessary
before beginning performance. The policy considerations are the
same in both cases; accordingly, the priority rules should not
differ.
Mechanic's liens and storage liens fit easily into section 9-310's
definition of the interests protected by "super-priority." Comment
1 to section 9-310 seems to limit the applicability of the section,
however, by stating that its purpose is "[t]o provide that liens secur-
ing claims arising from work intended to enhance or preserve the value
of the collateral take priority over an earlier security interest even
though perfected. '37 6 The apparent conflict between the Comment
and the section 377 creates an ambiguity that courts must con-
front.378 For example, although long-term storage will generally
"enhance or preserve the value of the collateral," a lien arising
from short-term warehousing pending transport of the goods37 9
may not fall within the language of the Comment.
M See In re Big Boy Mobile Homes, Inc., 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1307 (E.D. Tenn., Bankr. Ct.
1972).
174 See note 369 and accompanying text supra.
= See, e.g., Ferrante Equip. Co. v. Foley Mach. Co., 49 N.J. 432, 437, 231 A.2d 208,
210 (1967) (New Jersey's garageman's lien statute subordinates storer to secured creditor,
while common-law mechanic's lien entitled to priority under U.C.C. § 9-310); Murray,
supra note 362, at 685-86 (Virginia law subordinates garageman's lien for storage charges,
but grants priority to mechanic's lien for up to $75 in charges).
376 U.C.C. § 9-310, Comment 1 (emphasis added).
177 The formulation in the section itself is far less focused. Section 9-3 10 extends pro-
tection to liens arising when one "furnishes services or materials with respect to goods" (em-
phasis added).
378 Relying on the Comment, a secured creditor in In re Big Boy Mobile Homes, Inc.,
10 U.C.C. Rep. 1307 (E.D. Tenn., Bankr. Ct. 1972), argued that the holder of a storage
lien did not do work to "enhance or preserve the value of the collateral" and therefore did
not deserve § 9-310 priority. The court held, however, that "the towing and storing of [a]
vehicle after it had broken down on the highway 'preserved' its value." Id. at 1310. Hence,
the storage lienor was given priority over the secured creditor.
'79 See U.C.C. § 7-209.
1977]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The innkeeper's lien presents a similar problem. In Nicholson's
Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Schramm,3s  for example, Schramm, a
mobile home park owner, rented four lots to the debtor. The debt-
or installed trailers on the lots, each subject to a purchase money
security interest. When the debtor defaulted on his rent payments,
Schramm asserted a possessory innkeeper's lien over the trailers.
381
The secured creditor sought to repossess the trailers. The appel-
late court held that for purposes of section 9-310 "the providing
of rental or storage space does come under the category of ser-
vices."
38 2
The court in Nicholson did not limit the applicability of section
9-310 priority to the special lien of mobile home park owners.
Arguably, by renting lots, often complete with water, electricity,
and sewage connections, the mobile home park owner "preserves"
the collateral. The same cannot be said of the ordinary innkeeper.
The charges generally secured by an innkeeper's lien are charges
for room and board of the person who brought the collateral onto
the innkeeper's property. 38 3 The holder of a security interest does
not benefit from these materials and services. Furthermore, such
charges are not for services performed "with respect to" the collat-
eral. In giving section 9-310 priority to the special innkeeper's lien
in Nicholson, however, the court left room for expansion of this
priority. Relying on that case, another court might grant priority to
a more typical holder of a common-law or statutory innkeeper's
lien. Section 9-310 is an extraordinary priority rule, however,
384
and should not be extended beyond protecting those who furnish
services or materials "with respect to goods subject to a security
interest. ' 385 The "innkeeper" in Nicholson met this description. In
most cases the innkeeper will not.
380 330 N.E.2d 785, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 574 (Ind. App. 1975).
381 Indiana law extends innkeeper's liens to mobile home park owners: "The owner,
operator, or caretaker of any mobile home park shall have an innkeeper's lien or hotel
keeper's lien upon the property of his guest in the same manner, for the same purposes,
and subject to the same restrictions as innkeeper's lien or hotel keeper's lien." IND. CODE
§ 13-1-7-33 (1971).
382 Nicholson's Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Schramm, 330 N.E.2d 785, 790,17 U.C.C.
Rep. 574, 579 (Ind. App. 1975).
383 The Indiana innkeeper's lien statute which was extended to mobile home park
owners provides: "The owner or keeper of any hotel . . .shall have a lien upon any ...
article of value brought into such hotel.., by such person or persons for any and all proper
charges due from such person or persons for food, lodging, entertainment, or other ac-
commodation ...." IND. CODE § 32-8-27-2 (1971). For a general discussion of innkeeper's
liens, see Note, Evolving Concepts of the Innkeeper's Lien, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 587 (1976).
384 See text accompanying note 356 supra.
385 U.C.C. § 9-310.
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4. Possession of the Collateral
For section 9-310 to apply, the lienor must be in possession of
the collateral. 8 6 Carried over from the common law, this require-
ment conflicts with mechanic's lien statutes that allow the mechanic
to file his lien and release the collateral to the debtor. 38 7 The
mechanic who surrenders possession of the collateral under a non-
possessory lien statute also surrenders his ability to take priority
over a secured creditor under section 9-310. Thus, although both
section 9-310 and the state nonpossessory lien statutes are broadly
intended to benefit the mechanic, their combination may lead to
the mechanic-lienor's defeat.3 8 Until each state with a nonposses-
sory lien statute amends it to conform to section 9-310, secured
creditors may be enriched by the material and labor of others in
contravention of the policies of both laws.38 9
5. Title and Consent
Prior to the Code's enactment, some jurisdictions assigned
priority to secured creditors or mechanic's lienors on the basis
of title. 9 ° When the debtor held title, the mechanic's lien was
superior to the security interest.391 If the secured party held title,
however, the mechanic could not assert a lien on the collateral
because the debtor did not own the collateral and the secured party
had not authorized the repairs.392 State statutes imposing me-
chanic's liens only if the titleholder consented to the repairs were
"' As long as the mechanic intends to retain possession and does not voluntarily sur-
render the collateral, he is in technical possession. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. How-
ell Bros. Truck & Auto Repair, Inc., 57 Ala. App. 46, 48, 325 So. 2d 562, 564, 18 U.C.C.
Rep. 798, 800 (1975) (where repairman surrendered vehicle and later regained possession
by attachment, surrender held waiver of common-law mechanic's lien); Finch v. Miller, 271
Or. 271, 274, 531 P.2d 892, 893 (1975) (where possession involuntarily lost, lien persists).
Thus, the mechanic retains "possession." if another party replevies the collateral, or takes it
from him without his authorization. See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Colwell
Diesel Serv. & Garage, Inc., 302 A.2d 595, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 226 (Me. 1973) (requirement of
constant possession fulfilled where replevin caused loss of possession).
3
'
7 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-1901 (1955).
388 The mechanic, aware that his lien persists despite lack of possession, may release
the collateral. But preservation of the lien does not ensure its priority. Section 9-310 nega-
tively implies that nonpossessory liens will always lose to perfected security interests "unless
the statute expressly provides otherwise."
"9 See, e.g., Forest Gate Ford, Inc. v. Fryar, 62 Tenn. App. 572, 577, 465 S.W.2d 882,
884 (1970) (repairman must retain possession of repaired vehicle in order to maintain
priority of his statutory lien over previously perfected security interest).
392 W. HAWKLAND,supa note 114, 1 2.320202, at 712-13.
391 Id.
392 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Colwell Diesel Serv. & Garage, Inc., 302 A.2d
595, 597-98, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 226, 230 (Me. 1973).
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not directly altered by the Code's enactment. Section 9-310 is only
a priority provision; it does not govern the creation of liens. Under
the general policy of Article Nine, however, location of title is
immaterial.3 93 Looking beyond the title and consent requirements,
both pre- and post-Code courts have granted priority to mechanic's
lienors who performed work at the behest of non-owner
debtors.3 94 The secured creditor's consent to repairs may be im-
plied from the debtor's duty to keep the collateral in good
repair.3 95 Mechanic's lienors receive special priority over secured
creditors because mechanics "perform useful services to the gen-
eral public," 396 and because "the secured creditor as well as the
debtor benefits from such work. '397 Court enforcement of title and
consent provisions "would practically deprive [section 9-310] of any
meaningful effect .... ,,398 As a general matter, the Code should be
liberally construed 3 99 Therefore, effective application of section
9-310 requires that the location-of-tide and consent requirements
be ignored.
41111
6. Good Faith Under Section 9-310
Professor Gilmore has argued that the special priority given
the mechanic's lienor should be denied or limited if his charges are
excessive. 4 1 Gilmore states:
'" See U.C.C. § 9-202, set out at note 168 supra.
"4 See cases cited at note 398 infra. For examples of pre-Code cases finding location of
tide nondeterminative, see New Britain Real Estate & Title Co. v. Collington, 102 Conn.
652, 656, 129 A. 780, 781 (1925); Hammond v. Danielson, 126 Mass. 294, 296 (1879); De
Van Motor Co. v. Bailey, 177 Miss. 441, 449, 171 So. 342, 344 (1936).
39- 2 W. HAWKLAND, SUpra note 114, 2.320202, at 712.
396 Id.
191 Note, supra note 369, at 1650.
"I General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Colwell Diesel Serv. & Garage, Inc., 302 A.2d
595, 599-600, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 226, 233 (Me. 1973) (enforcement of requirement that debt-
or have title in order for mechanic to take priority over secured creditor would render
§ 9-310 substantially ineffective); Nickell v. Lambrecht, 29 Mich. App. 191, 200, 185
N.W.2d 155, 160 (1970) (requiring conditional vendor's consent to mechanic's repairs
would contravene Code's policy of de-emphasizing title); Manufacturers Acceptance Corp.
v. Gibson, 220 Tenn. 654, 422 S.W.2d 435 (1967) (conditional vendor's perfected security
interest subordinate to repairman's lien even though repairs made without vendor's knowl-
edge). But see Municipal Equip. Co. v. Butch & Son Deep Rock, 185 N.W.2d 756 (Iowa
1971) (Iowa's garageman's lien statute required car repairman to get consent of prior
lienholders of record to establish priority); Parker v. West, 161 Mont. 170, 505 P.2d 94
(1973) (to obtain priority over perfected security interest notice must be provided within 10
days under agister lien statute).
399 U.C.C. § 1-102(1).
400 See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Colwell Diesel Serv. & Garage, Inc., 302
A.2d 595, 599-600, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 226, 233 (Me. 1973).
401 2 GiLmolE, supra note 3, § 33.5, at 888-89.
[Vol. 62:834
ARTICLE NINE PRIORITY RULES
To be entitled to priority under § 9-310 the lienor must have
furnished services or materials "in the ordinary course of his
business." This limitation should be read as tantamount to a re-
quirement of good faith .... A general provision of the Code
specifies that: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." Sec-
tion 9-310 is designed to protect the honest lienor and not the
crook. However, the "ordinary course of business" limitation
goes beyond cases of actual fraud, which the courts could be
trusted to handle no matter what the statute said. Is it, for exam-
ple, within the "ordinary course of business" of a garageman to
run up a bill of $400 on a car which, after the repairs, is worth
$200? A court could well use the "ordinary course of business"
formula to deny, or reduce to a reasonable amount, the priority
of unduly rapacious lienors.
40 2
Here Gilmore argues that section 1-203 imposes a good faith stan-
dard on the performance of contracts and duties under the Code.
The Code's general requirement of good faith requires "honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. '4t1 3 Applying this sub-
jective standard, however, does not solve the problem of the over-
charging mechanic. In egregious cases, mechanics may engage in
fraud, but most cases of simple overcharging will not involve sub-
jective bad faith. In addition, section 1-203 applies only to the
performance or enforcement of a contract or duty. The mechanic
who overcharges for his services or overstates the amount of nec-
essary repairs may well act in bad faith at the time the contract
is made, without doing so in its subsequent performance or en-
forcement.
404
402 d. (footnote omitted). In Mousel v. Daringer, 190 Neb. 77, 206 N.W.2d 579, 12
U.C.C. Rep. 367 (1973), the court blindly followed Gilmore's suggestion and evaluated the
reasonableness of an agister's charges. The court said, without further analysis, that "[a]
person who furnishes materials or service with respect to goods that are already subject to
a perfected security interest is not engaged in the ordinary course of his business under
§ 9-310 ...with respect to any part of his charges that are unreasonable." Id. at 82, 206
N.W.2d at 584, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 371.
403 U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
404 See Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 220-21 (1968). Professor Summers argues that
the Code proscribes bad faith during the formation of contracts through § 1-103, non-
Code law and specific sections of Article Two. His description of potential abuses in the
area of sales applies equally to the furnishing of services by mechanics:
Forms of bad faith at the negotiation and contract formation stage include
negotiating without serious intent to contract, abusing the privilege to break off
negotiations, entering into a contract without having the intent to perform, enter-
ing a deal recklessly disregarding prospective inability to perform,failing to disclose
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Gilmore is not satisfied with applying the normal good faith
test. Instead he argues that the good faith requirement imposed by
section 9-310 prohibits more than actual fraud. 4115 Without specifi-
cally stating that Article Two's definition of good faith should con-
trol in section 9-310 cases, Gilmore, in arguing for an objective
standard, necessarily implies that he would extend the merchant-
good-faith standard to mechanic's lienors. Section 2-103(1)(b) pro-
vides:
In this Article unless the context otherwise requires
(b) "Good faith" in the case of a merchant means honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade.
40 6
If applicable, this rule would reach commercially unreasonable
overcharges. By its own terms, however, the standard applies only
to Article Two.
4 °7
Gilmore reads the "good faith" requirement into section 9-310
through its "ordinary course of business" clause. This interpreta-
tion plays fast and loose with terms that have a special meaning
under the Code. "Ordinary course of business" imposes a wide
range of qualifications for buyers under section 1-201(9), including
a requirement that the buyer act in good faith. °8 A mechanic,
however, is not a buyer, and section 9-310 does not include the
exact phrase "ordinary course of business." The section begins:
"When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes
services or materials .... ,,409 The phrase "his business" provides a
subjective standard, and does not carry an additional good faith
requirement.4 " Thus, the very language of section 9-310, as well as
known defects in goods being sold, and taking undue advantage of superior bargaining
power to strike an unconscionable bargain.
Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
4"' See text accompanying note 402 supra.
406 U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b).
407 For a more thorough discussion of the applicability of the merchant-good-faith
standard to Article Nine priority disputes, see notes 621-32 and accompanying text infra.
408 U.C.C. § 1-201(9) provides:
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good faith and
without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or
security interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a
person in the business of selling goods of that kind ....
409 U.C.C. § 9-310 (emphasis added).
410 For a discussion of the language "ordinary course of his business," see notes 686-91
and accompanying text infra. Since the phrase "ordinary course of his business" refers to the
general practices of a particular person (see id.), that language would not even subordinate
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the language of section 2-103(1)(b), precludes the infusion of Arti-
cle Two's good faith standard into section 9-3 10.
Professor Summers has suggested an alternative method of
imposing a more stringent good faith standard than that of section
1-203.411 He concludes that in the area of sales, "extra-Code law on
good faith-via section 1-103, which states that 'general principles'
are to supplement the Code's specific provisions-will prove a
more fertile source of Code requirements of good faith than will
the Code sections which use these very words. '41 2 These extra-
Code standards can be read just as easily into Article Nine. The law
outside the Code imposes sanctions on a wide variety of transgres-
sions ranging from fraud to unclean hands.413 Integration of these
provisions into the standard that a mechanic must satisfy before
obtaining section 9-310 priority would go beyond the requirement
of simple honesty.
The application of Code standards to the creation and en-
forcement of mechanic's liens by way of a priority rule is ques-
tionable at best. Non-Code law governs mechanic's liens, 414 and
non-Code law should determine the extent of the lien and the rea-
sonableness of the mechanic's charges. Indeed some states ex-
pressly provide by statute that mechanic's liens exist only to the
extent of the reasonable value of the services and materials
supplied. 41 5 In these states the Article Nine secured creditor has
full opportunity to challenge the mechanic's lien before the Code's
priority rules swing into operation. Moreover, the secured party
may be able to challenge a mechanic's lien under non-Code law on
the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or unclean hands.41 6 A
mechanic's lien granted by state law should receive priority under
section 9-310 to the full extent that state law recognizes the lien.
The priorities of section 9-310 should not be altered by implied
the fraudulent mechanic who engaged in fraud regularly. Of course, such rascals should be
subordinated; the proper vehicle for doing so, however, is state law applied via § 1-103.
411 See Summers, supra note 404, at 220.
41
2 Id. at 197 (footnotes omitted).
413 Professor Summers analyzes the non-Code law on good faith as serving primarily as
an "excluder" of unacceptable conduct, rather than as a positive standard of behavior. Id.
at 202.
414 U.G.C. § 9-104(c). This section provides that Article Nine "does not apply.., to a
lien given by statute or other rule of law for services oi materials except as provided in
Section 9-3 10 on priority of such liens .... "
415 E.g., N.Y. LIEN LAw § 180 (McKinney Supp. 1976), set out in note 372 supra.
416 We do not now stop to consider the restrictions on assertingjus tertii. Problems and
solutions will no doubt vary from state to state.
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prerequisites of good faith and reasonableness except to the extent
that these requirements are imposed by non-Code law.
417
IV
SPECIAL PROPERTY AND SPECIAL PRIORITY RULES
A. Fixtures-Section 9-313
Fixtures fall within a no man's land between personalty and
realty.4 18 They are the only realty-type interest to which the Code
applies.419 Under the Code, definition of the term "fixture" is left
entirely to non-Code property law. 42" Hence, the meaning of
"fixture"-and the scope of the Code's fixture provisions-varies
from state to state. For purposes of Article Nine's priority rules,
however, a chattel related to realty falls into one of three
categories:
(1) those which retain their chattel character entirely and are not
part of the real estate; (2) ordinary building materials which have
become an integral part of the real estate and cannot retain their
chattel character for purposes of finance; and (3) an inter-
mediate class which has become real estate for certain purposes,
but as to which chattel financing may be preserved.
42'
The Code denominates this last category "fixtures," and assigns
section 9-313 the task of resolving priority disputes involving such
property.
1. Defining "Fixture"-A Lesson in Commercial Confusion
A fixture creditor will be subordinated to competing realty
interests under section 9-313(4) if he does not correctly identify his
41 One author respectfully concurs in part and dissents in part with the foregoing
analysis. Although this author agrees that the phrase "ordinary course of his business" has
nothing to do with good faith, that the merchant standard is inapplicable, and that punish-
ing overcharging mechanic's lienors should generally be left to non-Code law, he also feels
that the Code's drafters evinced a sufficient interest in mechanic's liens and intended to
give § 1-203 a sufficiently broad application to impose a requirement of subjective good
faith on those who seek the benefits of § 9-310.
418 See U.C.C. § 9-313, Comment 1; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-8, at 924-25.
419 U.C.C. § 9-104(j) states that "[t]his Article does not apply ... except to the extent
that provision is made for fixtures in Section 9-313, to the creation or transfer of an
interest in or lien on real estate .... "
4
11 See U.C.C. § 9-313(I)(a) & Comment 2; 2 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313:2, at 591 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON].
421 U.C.C. § 9-313, Comment 3.
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collateral as a fixture and perfect his interest by filing in the local
real estate records. 422 Unfortunately for creditors, identification of
fixtures is easier to require than accomplish. State fixture law is so
confused that some states found it necessary to alter section 9-313
before enacting the Code.423
State law definitions of the term "f'xture" are notoriously
vague; however, they usually embody three general requirements:
the chattel's permanent annexation to the land, its adaptation to
the use of the realty, and the intention of the parties to make a
permanent addition to the land.424 Clearly these are shifting sands
on which to build. "Permanent annexation," for example, is subject
to a variety of interpretations. 425 Moreover, as the removal remedy
422 See, e.g., In re New Hope & Ivyland R.R. Co., 353 F. Supp. 608, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 204
(E.D. Pa. 1973).
423See IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9-313(2) (Burns 1971) (security interest attaching to
goods before they become fixtures is inferior to real estate interest unless consent of real
estate interest-holder obtained); KAN. U.C.C. ANN. § 84-9-313(4)(c) (Vernon 1965) (written
notice by fixture creditor required for priority over subsequent advances) (current version
at KAN. U.C.C. ANN. § 87-9-313(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975)); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75:9-313(4B)
(1972) (fixture interest superior only if perfected 'by filing under real estate laws). Califor-
nia excluded § 9-313 from its version of the Code to avoid compounding confusion about
fixture laws. See Goldie v. Bauchet Properties, 118 Cal. Rptr. 383, 387, 16 U.C.C. Rep.
533, 537-38 (Cal. App. 1974), vacated, 15 Cal. 3d 307, 540 P.2d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 161
(1975); CAL. COM. CODE § 9313 note (West 1"964) (Bohn & Williams, California Code
Comment). Oklahoma courts have been so baffled by § 9-313 that they have resorted to
equity to resolve fixture priority disputes, and the state's highest court has directed that
these holdings may not be used as precedent. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 555 (Okla. Ct. App. 1973) (opinion not
to be used for authority); Ellard v. Green Mach. Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1243 (Okla. Ct. App.
1972) (opinion not to be used for authority).
424 See, e.g., Fish v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 64 Ariz. 164, 170, 167 P.2d 107, 111 (1946); In
re Slum Clearance, 332 Mich. 485, 494, 52 N.W.2d 195, 199 (1952); Lipsett Steel Prods.,
Inc. v. King County, 67 Wash. 2d 650, 652, 409 P.2d 475, 477 (1965); Premonstratensian
Fathers v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Wis. 2d 362, 367, 175 N.W.2d 237, 239-40 (1970).
To the definition of "fixtures," the Code adds its own small refinement: "goods are
'fixtures' when they become so related to particular real estate that an interest in them
arises under real estate law." U.C.C. § 9-313(1)(a).
425 See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 216 Ind. 573, 580, 25 N.E.2d
444, 447 (1940); McClure v. Atlantic Rock Co., 339 Pa. 296, 300-01, 14 A.2d 124, 126
(1940). Ordinary building materials, although integrated into a structure, are not fixtures
under the Code. See U.C.C. § 9-313(2) & Comment 2.
Prior to its enactment of the Code, Massachusetts defined a fixture as "a nonremovable
part of the realty." Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
75 HARv. L. REv. 1319, 1346 (1962) (emphasis added). That definition did not allow for
the part-chattel, part-realty good that the Code calls a fixture. In contrast, the Supreme
Court of Washington held that a giant scrap shear enclosed by a building and craneway-a
contraption that "cost approximately half a million dollars and was capable of exerting a
pressure of 880 tons, [and] was installed on pilings and a reinforced concrete base which
was three feet thick"--was personalty rather than a fixture because its removal was physi-
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adopted in section 9-313(8) suggests, a fixture's annexation to the
realty may be far less than permanent.426 The concept of "adapta-
tion" is usually merged with that of annexation, and is equally
elastic. 427 Finally, although courts generally view intent as the con-
trolling factor, 428 parties seldom express their intentions in this
regard. And even where the parties clearly manifest their intent, a
court may simply ignore it.429 In light of this confusion, the se-
cured creditor with a potential fixture as collateral should observe
Peskind's law--"file everywhere it could possibly benefit you to
do so.
430
2. Fixture Financing-The Interface of Article Nine
and State Real Property Law
Because fixtures are on the borderline between realty and per-
sonalty, a security interest in fixtures can be created under the
Code or under local real estate law. 431 The creditor seeking to
encumber fixtures may: (1) perfect a fixture interest under Article
cally possible. Lipsett Steel Prods., Inc. v. King County, 67 Wash. 2d 650, 651, 653, 409
P.2d 475, 476, 477 (1965).
4 6 See U.C.C. § 9-313(8) & Comment 9. Section 9-313(4)(c) also casts doubt on the
validity of using "permanent annexation" as a standard, at least for purposes of the Code,
in determining whether goods qualify as fixtures. That provision grants a perfected se-
curity interest priority over conflicting real estate interests where "the fixtures are readily
removable factory or office machines or readily removable replacements of domestic ap-
pliances which are consumer goods, and before the goods become fixtures the security
interest is perfected by any method permitted by this Article." U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(c). See
ANDERSON, supra note 420, § 9-313:7, at 1264-65 (Cum. Supp. 1970-74).
427 See State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Wally Hutter Oil Co., 467 S.W.2d 279,
282 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
411See, e.g., Fish v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 64 Ariz. 164, 170, 167 P.2d 107, 111 (1946);
State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Wally Hutter Oil Co., 467 S.W.2d 279, 282 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1971); Lipsett Steel Prods., Inc. v. King County, 67 Wash. 2d 650, 652, 409 P.2d 475,
476-77 (1965); Premonstratensian Fathers v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Wis. 2d 362, 371,
175 N.W.2d 237, 242 (1970).
42 See Fedders Cent. Air Cond. Corp. v. Karpinecz & Sons, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 720,
721-22, 372 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 1376, 1378-79 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1975). In
Fedders the buyer of a diner gave a purchase money security interest to the seller. Both the
security agreement and the financing statement described the diner as personal property.
The court found that the diner was realty:
Those elegant structures of brick, chrome, glass and marble serving hundreds at a
time with food ranging from coffee and cake to lobster thermador, chateaubriand,
Beluga caviar and all the gastronomical delicacies that one can imagine can hardly
be called chattels by the world, no matter what two or three parties choose to call
one particular diner.
83 Misc. 2d at 722, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 472, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 1379.
4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 23-12, at 821.
431 See 2 GiuoRE, supra note 3, § 30.3, at 811.
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Nine; 432 (2) acquire an interest under local law in the real estate to
which the fixture is attached; 433 or, (3) if he is eligible to take a
mechanic's lien on real property, wait for a default in payment and
slap such a lien on the property to which the fixture is attached. 434
If the creditor follows the first path, his claim to the collateral will
be governed by the priority rules of subsections 9-313(4) and (5). If
the creditor takes the second route and his competitor holds an
Article Nine fixture security interest, the same provisions apply.
But when the conflicting claimants-be they mortgagees and/or
mechanics-both assert interests in the fixture by reason of real
estate encumbrances, Article Nine defers to state real estate law to
iron out priority problems.
435
The applicability of these different laws provides potential fix-
ture creditors with flexibility. The mortgagee or materialman can
create an interest in both fixtures and realty at once. The interplay
of these laws may, however, trap the unwary creditor. Because the
applicable priority rules depend upon the type of interest the cred-
itor takes, the creditor should not select a particular method of
securing his advances without first determining what alternatives
are available and evaluating the implications of each course of
action.
3. Section 9-313 Before and After-The 1972 Amendments
and Fixture Priorities
Section 9-313 determines the priorities between secured fix-
ture creditors and real estate owners or encumbrancers holding an
interest in the real estate to which the fixture is attached. The
section's priority rules are designed to uphold parties' reasonable
expectations and to encourage reliance on real estate recording
432 See U.C.C. § 9-313(l)(b).
433 U.C.C. § 9-313(3) states: "This Article does not prevent creation of an encumbrance
upon fixtures pursuant to real estate law."
434 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 30.3, at 811. The New York statutory formulation of a
mechanic's lien on real property provides:
A contractor, subcontractor, laborer, materialman, landscape gardener, nur-
seryman or person or corporation selling fruit or ornamental trees . . . who per-
forms labor or furnishes materials for the improvement of real property with the
consent or at the request of the owner thereof, or of his agent, contractor or
subcontractor, shall have a lien for the principal and interest, of the value, or the
agreed price, of such labor or materials upon the real property improved or to be
improved and upon such improvement, from the time of filing a notice of such
lien ....
N.Y. LIEN LAw § 3 (McKinney 1966).
41 See 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 30.3, at 811.
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systems. 436 Under section 9-313(2) of the 1962 version of the Code,
the secured fixture creditor whose security interest attaches to the
property before it becomes a fixture usually takes priority over all
real estate encumbrancers. 437 If the security interest attaches to the
property after it becomes a fixture, the Article Nine fixture interest
will take priority over only "subsequent" encumbrancers of the
realty. 438 Exceptions to these rules protect certain subsequent real
estate claimants who extend credit against the fixture without
knowledge of the outstanding security interest prior to its per-
fection. 439 In effect, section 9-313 subordinates holders of security
interests in fixtures who provide insufficient warning to inter-
vening encumbrancers of the real estate.
44
0
The confusion generated by the 1962 version of section 9-313
prompted the Review Committee for Article Nine to revise and
clarify the fixture provisions in the Code's 1972 amendments.
441
436 See generally U.C.C. § 9-313, Comment 1.
437 "A security interest which attaches to goods before they become fixtures takes
priority as to the goods over the claims of all persons who have an interest in the real
estate .. " U.C.C. § 9-313(2) (1962 version). See General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Pennsyl-
vania Bank & Trust Co., 56 Pa. D. & C.2d 479, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 858 (C.P. 1972).
438 U.C.C. § 9-313(3) (1962 version) provides:
A security interest which attaches to goods after they become fixtures is valid
against all persons subsequently acquiring interests in the real estate . . . but is
invalid against any person with an interest in the real estate at the time the se-
curity interest attaches to the goods who has not in writing consented to the se-
curity interest or disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures.
439 U.C.C. § 9-313(4) (1962 version) provides:
The security interests described in subsections (2) and (3) do not take priority
over
(a) a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the real estate; or
(b) a creditor with a lien on the real estate subsequently obtained by judicial
proceedings; or
(c) a creditor with a prior encumbrance of record on the real estate to the
extent that he makes subsequent advances
if the subsequent purchase is made, the lien by judicial proceedings is obtained, or
the subsequent advance under the prior encumbrance is made or contracted for
without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected. A purchaser
of the real estate at a foreclosure sale other than an encumbrancer purchasing at
his own foreclosure sale is a subsequent purchaser within this section.
""'See, e.g., Meads v. Dial Fin. Co., 56 Ala. App. 84, 319 So. 2d 281, 17 U.C.C. Rep.
1380 (1965) (intervening purchaser without knowledge takes free of fixture security in-
terest); Tillotson v. Stephens, 195 Neb. 104, 237 N.W.2d 108, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 531 (1975)
(filing with county clerk rather than registrar of deeds ineffective against realty creditor
who lacked knowledge of fixture interest when realty mortgaged); Home Say. Ass'n v.
Southern Union Gas Co., 486 S.W.2d 386, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 639 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)
(mortgagor without knowledge of fixture interest given priority over prior fixture creditor
who perfected late and filed in wrong office).
441 FINAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 126; Bernstein & Fleisher, supra note 57, at 318-19.
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Thus far, only a few states have adopted the amended section.
Consequently, the statute has not received sufficient judicial in-
terpretation to indicate the extent of the Review Committee's suc-
cess in identifying and correcting the section's deficiencies, but on
its face the 1972 amendment goes a long way toward fixing the
fixture section.
One difficulty under the 1962 version of section 9-313 is the
meaning of the term "subsequent." The old version of section
9-313(4) provides that fixture security interests are subordinate to
the interests of (1) a "subsequent purchaser for value"; 442 (2) a
creditor with a "subsequently obtained" judgment lien;443 and (3) a
prior recorded real estate encumbrancer "to the extent that he
makes subsequent advances. 444 Unfortunately, the section does
not indicate whether "subsequent" means after the security interest
has attached or after the good has been affixed to the realty.
445
The 1972 version resolves this problem. Priorities are determined
by reference to the easily ascertained date of the fixture filing.
446
Prospective creditors may now rely on the real estate records to
reveal any prior, and therefore superior, interests in fixtures.
The 1962 version of section 9-313 also fails to follow the for-
mat of other Article Nine priority rules in making little reference
to perfected, as opposed to unperfected, security interests.447 The
442 See, e.g., In re New Hope & Ivyland R.R. Co., 353 F. Supp. 608, 612, 12 U.C.C.
Rep. 204, 207-08 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Meads v. Dial Fin. Co., 56 Ala. App. 84, 319 So. 2d 281,
17 U.C.C. Rep. 1380 (1975); Tillotson v. Stephens, 195 Neb. 104, 237 N.W.2d 108, 18
U.C.C. Rep. 531 (1975).
44'See, e.g., In re New Hope & Ivyland R.R. Co., 353 F. Supp. 608, 612, 12 U.C.C.
Rep. 204, 207-08 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
444 See, e.g., Home Say. Ass'n v. Southern Union Gas Co., 486 S.W.2d 386, 392-93, 11
U.C.C. Rep. 639, 642-43 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
445 General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Co., 56 Pa. D. & C.2d
479, 490-91, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 858, 866-67 (C.P. 1972); WHITE & SUMNIERS, supra note 1,
§ 25-10, at 932-33. Reading "subsequent" to mean "after attachment" does not correspond
with § 9-313's policy of protecting reliance interests, because real estate encumbrancers
seldom rely on fixtures not yet affixed to realty.
44' For example, U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(b) (1972 version) states:
A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflicting interest of
an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where
(b) The security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of
the encumbrancer or owner is of record ....
A fixture security interest is perfected when a financing statement complying with § 9-402(5)
is filed in the real estate records. U.C.C. § 9-313(I)(b).
A mortgage effectively perfects a fixture interest from the date it is filed if it complies
with § 9-402(6).
447 U.C.C. § 9-313(2) (1962 version) refers to "[a] security interest which attaches to
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amended version of section 9-313, however, establishes special
priority for perfected fixture security interests448 and sets forth
precise rules governing the priority of unperfected security in-
terests in fixtures.
449
4. Fixture Security Interests and Construction Mortgages
Construction mortgages450 present a special priorities prob-
lem. Under the 1962 version of section 9-313(4), "a creditor with a
prior encumbrance of record on the real estate [will take priority]
to the extent that he makes subsequent advances if ... the subse-
quent advance under the prior encumbrance is made or contracted
for without knowledge of the security interest and before it is
perfected."' 45' The phrase "or contracted for" provides an opening
for the construction mortgagee to claim priority over a perfected
purchase money security interest in a fixture.
452
The construction mortgagee's interest begins when the en-
cumbered property is still vacant land and continues, as he makes
subsequent advances, during the entire course of construction.
Thus the construction mortgagee seems to qualify as a prior "en-
cumbrancer" under section 9-313(4), at least where he initially
commits himself to making periodic future advances. Construction
financers feared, however, that courts, by reading the statute nar-
rowly, would subordinate their interests to creditors with fixture
goods before they become fixtures," and § 9-313(3) (1962 version) refers to "[a] security
interest which attaches to goods after they become fixtures." Only subsection (4) grants
priority to certain interests that arise before perfection. In contrast, the priority rules gov-
erning chattels clearly distinguish between perfected and unperfected security interests.
See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-312.
448 U.C.C. § 9-313(4).
411 Under U.C.C. § 9-313(5) a security interest in fixtures, whether perfected or un-
perfected, is effective against owners or encumbrancers of realty where
(a) the encumbrancer or owner has consented in writing to the security interest or
has disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures; or
(b) the debtor has a right to remove the goods as against the encumbrancer or
owner.
These conditions are consistent with the notice and reliance concepts of Article Nine. A
written disclaimer or a right of removal ensures in most cases that the real estate owner
or encumbrancer was aware of and consented to the superiority of the fixture creditor's
interest.
4'1 The 1972 Amendments to the Code define a "construction mortgage" as a mort-
gage "to the extent that it secures an obligation incurred for the construction of an im-
provement on land including the acquisition cost of the land, if the recorded writing so
indicates." U.C.C. § 9-313(1)(c).
451 U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(c) (1962 version) (emphasis added).
452 See 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 30.6, at 829-32.
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collateral. 453 Indeed, it has been argued that interpreting the old
version of section 9-313 to grant priority to construction mort-
gagees would "reverse the scheme of priorities which [section]
9-313 and Article 9 as a whole seem to accept. '454
The Review Committee recognized this ambiguity,455 and in
the 1972 amendments added a new subsection specifically dealing
with construction mortgages.456 New section 9-313(6) provides that
"a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a construction
mortgage recorded before the goods become fixtures if the goods
become fixtures before the completion of the construction. '457 The
construction mortgagee takes priority whether his advances are
optional or contractually required.458 The mortgagee who refi-
nances a construction mortgage also takes priority over a perfected
security interest under the new rule.459
The new section on construction mortgages eliminates the
confusion that existed under the 1962 version of section 9-313.
Moreover, the construction mortgagee's treatment does not wholly
violate the interests protected by the rest of Article Nine. Both the
construction mortgagee and the fixture creditor extend new credit.
The priority given to construction mortgagees primarily reflects
the drafters' preference of real estate interests over personal prop-
erty interests. 46 11 Vacant land is insufficient collateral for the con-
struction mortgagee's advances. The construction mortgagee must
rely instead on the structure being built to secure his loan. A cred-
itor considering a purchase money security interest in fixtures can
discover the existence of a construction mortgage in the real estate
records. Because the priority of a construction mortgagee "applies
only during the construction period leading to the completion of
453 Bernstein & Fleisher, supra note 57, at 320-21.
454 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 30.6, at 832. See id. at 830-32. Article Nine, in the
purchase money provisions of § 9-312 and the fixture provisions of § 9-313, gives "an
apparently absolute priority to the purchase-money or fixture interest." Id. at 830. The
1962 Code's fixture priority rules do not distinguish between purchase money and non-
purchase money security interests.
455 3 U.L.A. 1977 Pamphlet § 9-313 note (Official Reasons for Change).
456 The Article Nine Review Committee thought that construction mortgagees de-
served preferential treatment and that such a rule would not compromise Article Nine's
priority scheme. FINAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 203.
457 U.C.C. § 9-313(6).
458 U.C.C. § 9-313, Comment 4(e). This conclusion is based on the language of
§ 9-313(1)(c), set out at note 450 supra.
459 U.C.C. § 9-313(6). See also Bernstein & Fleisher, supra note 57, at 320-31.
460 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 203 (general comment on the approach of the
Review Committee); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-11, at 937.
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the improvement," 461 construction activity itself will alert the po-
tential fixture creditor that another's advances may be secured
under a prior recorded mortgage. Even optional advances are gen-
erally predictable. Moreover the potential fixture creditor can eas-
ily discover whether such advances are permitted under the origi-
nal agreement. In sum, fixture creditors should not be able to
disrupt the priority of a construction mortgagee if the mortgage
was recorded in time to give fair notice to the potential Article
Nine secured creditor.
5. Fixtures Attached to Realty Not Owned by the Debtor
When fixtures subject to a security interest are attached to
land owned by someone other than the debtor, special problems
develop. Two important questions are: (1) What happens when a
fixture interest is filed in the real estate records against a debtor
who has no recorded interest in the real estate? and (2) What effect
does a landlord-tenant agreement have on fixture interests?462 The
1962 version of section 9-313 ignores these problems. Under that
provision, if the fixture interest is filed under the debtor's name
and the debtor has no recorded interest in the realty, the real
estate encumbrancer is practically helpless-a search of the real
estate records will not reveal the fixture creditor's interest.463 If not
alerted by the debtor's physical possession of the realty, the real
estate creditor will remain unaware of the perfected fixture in-
terest when evaluating the property as collateral for a loan. In a
fight for priority, the fixture creditor will triumph. The 1972
amendments to section 9-313 attempt to resolve these problems by
providing notice to creditors who will be subordinated to prior
interests.
Amended section 9-313(4)(a) limits the general priority of a
purchase money fixture creditor over real estate interests.464 The
461 U.C.C. § 9-313, Comment 4(e). The priority given to construction mortgagees does
not extend to the financing of additions to the building long after completion of the im-
provement. This is true even though the construction mortgagee provides such financing
under an open-end clause of the construction mortgage. Id.
462 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-10, at 933-34.
463 ANDERSON, supra note 420, § 9-313:17(a), at 1263-64 (Gum. Supp. 1970-74). If the
debtor has no recorded interest in the real estate, the filing would fulfill all the require-
ments of the 1962 versions of §§ 9-401 and 9-313, but would not form a link in the
property's chain of title. Thus the real estate encumbrancer would be unable to discover it
no matter how diligent he was.
464 A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflicting
interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where
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fixture creditor may only take priority if the real estate interest
arises before the goods become fixtures and the debtor has posses-
sion of, or a recorded interest in, the real estate. The language and
purpose of the provision are clear. The requirement that the
debtor have an apparent interest in the land is designed to warn
the potential real estate creditor that prior obligations may exist
under the name of someone other than the landowner. 465 The real
estate encumbrancer should check for prior interests before he
relies on the fixture in extending credit. Thus, new section
9-313(4) is fully consistent with the Code's emphasis on notice and
reliance.
Prior to the 1972 amendments to section 9-313, the impact of
an agreement between a landlord and a tenant with respect to the
removal of fixtures was uncertain. The new section 9-313(5)(b) fills
in this gap. Under this provision, the tenant's fixture creditor,
whether or not his interest is perfected, takes priority over the
owner or encumbrancer of real estate where "the debtor [i.e., the
tenant] has a right to remove the goods as against the encum-
brancer or owner. If the debtor's right terminates, the priority of
the security interest continues for a reasonable time. '466 Although
this provision does not establish priorities on the basis of notice, it
may not entirely undermine Article Nine's policy of preventing
adverse reliance and protecting those who rely without notice:
Mortgagees are big boys; they can be expected to understand
leases and to know that certain tenants commonly install fixtures
and retain a right to remove them. If they wish to guard against
that possibility, they can lend a little less money or can insist that
landlords to whom they lend use leases which deny the tenant
the right of removal.467
Under the amended section, creditors can at least be certain of the
law. Accordingly, they can take steps to ensure that their interests
are protected.
(a) the security interest is a purchase money security interest, the interest of
the encumbrancer or owner arises before the goods become fixtures, the security
interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the goods become fixtures or within
ten days thereafter, and the debtor has an interest of record in the real estate or is
in possession of the real estate ....
U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a).
4" See U.C.C. § 9-313, Comment 5.
466 U.C.C. § 9-313(5)(b).
467 WHITE & SuMNmaas, supra note 1, § 25-10, at 933.
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B. Accessions--Section 9-314
Personal property law's analogue to fixtures is "accessions,"
a term defined in section 9-314(1) as "goods ... installed in or af-
fixed to other goods." Closely patterned after the pre-1972 fixture
section, 468 section 9-314 governs priority disputes involving se-
curity interests in accessions. Subsection (1) broadly protects the
security interest in accessions obtained prior to their installation or
affixation. 469 Subsection (2) protects accession security interests ac-
quired after installation or affixation except against parties who
have previously obtained interests in the whole.47 " Exceptions to
both rules are found in subsection (3), which subordinates acces-
sion security interests to specific parties who subsequently obtain
interests in the whole (namely, subsequent purchasers, subsequent
lieih creditors, and previously perfected secured creditors making
subsequent advances) without knowledge of the accession security
interest, and prior to its perfection. 471 Litigation involving section
468 Section 9-314 is virtually a carbon copy of former § 9-313, with the substitution of a
few key words to apply its rules to accessions rather than fixtures. Gilmore remarks that
the Code's draftsmen treated accessions and fixtures as "identical twins." 2 GILMORE, supra
note 3, § 31.3, at 845. It is interesting to note that although the Code's fixture provision
was totally rewritten in 1972, § 9-314 avoided the editing pencil completely.
469 (1) A security interest in goods which attaches before they are installed in
or affixed to other goods takes priority as to the goods installed or affixed (called
in this section "accessions") over the claims of all persons to the whole except as
stated in subsection (3) and subject to Section 9-315(1).
U.C.C. § 9-314(1).
470 (2) A security interest which attaches to goods after they become part of a
whole is valid against all persons subsequently acquiring interests in the whole
except as stated in subsection (3) but is invalid against any person with an interest
in the whole at the time the security interest attaches to the goods who has not
in writing consented to the security interest or disclaimed an interest in the goods
as part of the whole.
U.C.C. § 9-314(2).
Two points about this section-one practical and one esoteric--deserve special men-
tion. First, the creditor making advances against accessions should make sure that his se-
curity agreement is executed (and therefore that the security interest is attached) before
the collateral is installed or affixed. This will assure him of the more generous treatment
provided by subsection (1). Second, the section's characterization of the security interest as
"invalid" suggests a strong case for trustee subrogation to prior interests under § 70e of the
Bankruptcy Act in certain unusual cases. See notes 329-30 and accompanying text supra.
471 (3) The security interests described in subsections (1) and (2) do not take
priority over
(a) a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the whole; or
(b) a creditor with a lien on the whole subsequently obtained by judicial
proceedings; or
(c) a creditor with a prior perfected security interest in the whole to the
extent that he makes subsequent advances
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9-314 is uncommon, 472 and Code commentators have given acces-
sions short shrift.4 73 The reported cases, however, do point up
some definite problems with section 9-314,4 7 4 and show that courts
fail to understand fully the statute's scope and meaning.
475
1. Defining "Accession"
The threshold question in every section 9-314 case is whether
the goods involved qualify as accessions. Properly noting the limita-
tion imposed by section 9-315,476 one commentator has defined
section 9-314 accessions as "what occurs when goods are affixed to
other goods, without destroying their respective identities. ' 47 7 Un-
if the subsequent purchase is made, the lien by judicial proceedings obtained or
the subsequent advance under the prior perfected security interest is made or con-
tracted for without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected.
U.C.C. § 9-314(3).
472 Our research uncovered only seven reported cases dealing with § 9-314.
473 Characteristically, the most thorough treatment has been provided by Professor
Gilmore. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, §§ 31.1, .3, at 837-41, 844-45. Uncharacteristically,
Professors White and Summers do not even mention accessions in their one-volume
treatise on the Code.
474 Because the statute is virtually identical to the 1962 fixtures provision discussed in
the previous section, these problems need not be reexplored. Most important among them,
however, is the meaning of "subsequent" in subsection 9-314(3). See notes 442-45 and ac-
companying text supra. _
47' See, e.g., In re Verrango Limestone Co., 1 U.C.C. Rep. 591, 601-02 (W.D. Pa.,
Bankr. Ct.), affd, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 602 (W.D. Pa. 1960). In discussing § 9-314, the Verrango
court made two serious errors. Its first mistake was discussing the section at all. Since the
goods involved were allegedly attached to realty rather than personalty, the case was totally
controlled by the Code's fixture provisions. However, in addition to analyzing the case
under § 9-313, the court launched into an unwarranted application of § 9-314. Moreover,
the court's muddled § 9-314 analysis was itself laced with error. In quoting only isolated
parts of § 9-314, the court demonstrated ignorance of the fact that even if the disputed
goods were accessions, the bankruptcy trustee (claiming under § 70c of the Bankruptcy Act
as a subsequent lien creditor) would lose priority, since the secured party perfected prior
to bankruptcy. Rather, the court rested its decision in favor of the secured creditor on
conclusory passages from the Comments which, rather than illustrating its specific applica-
tions, summarized the general rule. Although the court decided the case under the 1953 Code
(12A PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9-314 (Appendix-U.C.C. 1953), at 582-83 (Purdon 1970)),
the new section would change neither the case's result nor the analysis set forth above. For
another decision that mishandles § 9-314, seeIn re Williams, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 990 (E.D. Wis.,
Bankr. Ct. 1973), discussed at length in note 479 infra.4 76 See U.C.C. § 9-314, Comment 3. Section 9-315 governs priority disputes over goods
that "become part of a product or mass." Comment 3 to § 9-315 states that "components
• . . assembled into a machine" are within the scope of the section, but makes clear that
such goods also qualify as accessions. See note 499 infra.
477 Lee, Perfection and Priorities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 Wyo. L.J. 1, 45
(1972) (footnote omitted). For a closer look at the interplay of §§ 9-314 and 9-315, see
notes 499-508 and accompanying text infra.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
like the fixtures provision,478 section 9-314 does not leave the de-
finition of accessions entirely to non-Code law. But perhaps due to
the generality of subsection 9-314(1)'s definition, courts have
looked to pre-Code and non-Code law in deciding what qualifies as
an accession. 47 9 This approach creates several problems. First, the
section on its face defines accessions broadly. It does not mention
integration, nondetachability, or other catchwords traditionally as-
sociated with accessions; 481 instead, it requires only installation or
478 U.C.C. § 9-313.
471 For examples of items held to be accessions under pre-Code law, see Annot., 43
A.L.R.2d 813, 820 (1955). In In re Williams, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 990 (E.D. Wis., Bankr. Ct.
1973) (dictum), the bankruptcy court held that § 9-314 codified, rather than modified, the
common-law definition of accessions. It therefore applied the "integral part" test, and
found that an air compressor affixed to a truck "with eight to ten bolts" was not an acces-
sion. Id. at 991-92. The court cited removability without injury and the secured party's
treatment of the compressor as distinct property (evidenced by execution of a separate
security agreement) as relevant to its conclusion. Id. at 992.
Williams illustrates the confusion surrounding § 9-314. The Bank of Menasha obtained
and perfected a security interest in Williams' truck. Later it financed the compressor, ex-
ecuting a security agreement covering it. The bank, however, did not file as to the com-
pressor. Williams' trustee in bankruptcy therefore challenged the security interest in the
compressor, apparently relying on his lien creditor status and § 9-301. The court responded
by analyzing at some length whether the compressor was an accession. After concluding
that the machinery was not an accession, the court added:
However, the bank did not perfect its lien on the compressor by filing notice
with the Secretary of State. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that failure
to file with both the Register of Deeds and the Secretary of State renders the
lien void against a lien creditor.... A trustee in bankruptcy has the status of a
lien creditor so the lien on the compressor is therefore null and void against the
trustee.
Id. (citation omitted).
The court's accession analysis is mysterious, since § 9-314 appears irrelevant to the
conflict posed in the case. Section 9-314 does not resolve all priority disputes involving
accessions; it only settles priority disputes between creditors secured by the accession and
parties holding interests in the whole. Here, however, the trustee's claim was based on his
hypothetical judgment lien in the compressor arising under § 70c of the Bankruptcy Act.
See notes 315-17 and accompanying text supra. Because the dispute involved conflicting
interests in the accession itself, the standard priority provisions of Article Nine-here,
§ 9-301(l)(b)-should have controlled. The opinion could be read as viewing the trustee's
interest as a judgment lien on both the truck and the compressor-a perfectly defensible
position under Bankruptcy Act § 70c. If this construction of the Bankruptcy Act is correct,
the trustee would have been a "creditor with a lien on the whole" (U.C.C. § 9-314(3)(b)),
and § 9-314 would apply if the compressor were an accession. But whether or not the
compressor qualified as an accession under § 9-314, the trustee was entitled to priority. If
it were an accession, § 9-314(3) would give the trustee priority since the bank did not
perfect its security interest before the trustee assumed the status of a hypothetical lien
creditor. If it were not an accession, the conflict would be resolved outside § 9-314, and
§ 9-301(I)(b) would give priority to the trustee. In short, the court's entire analysis of the
accession issue is dictum.
4 0 See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 813, 814 (1955).
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affixation. Second, reliance on restrictive common-law tests not
only dilutes the statute's importance, but may result in trespassing
on territory intended to be covered by section 9-315.481
Section 9-314's definition of accessions applies only to section
9-314, and is irrelevant to determining whether a good should be
categorized as an accession for other purposes. This point is driven
home in classic fashion by Mills-Morris Automotive v. Baskin,482 a
distressingly unclear opinion. Mills-Morris installed wrecker ap-
paratus on Milligan's truck, took an Article Nine security interest in
the wrecking equipment, 483 and properly filed a financing state-
ment. Milligan sold the truck to Baskin and defaulted on his obli-
gation. Mills-Morris sued Baskin in replevin for the installed
equipment. 4 4 After ruling that the wrecking apparatus was not an
"accession to or an integral part of the truck," the court nonethe-
less applied section 9-314 to give Mills-Morris priority. 485 One
plausible explanation is that the court was utterly confused; once it
found that no accession was involved, it should have applied the
Code provisions dealing with buyers of separate goods. 48 6 A more
generous explanation is that the court possessed sufficient mental
dexterity to conclude that the same word may have different mean-
ings in different contexts. According to this view, the court did not
mean to say the wrecking apparatus was not an accession under
section 9-314. Rather, the court concluded that the equipment was
not so integral a part of the truck as to require recording of the
security interests under the state's motor vehicle registration
statute.487 Therefore, the reasoning goes, the wrecking equipment
was enough of an accession to qualify under section 9-314, but not
enough of an accession to require special filing under Tennessee's
motor vehicle registration statute as a condition of perfection.
Hence, Mills-Morris' interest covered a section 9-314 accession, was
481 Gilmore has this to say of §§ 9-314 and 9-315: "[T]hin partitions do their bounds
divide and it may not always be easy to see where one leaves off and the other takes up." 2
GItMORE, supra note 3, § 31.1, at 837.
482 224 Tenn. 697, 462 S.W.2d 486, 8 U.C.G. Rep. 732 (1971).
483 The court does not make explicit that Mills-Morris' security interest was in the
equipment rather than in the truck itself. The court's application of § 9-314 strongly sug-
gests, however, that the security interest covered only the wrecker machinery.
484 The court again fails to make clear whether Mills-Morris sued for the equipment or
the truck. However, if it is safe to assume that its security interest extended only to the
equipment (see note 483 supra), it is reasonable to conclude that the replevin action con-
cerned only the equipment.
485 224 Tenn. at 699-700, 462 S.W.2d at 487, 8 U.C.C. Rep. at 733.
486 U.C.C. §§ 9-301(l)(c), 9-307.
487 See notes 488-91 and accompanying text infra.
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perfected before sale, and therefore was not defeated by section
9-314(3).
2. Motor Vehicle Registration and Section 9-314
A second issue, also important in Mills-Morris, concerns the
extent to which non-Code statutes affect section 9-314. Since acces-
sion questions normally arise where the "whole" is a motor vehi-
cle, 488 the most important of these potential intruders are motor
vehicle registration statutes. 489 Section 9-314 is completely silent on
this point, but one court has specifically denied priority to a party
secured by an accession installed in a mobile home due to noncom-
pliance with a state certificate-of-title statute.49 ° Problems of this
sort will vary among jurisdictions, but a few generalizations can be
made. First, basic Code policy favors expansive notice. Courts are
certain to be influenced by this philosophy, especially where, as
with motor vehicles, subsequent lenders and buyers tend to rely
exclusively on the certificate of title. Potential creditors and buyers
may not even consider examining the Article Nine files for inde-
pendent security interests in affixed or installed property. Second,
it is clear that the practitioner must familiarize himself with his own
state's law. Much will hinge on statutory language, and some sta-
tutes may even expressly resolve this problem. Third, the practical
practitioner should file liberally, at least where the law is unclear
and the stakes are high.
49 '
3. Mechanic's Liens and Section 9-314
The final point to make about priorities and accessions bor-
ders on the obvious, although it has apparently confused some
lawyers.492 Section 9-314 deals only with Article Nine security in-
488 See 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 31.1, at 837.
489 See U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d), (3)(b), which specifically allows states to implement special
registration and filing provisions under certificate-of-tide statutes.
491 See Wooden v. Michigan Natl Bank, 117 Ga. App. 852, 162 S.E.2d 222, 5 U.C.C.
Rep. 634 (1968) (filing with Article Nine filing office rather than following exclusive pro-
cedure provided by Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Tide Act resulted in failure to
perfect and lost priority).
49 The provisions of § 9-314 may be displaced, as well as supplemented, by non-Code
statutes. See International Atlas Servs., Inc. v. Twentieth Century Aircraft Co., 251 Cal.
App. 2d 434, 59 Cal. Rptr. 495, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 439 (1967) (§ 9-314 preempted by Federal
Aviation Act in priority dispute between aircraft financer and installer of new engine), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1038 (1968).
492 See Municipal Equip. Co. v. Butch & Son Deep Rock, 185 N.W.2d 756, 757, 8
U.C.C. Rep. 1368, 1369-70 (Iowa 1971) (artisan's lienor unsuccessfully claimed priority
under § 9-314).
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terests. Since accessions often arise when machine parts are re-
placed, some parties holding mechanic's or artisan's liens have
looked for help in section 9-314. These creditors belong in section
9-3 10,493 and courts have correctly shooed them away when they
have knocked on the door of section 9-3 14.
C. Processed and Commingled Goods-Section 9-315
When a mixing of goods resulted in the loss of their separate
identities, the common law characterized the result as "confu-
sion.' '495 This is one of the subjects dealt with in section 9-315, and
no word could more aptly summarize that provision. The first of
its two subsections reads in full:
If a security interest in goods was perfected and subsequently
the goods or a part thereof have become part of a product or
mass, the security interest continues in the product or mass if
(a) the goods are so manufactured, processed, assembled or
commingled that their identity is lost in the product or mass;
or
(b) a financing statement covering the original goods also cov-
ers the product into which the goods have been manufactured,
processed or assembled.
In a case to which paragraph (b) applies, no separate security
interest in that part of the original goods which has been man-
ufactured, processed or assembled into the product may be
claimed under section 9-314.496
Notice first that section 9-315(1) is not a true priority rule.
Instead, like section 9-201, it merely ensures that security interests
survive certain vicissitudes of commercial life. Unlike section 9-201,
the subsection also transforms a security interest in certain goods
(i.e., constituent or ingredient parts) into a security interest in other
goods (i.e., resulting products or masses). Because many goods
provided by many sellers may go into the production of finished
goods, and because many creditors may already hold security in-
493 Section 9-310 is set out in text accompanying note 357 supra.
4 94 See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Howell Bros. Truck & Auto Repair, Inc., 57 Ala.
App. 46, 49, 325 So. 2d 562, 565 (1975) (§ 9-314 does not protect truck repairman who
failed to acquire security interest); Municipal Equip. Co. v. Butch & Son Deep Rock, 185
N.W.2d 756, 759, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 1368, 1372 (Iowa 1971) (§ 9-314 inapplicable because no
security interest attached to accessions).
495 Treat v. Barber, 7 Conn. 274, 280 (1828).
496 U.C.C. § 9-315(1).
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terests in the producer's inventories, priority problems are inevita-
ble. In short, subsection (1) merely causes priority disputes. It is
subsection (2)'s job to resolve them. The miraculous change facili-
tated by section 9-315(1) occurs only if a security interest in a good
was perfected prior to its incorporation into the product or mass,
497
and in addition, if the conditions of either paragraph (a) or (b)
are satisfied. Paragraph (a) allows transformation if the "identity
[of the good] is lost" through manufacturing, processing, assem-
bling or commingling. Paragraph (b) by omission disclaims appli-
cability to "commingling" and "masses," and shifts the security in-
terest only if the financing statement covering the unincorporated
goods covers the product they go into as well.
498
1. The Overlap of Sections 9-314 and 9-315
The final sentence of section 9-315(1) makes it clear that the
goods covered by paragraph (b) include at least some accessions,
and resolves the problem that arises when particular goods match
the descriptions embodied in both sections 9-314 and 9-315(1). In
effect, section 9-315 gives the creditor holding a security interest in
such goods a choice. He can file as to the goods and the product, in
which case his security interest will shift to the product upon pro-
duction. Alternatively, he can restrict his security interest to the
goods themselves, in which case the security interest will not shift
to the product, and priority will be determined under section
9-314.4
Unfortunately, the Code does not clarify exactly which
"goods-in-contact" qualify for the option presented by the final
sentence of section 9-315(1).510 It can be argued that the broad
497 Of course, the security interest may terminate entirely prior to incorporation. See
Associated Poultry, Inc. v. Wake Farmers Coop., Inc., 17 N.C. App. 722, 195 S.E.2d 325
(1973) (§ 9-315 ignored by court where security interest apparently terminated through
authorized sale before goods commingled by buyer).
498 As a practical matter, most financers of raw materials or ingredients, knowing that
these goods will go into making other products, will take a security interest in the debtor's
finished products.
499 U.C.C. § 9-315, Comment 3 states:
This section applies not only to cases where flour, sugar and eggs are com-
mingled into cake mix or cake, but also to cases where components are assem-
bled into a machine. In the latter case a secured party is put to an election at
the time of filing, by the last sentence of subsection (1), whether to claim under
this section or to claim a security interest in one component under Section
9-314.
5"" See 2 GILIORE, supra note 3, § 31.4, at 848-49.
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language of section 9-315 ("goods... manufactured, processed or
assembled [into a product]") subsumes all accessions ("goods ...
installed in or affixed to other goods"). We reject this argument for
two reasons. First, had the drafters intended this result, they could
have expressly provided for it by incorporating the specific lan-
guage of section 9-314(1) into section 9-315(1)(b). Second, the
Comment suggests that the election rule was specifically designed
to cover "components ... assembled into a machine." 50 1 Although
we are unprepared to say that machine components are the only
goods to which the election rule applies, 50 2 the Comment per-
suades us that election is not allowed for all accession security
interests.
As a practical matter, the secured creditor should generally
elect the shift-to-the-product security route. If he chooses the
goods-only security interest, his remedy will be limited to removal,
and he will be liable for resulting property damage. 50 3 Under sec-
tion 9-315(1)(b), he will obtain rights to an allocable portion of the
proceeds arising from sale of the whole. 50 4 Besides being simpler
and more efficient, this process avoids the possible pitfall of incur-
ring liability for property damage-a liability that may exceed the
value of the repossessed collateral.
2. Separability, Lost Identity, and a Schematic View of
In-Contact Goods
Probably the single most serious problem presented by section
9-315(1) involves fleshing out the notion of "lost identity." Three
sound reasons suggest that the determination should hinge on
whether the goods are severable or separable from the product or
mass. First, this approach is in keeping with the different results
and remedies afforded by section 9-314 (allowing security interests
in goods to continue despite affixation to other goods, and provid-
ing a remedy of removal) and section 9-315 (facilitating transfor-
mation of security interest in part into security interest in whole,
and allocating the whole pro rata among secured creditors). Sec-
ond, the policy of the section, which is to afford continued protec-
"I See U.C.C. § 9-315, Comment 3, set out at note 499 supra.
502 Gilmore, who acknowledges authorship of the ambiguous Comment, agrees that
subsection (b) is not limited to such cases. 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 31.4, at 848.
503 U.C.C. § 9-314(4).
504 U.C.C. § 9-315(2).
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tion to diligent creditors and a practical remedy to secured cred-
itors whose collateral is amalgamated into a mass or product, may
recommend looking to separability even when the collateral con-
tinues to be technically identifiable. 50 5 Finally, we fear that a defini-
tion focusing on factors other than separability will bring ruination
to the carefully constructed diagram we have set out below. 5 6
The fundamental assumption of this model is that the Code
envisions three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive categories
of goods. Goods are classifiable by how easily they can be severed
or separated from other goods, and in accordance with this vari-
able are placed by the Code into one of three classes: (1) separate
chattels, (2) accessions, and (3) goods that lose their identity in be-
coming part of a product. All goods (except fixtures) fall into one
of these classes. Moreover, they fall on the continuum of separabil-
ity at one, and only one, point. The continuum would be compli-
cated by fungibles and ingredients-goods that are clearly covered
by section 9-315, but not dealt with by section 9-314. Hence, they
are excluded.507 We offer our model without further explication.
We challenge the reader to come up with an example of nonfixture
goods (excluding ingredients and fungibles) that does not fall on
this continuum or that can be plotted at more than one point.508
505 Assume, for example, that A manufactures black jelly beans and that B manufac-
tures white jelly beans. Both sell them to C and take perfected security interests. C then
mixes them, bags them, and defaults on his obligations. When the beans are mixed, each
group remains clearly identifiable. Separating them, however, would be highly impractical.
Prorating the whole is infinitely more sensible than forcing each creditor to reclaim his
own jelly beans from C.
506 The diagram, representing our view of the interplay of sections 9-314 and 9-315, is
based on (1) the foregoing analysis, (2) our sanguine (and perhaps presumptuous) conclu-
sion that the drafters intended in sections 9-314 and 9-315 to deal with "in-contact goods"
comprehensively and coherently, (3) the broad definition of accessions suggested by the
Comments, and (4) the admonition of the Comment to section 9-314 that "accessions" and
"lost-identity" goods are mutually exclusive categories. Comment 3 to § 9-314 states: "This
section does not apply to goods which, for example, are so commingled in a manufacturing
process that their original identity is lost. That type of situation is covered in Section
9-315."
507 Intermingled fungibles and ingredients form their own continuum based on
separability, at some point becoming "lost identity" goods rather than separate goods.
separate goods goods that lose identity
HIGH SEPARABILITY LOW SEPARABILITY
508 It is important to realize that this diagram merely provides a framework for
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U.C.C. § 9-315
goods that become part of a product or mass
U.C.C. § 9-314 U.C.C. § 9-315(I)(a)





U.C.C. § 9-315(l)I I
U.C.C. § 9-315(1)(b)
goods that are manufactured,
processed, or assembled into a product
3. Priorities as to Processed or Commingled Goods-Section 9-315(2)
Now that the interplay of sections 9-314 and 9-315 is clear, we
shall analyze the latter section's priority provision, section 9-315(2).
The rule states:
When under subsection (1) more than one security interest at-
taches to the product or mass, they rank equally according to the
ratio that the cost of the goods to which each interest originally
attached bears to the cost of the total product or mass.
The section controls priority "[w]hen under subsection (1) more
than one security interest attaches to the product or mass." Appar-
ently this means that both competing security interests must have
arisen "magically" under section 9-315. Hence, subsection (2) has
no bearing on the more common conflict between a section 9-315
security interest and the security interest covering the debtor's
finished product. 5 9 If two section 9-315 security interests do con-
categorizing "in-contact" goods. While this will sometimes determine which priority rules
apply, it will not always be controlling. For example, although a good may lose its identity
under § 9-315(1)(a), priority as to the resulting product may be determined by § 9-312. See
note 509 and accompanying text infra.
509 Such a conflict will be resolved under the general priority rules governing compet-
ing security interests found in § 9-312.
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flict, they "rank equally," and the amount each secured creditor
recovers is controlled by section 9-315's formula:
cost of goods to which his security interest attached x total proceeds
cost of the total product or mass
Unfortunately this apparently simple formula is rife with serious
problems.
The first problem arises because the formula is cost-based.
Assume A sells C $100 worth of tin on credit, and perfects a se-
curity interest in it. B sells C $100 worth of copper, takes a $50
downpayment, and likewise perfects. C melts the metals into
bronze, the market crumbles, C defaults, and the bronze is sold for
$100. A's and B's security interests both continued in the bronze
under section 9-315(1)(a). Hence, subsection (2) controls. Applying
the formula, A gets $50 (i.e., his debt is one-half paid), and B gets
$50 (i.e., his debt is paid in full). The result seems sorely inequi-
table. Moreover, section 9-315(2) fails to follow the rule of bank-
ruptcy distribution, its closest analogue, which bases pro rata dis-
tribution on the amount still owed each creditor. Finally, and most
importantly, no sensible justification supports this unusual scheme.
Defining the formula's denominator presents a second prob-
lem. If, as Professor Gilmore suggests,;1 "the cost of the total
product or mass" includes labor and overhead costs in addition to
the cost of materials, in many cases the secured creditors together
will receive only part of the total proceeds resulting from sale of
the mutually encumbered collateral.5 1' Unlike Professor Gilmore,
we feel that this anomalous outcome justifies limiting "the cost of
the total product or mass" to the cost of its constituent parts. The
phrase, at least in context, is not unambiguous. Moreover, as cost
accountants insist, actual cost is incalculable. But inasmuch as the
line must be drawn, policy should guide the pen. Defining "the cost
of the total product or mass" as the sum of the costs of its parts or
ingredients avoids not only anomalous results, but also complex
problems of proof.
A final problem results from section 9-315's failure to give
special treatment to purchase money security interests. Concerned
with the specter that purchase money secured parties may have to
share the loaf with secured parties claiming under an after-
acquired property clause covering the goods to be processed or
510 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 31.5, at 852.
11 Id. at 852-53.
[Vol. 62:834
ARTICLE NINE PRIORITY RULES
commingled, Gilmore recommends that in cases involving section
9-315(2) courts should allow the after-acquired property interest to
attach only to the debtor's equity in the collateral. 512 Gilmore's
position borders on the outrageous. It is wholly without statutory
foundation and invites a potentially disastrous emasculation of the
Code-endorsed after-acquired property clause. Gilmore bases the
argument on his fear of a result that "seems unfair. '513 Exactly the
same unfairness argument and property-equals-equity analysis re-
cently convinced the Florida Supreme Court to repeal judicially the
priority scheme envisioned by sections 9-204(1) and 9-312(4).51
4
The drafters of the Code, it seems, should be more protective of
the fruits of their labor.
V
SECURED CREDITORS AND TRANSFEREES OF COLLATERAL
SECTIONS 9-306 TO 9-309
The typical commercial setting in which sections 9-307, 9-308,
and 9-309 operate looks like this:
A lender has extended credit to a seller in return for a security
interest in collateral. The seller has sold part or all of the collateral
to a purchaser, perhaps giving rise to another security interest. At
this point all is well: the lender has a security interest in the pro-
ceeds of the sale, the seller has been paid, and the purchaser has
the collateral to use as he pleases. If the purchaser bought on
credit, other lenders and new security interests may come into the
picture. In any event, as long as everyone continues to meet his
obligations, the stream of commerce flows smoothly and the prior-
ity rules remain in the background.
Inevitably, however, someone defaults on an obligation se-
cured by the collateral. Once this trigger is pulled, all interested
parties scramble to get a grip on the collateral before the hammer
falls. The resulting battle is the cue for the priority rules to step in
and resolve the conflict.
A. Was the Sale Authorized?
Section 9-306(2) goes far toward protecting the secured cred-
itor against surprise sales by his debtor:
5 2 Id. at 855-56.
513 Id. at 856.
524 International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank, 296 So. 2d 32, 14
U.C.C. Rep. 19 (Fla. 1974). See notes 208-21 and accompanying text supra.
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Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security in-
terest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or
other disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized by
the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and
also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections
received by the debtor.
515
Thus, the purchaser and the secured party fight the first
round over whether the secured party authorized a sale of the
collateral. If the purchaser shows that the secured party authorized
the sale, the fight is over: the purchaser takes the collateral free of
the security interest.516 In attempting to meet this burden, the
purchaser is not limited to the four corners of the security agree-
ment; he can show that the sale was authorized through a course of
dealing or usage of trade.
5 1 7
Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.518 illustrates such
an authorization. In that case, the debtor-seller converted raw tex-
tiles into finished goods. The lender had a security interest in all of
the debtor's finished and unfinished inventory. In accordance with
industry practice, the debtor occasionally sold some of his excess
unfinished stock in the market. The debtor normally applied the
proceeds of these sales to its outstanding debt with the secured
party. In light of this industry custom and the parties' own course
of dealing, the New York Court of Appeals found an implied au-
thority to sell; after all, the court reasoned, if the debtor were ever
to liquidate his debt to the secured party, such sales would have to
be authorized.
519
In essence, section 9-306(2) provides that when a secured
party cloaks his debtor with apparent authority to sell collateral, he
should be estopped from denying later that the debtor had no such
authority.520 If the secured party's conduct does not go far enough,
515 U.C.C. § 9-306(2). This provision creates an exception to the general rule of Article
Nine that "a security agreement is effective according to its terms ... against purchasers of
the collateral and against creditors." U.C.C. § 9-201.
'16 See Bank of Beulah v. Chase, 231 N.W.2d 738, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 330 (N.D. 1975)
(word "resale" on face of security agreement expressly indicated secured party's authoriza-
tion of sale).
5 1"See Planters Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Bowles, 256 Ark. 1063, 511 S.W.2d 645, 14
U.C.C. Rep. 1435 (1974) (credit association authorized sale where member-debtors, in ac-
cordance with association policy, sold collateral and applied proceeds toward debts at will).
518 39 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 385 (1976).
5 19 Id. at 637, 350 N.E.2d at 593, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 262, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 389-90.
52 See Apeco Corp. v. Bishop Mobile Homes, Inc., 506 S.W.2d 711, 14 U.C.C. Rep.
680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (after delivering mobile home to dealer, manufacturer estopped
from denying authorization of sale).
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no authorization will be found. For example, a bank's failure to file
a purchase money security interest in an automobile is insufficient
to give the debtor apparent authority to sell the car, where the
applicable statute does not require filing to perfect the security
interest.52I And even where the secured party explicitly authorizes
the sale, if he does so upon a condition, the sale will not be deemed
authorized unless the condition is met.
522
Comment 3 to section 9-306(2) in the 1962 Code suggests that
authorization might be inferred from the secured party's claim in
the security agreement to all proceeds resulting from the sale of
the collateral. 523 Although Comment 3 under the 1972 amend-
ments retreats from this position,524 at least one court has recog-
nized that an authorization to sell might be inferred from a claim
to proceeds.52 5 Clearly, such a claim should be considered in the
overall commercial setting as one fact tending to show authoriza-
tion.
52 6
If the sale was authorized, the lender's security interest is se-
vered at the moment of sale, and the buyer acquires full rights in
the collateral. In addition, any secured party claiming through the
buyer takes free of the original security interest. 527 The purchaser
521 See National Shawmut Bank v. Corcoran Motor Sales Co., 47 Mass. App. Dec. 72, 10
U.C.C. Rep. 273 (Boston Mun. Ct. 1971). Under the Massachusetts Commercial Code, no
filing is required to perfect a purchase money security interest in a motor vehicle, which is
a "consumer good." MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 9-302(I)(d) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976).
522 See, for example, South Omaha Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Tyson's Inc., 189 Neb. 702,
204 N.W.2d 806, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 352 (1973), where the secured creditor agreed to a sale
of the collateral on the condition that the proceeds first be applied in full satisfaction of its
claim. Because some of the proceeds went to another creditor before the secured party's
claim was fully satisfied, the court found no authorization for the sale.
523 U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1962 version), Comment 3, states: "A claim to proceeds in a
filed financing statement might be considered as impliedly authorizing sale or other dis-
position of the collateral, depending upon the circumstances of the parties, the nature of
the collateral, the course of dealing of the parties and the usage of trade (see Section
1-205)."
524 U.C.C. § 9-306(2), Comment 3, now states: "The right to proceeds, either under
the rules of this section or under specific mention thereof in a security agreement or
financing statement does not in itself constitute an authorization of sale."
52 S See Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 35, 39-40,
312 N.Y.S.2d 317, 321-22, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 932, 936-37 (2d Dep't 1970) (construing U.C.C.
§ 9-306(2) (1962 version)). Cf. Long Island Trust Co. v. Porta Aluminum Corp., 44 App.
Div. 2d 118, 354 N.Y.S.2d 134, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 619 (2d Dep't 1974) (security agreement
covering proceeds held only one factor showing authorization of sale). But see WHiTE &
SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-12, at 939 n. 83.
526 Indeed, the 1972 Comment, set out in note 524 supra, suggests this by negative
implication.
527 See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Financial Serv. Co., 133 Ga.
App. 488, 211 S.E.2d 430, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 396 (1974).
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prevails without resorting to the "otherwise" ammunition in the
first clause of section 9-306(2).528 This point bears repeating: It is
only when the purchaser is unable to show that the sale was au-
thorized that he need resort to the "[e]xcept where this Article
otherwise provides" language of section 9-306(2).529 Some courts
have missed this point entirely and have launched into unnecessary
analyses under section 9-307. 53o It is only when sales are unau-
thorized that courts must turn to the buyer-versus-secured-party
priority rules.
B. The Buyer Versus the Unperfected Security Interest
Section 9-301(1)(c) grants buyers not in the ordinary course of
business priority over unperfected security interests to the extent
they give value and take possession of the collateral without knowl-
edge of the security interest before the interest is perfected. 53 ' A
comparison of sections 9-301(1)(c) and 9-307(1) points up the im-
portant characteristics of the former section and provides a good
introduction to the latter.
Like section 9-307(1), section 9-301(1)(c) protects "buyers.
53 2
Unlike section 9-307(1), 5 33 however, it does not limit its protection
to buyers of goods. Rather it covers transfers of "goods, instru-
ments, documents, and chattel paper. '53 4 Section 9-301(1)(c), as
amended in 1972, also protects ordinary-course buyers of farm
products, a group specifically excluded from section 9-307. 5
35
528 Lisbon Bank & Trust Co. v. Murray, 206 N.W.2d 96, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 356 (Iowa
1973).
529 See U.C.C. § 9-307, Comment 2; Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Ceres Land Co., 32 Colo.
App. 290, 292-93, 512 P.2d 1174, 1176, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 960, 962 (1973).
50 See, e.g., Cunningham v. Camelot Motors, Inc., 138 N.J. Super. 489, 351 A.2d 402,
18 U.C.C. Rep. 1068 (Ch. Div. 1975).
531 U.C.C. § 9-301(I)(c) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected security interest
is subordinate to the rights of
(c) in the case of goods, instruments, documents, and chattel paper, a per-
son who is not a secured party and who is a transferee in bulk or other buyer
not in ordinary course of business or is a buyer of farm products in ordinary
course of business, to the extent that he gives value and receives delivery of the
collateral without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected
532 For a discussion of the term "buyer," see notes 546-61 and accompanying text inzfra.
Elsewhere we argue that § 9-301(l)(c) also protects holders of commercial paper-a group
of purchasers not traditionally referred to as "buyers." See note 716 infra.
-11 Section 9-307(1) is set out in text accompanying note 542 infra.
334 U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c).
531 The 1962 version of § 9-301(l)(c) made no reference to buyers of farm products in
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The buyer under section 9-301(1)(c) takes priority only to the
extent that he gives value without knowledge of the security in-
terest and before it is perfected. The requirement that a buyer give
value raises an ambiguity. Under section 1-201(44)(b), the giving of
"value" includes a transfer in satisfaction of a pre-existing debt.
Under section 1-201(9), however, a transfer in satisfaction of a pre-
existing debt does not constitute "buying." In our opinion, section
9-301(1)(c) covers only those who engage in "buying. ' 536 The sec-
tion's "to the extent that he gives value" language should thus be
read not as broadening the class of protected purchasers, but as
merely delineating the extent to which a "buyer" may claim the
protection of section 9-301(1)(c).
Perhaps the most mysterious feature of section 9-301(1)(c) is
its requirement that the buyer take possession of the collateral
without knowledge of the security interest. This rule applies even if
the buyer has already committed himself by paying for yet-
undelivered goods or paper. The Code's drafters apparently in-
tended to force the buyer in such cases to resort to his right of
rejection; since the seller has breached his warranty of title, 537 the
buyer can sue for restitution. The requirement that he take with-
out knowledge, however, seems overly severe and difficult to jus-
tify. Priority conflicts arise when and because the seller has de-
faulted. Under these circumstances it is unlikely that the seller will
be able to satisfy the buyer's restitutionary claim. Nevertheless, the
buyer has emptied his pocket into the seller's drawer and now
seeks the law's assistance in recovering his money. The purpose of
section 9-301(1)(c) is to protect buyers not in the ordinary course
against those who fail to give such buyers notice of their interests.
It therefore seems inconsistent and arbitrary to subordinate the
buyer who, after giving value but before taking delivery, discovers
the security interest of the creditor-at least in those cases where
the creditor could have filed and thus put the buyer on notice.
538
ordinary course, but apparently the omission was unintentional. WHITE & SUIIERS, supra
note 1, § 25-2, at 902. Although Professors White and Summers have argued that courts
should protect ordinary-course buyers of farm products under former § 9-301(1)(c), at
least one court has refused to apply the old section in this manner. See United States v.
Busing, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 1120, 1123 (E.D. Ill. 1970).
536 See notes 558-59 and accompanying text infra.
537 See U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(b), (2).
538 The drafters no doubt also wanted to protect the creditor who, without knowledge
that the buyer had given value, obtained a security interest relying on the seller's pos-
session of collateral, and thereafter promptly perfected. In attempting to protect such cred-
itors, however, § 9-301(I)(c) paints with too broad a brush; it has the further effect of
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The knowledge referred to in section 9-301(1)(c) means actual
knowledge of a competing security interest.539 Knowledge of the
underlying debt does not constitute knowledge that the debt is
secured. 541 But if the buyer knows of a competing security interest,
it makes no difference whether he knows who holds it; knowledge
that a security interest exists is sufficient by itself to subordinate the
buyer.
541
C. Protecting Buyers in Ordinary Course-Section 9-307(1)
If the purchaser cannot obtain an early victory under section
9-306(2) or 9-301(l)(c), he must prepare for a more arduous
struggle under section 9-307.
Section 9-307(1) provides:
A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of
Section 1-201) other than a person buying farm products from a
person engaged in farming operations takes free of a security
interest created by his seller even though the security interest is
perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence.
542
We find seven conditions in sections 9-307(1) and 1-201(9)
543
that a purchaser must satisfy to avoid subordination to a. secured
creditor claiming under section 9-201:544
(1) He must be a buyer of goods
(2) who took by non-bulk sale
protecting prior secured creditors who, by failing to file, denied buyers the chance to pro-
tect themselves. A compromise is in order. If a buyer of the collateral obtains knowledge
(or the security interest is perfected) after payment but before delivery, only those cred-
itors who rely on the seller's possession of the collateral in taking their security interest and
who file within 10 days after the interest attaches should be protected. We recommend that
§ 9-301(1)(c) be amended to achieve this result.
539 See U.C.C. § 1-201(25); In re Dennis Mitchell Indus., Inc., 419 F.2d 349, 353 n.11,
6 U.C.C. Rep. 573, 579 n.ll (3d Cir. 1969).
541 Whitmire v. Keylon, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1203, 1209 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).
541 Bloom v. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 469 n.2, 234 A.2d 860, 862 n.2, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 821,
825 n.2 (1967).
542 U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
543 U.C.C. § 1-201(9) defines "buyer in ordinary course of business":
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good faith and
without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or
security interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a per-
son in the business of selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker
.... Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of other property or on secured
or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or documents of title under a
pre-existing contract for sale but does not include a transfer in bulk or as security
for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.
544 U.C.C. § 9-201 is set out in the text accompanying note 22 supra.
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(3) giving new value
(4) from one in the business of selling goods of that kind (i.e.,
out of inventory)
(5) in good faith and without knowledge that the sale violated
others' ownership rights or security interests
(6) and who did not buy farm products.
(7) Finally, the security interest that the buyer is competing
against must have been "created by his seller.1
54 5
We shall examine each of these requirements in turn.
1. Requirement 1: Is the Purchaser a "Buyer"for Purposes of
Section 9-307(1)?
To qualify as a buyer in ordinary course of business (BLOC),
one must first qualify as a "buyer.1546 Unfortunately, "buyer" is not
functionally defined in Article Nine.547 Although it is usually clear
515 Professors White and Summers identify six conditions that the buyer must satisfy to
qualify for the protection of § 9-307(1):
(I) He must be a buyer in the ordinary course
(2) who does not buy in bulk and does not take his interest as security for or
in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing debt (that is, he must give some
form of "new" value)
(3) who buys from one in the business of selling goods of that kind (that is,
cars from a car dealer, i.e. inventory);
(4) who buys in good faith and without knowledge that his purchase is in
violation of others' ownership rights or security interests, and.
(5) does not buy farm products from a person engaged in farming opera-
tions, and
(6) the competing security interest must be one "created by his seller".
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-13, at 940.
Although this analytic structure is extremely helpful and provides the basis for our
own organization, we find the first condition conclusory, and therefore potentially confus-
ing. Accordingly we have modified the list in an effort to provide a more precise frame-
work for analysis.
546 Section 9-307(1) was intended to protect the class of persons who normally buy
from a seller's inventory. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-13, at 940. Although it is
clear that a consumer or business buying for use or resale can be a BIOC (2 GILMoIPE,
supra note 3, § 26.6, at 697), in the early days of Article Nine it was unclear whether a party
buying from another party on the same level in the chain of distribution (as in dealer-
dealer or manufacturer-manufacturer transactions) could qualify as a BIOC. Id. Today the
question is settled: the buyer's business is immaterial. As long as he otherwise qualifies,
even a fellow merchant may be a BIOC. See Weidinger Chevrolet, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 501 F.2d 459, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 197 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033
(1974); Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 523 (Del.
1972); Bank of Utica v. Castle Ford, Inc., 36 App. Div. 2d 6, 317 N.Y.S.2d 542, 8 U.C.C.
Rep. 910 (4th Dep't 1971); Associates Discount Corp. v. Rattan Chevrolet, Inc., 462 S.W.2d
546, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 117 (Tex. 1970). The only class of purchasers specifically excluded
from the protection of § 9-307(1) are pawnbrokers. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
547 Section 2-103(1)(a) defines "buyer" for purposes of Article Two as "a person who
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whether a party qualifies as a buyer, at least one court has had to
address this issue. In Troy Lumber Co. v. Williams, 5 48 a purchaser
gave a dealer a $600 deposit on a new mobile home. Before the
purchase was consummated, one of the dealer's officers absconded
with all of the company's cash. The purchaser, seeking to recover
his $600 deposit, attached the mobile home to satisfy his claim. He
thus came into conflict with the manufacturer of the mobile home,
which held a perfected security interest in the dealer's inventory.
The court held that the purchaser could not invoke section
9-307(1) to sever the manufacturer's security interest; because he
had rescinded his contract with the dealer and demanded return of
his down payment, the purchaser was not a buyer within the mean-
ing of that section. To qualify as a BIOC, the court reasoned, a
purchaser must seek to vindicate his rights in a manner consistent
with his status as a BIOC-that is, he must complete the process of
buying. Had the purchaser sought full performance under his con-
tract with the dealer, he would have behaved like a "buyer" and
would therefore have qualified as a BIOC.5 49 Since the purchaser
had insisted on rescinding rather than going forward with the
transaction, he could not use section 9-307(1) to cut off the
manufacturer's interest.
Although the court in Troy Lumber reached a correct result, it
left much unsaid. In one sense, Troy Lumber's buyer-turned-
attacher was a "buyer. '55 " However, the policies underlying section
9-307 militate against awarding him "buyer" status. The two basic
purposes of section 9-307(1) are to facilitate the free exchange of
goods in the market place, and to protect legitimate reliance in-
terests of owners who acquire goods in common commercial trans-
actions. In this case, however, neither of these policies applied
because the "buyer" rescinded his contract. The buyer, like any
other lienor, was merely trying to collect an obligation owed him by
the dealer. To do this, he could have attached any property of the
dealer. His decision to attach a mobile home as to which he had
buys or contracts to buy." This circularity, however, hardly amounts to an operational
definition. See WHITE & SuiNIERs, supra note 1, § 25-13, at 942 n.90.
548 124 Ga. App. 636, 185 S.E.2d 580, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 1144 (1971).
59 Id. at 637-38, 185 S.E.2d at 582, 9 U.C.C. Rep. at 1145-46.
550 Having contracted to buy, he at least satisfied Article Two's definition of "buyer."
See U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a). He could thus resort to "buyers'" remedies, including the remedy
of rescission which in fact he exercised. The Article Two definition, however, is inappli-
cable to Article Nine. See note 557 and accompanying text infra.
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specifically rejected an ownership interest should not affect the
result. Moreover, we find rescission cases indistinguishable from
cases in which tendered goods are rejected. 551 In both settings, the
policies of section 9-307 require forsaking the would-be "buyer."
Another case-this one involving section 9-301(1)(c)-also
poses an interesting "buyer" question. In Ray v. City Bank & Trust
Co. 552 the purchaser of an oil drilling rig failed to qualify as a
BIOC because the transfer was in satisfaction of a pre-existing
debt.553 This, however, did not end the court's inquiry. Due to a
misleading omission in the financing statement, the security in-
terest in the rig had not been properly perfected. In resolving the
conflict between the buyer and the seller's unperfected secured
creditor, the court reasoned that priorities involving unperfected
security interests are governed by section 9-301, which subordi-
nates unperfected security interests to buyers not in the ordinary
course.554 Finding no further complications, the court granted
priority to the purchaser of the rig.
But wait a minute. Section 9-301(1)(c) makes unperfected se-
curity interests subordinate to "buyers not in ordinary course.
555 If
the purchaser 556 fails to qualify as a BIOC, he cannot automatically
claim that he is a "buyer not in ordinary course." Under section
9-301(1)(c), as under section 9-307(1), he must first show that he is
a "buyer." This, however, is no easy task. Article Nine provides no
definition of "buyer," and the Article Two definition in section
2-103(1)(a) does not apply to Article Nine.557 The only place left to
turn to is Article One. Although Article One does not define
"buyer," it does discuss, if not define, "buying":
"Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of other property or
on secured or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or
551 At least one court has specifically found § 9-307 inapplicable where the buyer re-
jected goods. See Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97, 12
U.C.C. Rep. 849 (1973) (buyer not in ordinary course of business because no sale oc-
curred).
52 358 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
5-3 Id. at 639.
554 Id. at 64 1.
555 U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(c) (emphasis added).
556 "Purchaser" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(32)-(33):
(32) "Purchase" includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge,
lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest
in property.
(33) "Purchaser" means a person who takes by purchase.
557 See U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a), set out in part in note 547 supra.
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documents of title under a pre-existing contract for sale but does
not include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or
partial satisfaction of a money debt.
55 8
Largely because no other formulation exists, we recommend com-
pliance with this language as the minimum requirement for estab-
lishing "buyer" status under Article Nine.55 9
Under this test, the court's decision in Ray is incorrect. "Buy-
ing" specifically excludes a "transfer . . . in . . . satisfaction of a
money debt. ' 5611 Therefore, the purchaser who took the rig in satis-
faction of such a debt did not engage in "buying" and hence did
not qualify as a "buyer." Because section 9-301(1)(c) was inapplica-
ble, the security interest, even though unperfected, should have
prevailed against the purchaser under the golden rule of section
9-201.561
2. Requirement 2: Did the Transaction Amount to a Sale?
Section 1-201(9) uses the word "sale" in defining buyer in the
ordinary course of business. If secured parties seize on this lan-
guage in arguing that a section 9-307 claimant is not a BIOC,
562
the factfinder will have to address the question of whether a "sale"
has occurred.5 63 Sectilon 2-106 defines "sale" as "the passing of title
from the seller to the buyer for a price (Section 2-401)."564 If title
558 U.G.C. § 1-201(9).
559 Although the Code discusses "buying" in § 1-201(9), which defines "buyer in ordi-
nary course of business," we feel that the term "buying" was intended to have an indepen-
dent significance. Note first that the term "buying" is physically set apart from the defini-
tion of "buyer in ordinary course of business." Second, the definition of the latter phrase
does not even include the term "buying." Finally the concepts embodied in the discussion
of "buying" could have easily been written into the definition of "buyer in ordinary course
of business." Their inclusion in the broader term "buying" suggests that the drafters in-
tended these concepts to have a broader application. It is thus our view that at the very
least a "buyer" is one who engages in "buying."
560 U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
561 Even the most deserving buyer may not qualify as a BIOC. Section 9-201 confers
this special status only on buyers of "goods," a term defined for Article Nine purposes in
§ 9-105(1)(h) as essentially "things which are movable." Others have discussed what is
meant by "goods" (see 1 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 12.2, at 368-71; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 1, § 2-2, at 45), and we do not pause to consider this issue.
562 See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 5 U.C.C.
Rep. 226 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d
97, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 849 (1973).
563 See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Financial Servs. Co., 133 Ga.
App. 488, 211 S.E.2d 430, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 396 (1974); Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc.,
59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 849 (1973).
564 U.C.C. § 2-106. Section 9-105(3) makes this definition of "sale" applicable to Article
Nine.
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has passed under section 2-401, the buyer will not be defeated by
the security interest simply because he has not taken actual
possession. 565 However, if the buyer rejects the goods or does not
accept them in accordance with the provisions of Article Two, the
transaction between the seller and the buyer has no binding effect,
and the secured party will win.
566
Whether a "sale" has occurred may become an important ques-
tion when the buyer has returned goods to the seller. In foreclos-
ing on the seller's inventory while the goods are in the seller's
possession, a secured party will argue that his security interest con-
tinues in the goods despite the seller's momentary loss of pos-
session.56 7 In such cases, the outcome depends on whether the
antecedent dealings between buyer and seller constituted a com-
pleted sale.
Two cases aptly illustrate these concepts. In Chrysler Corp. v.
Adamatic, Inc. 5 68 and International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fi-
nancial Services Co.,569 the seller's secured creditor foreclosed while
the seller had possession of goods claimed by the buyer. In both
cases the buyer sought to free the goods from the perfected se-
curity interest of the inventory financer by claiming that he was a
BIOC.
Adamatic involved contracts for the manufacture of several
machines. The seller-manufacturer completed the first machine
and delivered it to the buyer. While the second and third machines
were still being manufactured, the buyer returned the first ma-
chine for repairs. A creditor of the seller, seeking at this point to
forelose on the seller's inventory, asserted a perfected security
interest in all three machines.
In International Harvester, the dealer, having contracted to sell
tractor-trucks and matching trailers to the buyer, agreed to store
the trucks until the trailers were also ready for delivery. Before
delivery could be made, the dealer's secured creditor foreclosed on
the dealer's inventory. Arguing that the transaction between the
dealer and the buyer had never been consummated, the creditor
claimed a security interest in the undelivered trucks.
Adamatic and International Harvester thus collectively represent
transactions at three different stages of completion:
565 Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97, 12 U.C.C. Rep.
849 (1973).
566 See id.
567 See, e.g., id. at 231, 208 N.W.2d at 102, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 857-58.
568 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 849 (1973).
569 133 Ga. App. 488, 211 S.E.2d 430, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 396 (1974).
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(1) First machine in Adamatic-delivery completed, goods re-
turned for repair.
(2) Trucks in International Harvester-"sale" completed except
for delivery.
(3) Second and third machines in Adamatic-goods still in the
process of manufacture.
In both cases, the courts held that although the Code failed to
cover explicitly situations where buying involved nonreceipt of
goods, it was reasonable to assume that section 1-201(9) requires a
"sale." 57" Thus, with respect to the first machine in Adamatic, the
court held that the return of the machine for repairs did not undo
the sale completed earlier. 71 There was neither evidence that the
buyer was rejecting or refusing to accept the machine, nor any-
thing to indicate that the buyer was rescinding the contract.
572
With respect to the trucks, the court in International Harvester
held that the transaction had progressed far enough to constitute a
"sale" under section 2-106. 5 7 3 Unless otherwise agreed, title under
the Code passes when the seller finally commits himself.574 Since
title passed under section 2-401, a sale took place under section
2-106. The buyer's failure to take immediate possession did not
vitiate the sale, because the seller had finally committed himself.
575
Finally, with respect to the second and third machines in
Adamatic, the court found that title had not passed under section
2-401 before the secured party foreclosed. Hence a section 2-106
sale had not taken place. 576 The seller's security interest was not
371 International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Financial Servs. Co., 133 Ga.
App. 488, 493-94, 211 S.E.2d 430, 433-34, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 396, 400-01 (1974); Chrysler
Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 239, 208 N.W.2d 97, 106, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 849,
863 (1973).
37, 59 Wis. 2d at 233, 208 N.W.2d at 103, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 859.
572 Id. at 232-33, 208 N.W.2d at 103, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 858-59.
573 133 Ga. App. at 494, 211 S.E.2d at 434, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 401.
.,4 See U.C.C. § 2-401(2)-(3). Comment 4 explains:
The factual situations in subsections (2) and (3) upon which passage of title
turn actually base the test upon the time when the seller has finally committed
himself in regard to specific goods. Thus in a "shipment" contract he commits
himself by the act of making the shipment. If shipment is not contemplated
subsection (3) turns on the seller's final commitment, i.e. the delivery of docu-
ments or the making of the contract.
U.C.C. § 2-401, Comment 4.
Since the parties in International Harvester made no plans for shipment, § 2-401(3)
fixed the point of final commitment at the time the contract was signed.
5 133 Ga. App. at 493-94, 211 S.E.2d at 434, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 401.
S76 59 Wis. 2d at 238-39, 208 N.W.2d at 106-07, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 863-64.
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severed because the transaction had not progressed far enough to
make the buyer a BIOC.
57
In sum, Adamatic and International Harvester illustrate the im-
portance to the buyer of a completed sale. Only if the buyer has
participated in this sacred act will Article Nine bless him with the
protection of section 9-307(1).578
3. Requirement 3: Did the Purchaser Give "New Value"
and Take More than Mere Security?
Section 9-307 applies when sellers and buyers exchange goods
for tangible value in discrete transactions. Such marketplace trans-
actions enjoy considerable buoyancy in the Code's stream of com-
merce, unlike transactions involving intangibles such as debt. For a
transfer to qualify as a protected marketplace transaction, "new
value" must be given. This requirement is embedded in the last
sentence of section 1-201(9):
"Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of other property...
but does not include a transfer ... as security for or in total or
partial satisfaction of a money debt.579
This language contains more than a mere "new value" re-
quirement. It also requires that the "seller" transfer more than just
security. In most cases, an exchange of one good for another,
without more, qualifies as "buying" under section 1-201(9). 8 0 But
5 7
*1 Id. Note that the buyer in Adamiatic successfully replevied all three machines follow-
ing the secured creditor's threat to foreclose. Id. at 228, 208 N.W.2d at 101, 12 U.C.C.
Rep. at 856. The court held, however, that the replevin action was not a part of the pro-
cess by which title might pass; i.e., a buyer could not replevy the undelivered goods and
then claim that a delivery had completed the transaction. Id. at 239-40, 208 N.W.2d at 107,
12 U.C.C. Rep. at 864-65. The court recognized that this result was unfair, because the
buyer had already made substantial payments on the undelivered goods. Id. at 241-42, 208
N.W.2d at 107, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 864. As the court pointed out, however, a financing buyer
can protect himself against the perfected security interests of other creditors by taking a
security interest directly in the goods to be manufactured and obtaining an agreement in
which the seller's other creditors partially subordinate their security interests in the seller's
inventory. Id. at 242, 208 N.W.2d at 108, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 865. The other secured cred-
itors, eager to see the seller take on more business, should be willing to enter into such an
agreement, especially if they realize that the financing buyer will not otherwise make the
purchase.
578 Under some circumstances buyers may be protected even though a sale has not been
finalized. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Cor1f v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 269-70, 288 N.Y.S.2d
525, 533-34, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 226, 235 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (Article Two applies to effect sale even
though technically title failed to pass).
579 U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
"" See Black v. Schenectady Discount Corp., 31 Conn. Supp. 521, 324 A.2d 921, 15
U.C.C. Rep. 519 (C.P. 1974).
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if L and D exchange goods, and L takes D's property merely as
security for the debt arising from D's receipt of the property from
L, L will not qualify as a BIOC; all L has received is "security for
... a money debt."' 581 Similarly, one who makes a cash advance and
takes property with the understanding that it will be returned
upon repayment of the debt cannot claim the protection of section
9-307.582 Courts have carefully scrutinized such attempts to place
security transactions in the posture of a "sale," and have not hesi-
tated to deny section 9-307 protection when too many elements of
debt security appear in the transaction.5 83
But the heart of the "buying" language is its new value re-
quirement. Under section 1-201(9), no "buying" occurs when a
seller-debtor transfers his inventory directly to a buyer-creditor in
satisfaction of a preexisting debt. But has "buying" occurred when
the buyer takes the seller's inventory, agreeing in return to assume
the seller's debt to a third party? The Eighth Circuit faced this
question in Weidinger Chevrolet, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.
5 84
The case involved two inventory lenders (Li and L2) and two car
dealers (D1 and D2). Li extended credit to Di in return for prom-
issory notes and a security interest (which Li later perfected) in all
cars that DI purchased for inventory. In another business venture,
Di accepted credit from L2 and gave L2 a security interest in the
cars already subject to Ll's security interest. Di subsequently as-
signed cars to D2, which agreed to issue its own notes to Li in place
of Dl's notes to L1. Although the cars remained on Di 's lot, D2 set
the minimum selling price. Di then sold the cars to regular cus-
tomers for whatever price he could get and pocketed any excess
over D2's minimum selling price. 585 Di defaulted on his obligation
to L2, and L2 sought satisfaction out of Dl's inventory.
In court, L2 and D2 locked horns over D2's status as a BLOC.
L2 contended that the transfer of cars from DI to D2 was in "satis-
5"1 See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 125
Ga. App. 477, 188 S.E.2d 110, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 196 (1972).
582 Mother Lode Bank v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 46 Cal. App. 3d 807, 120
Cal. Rptr. 429, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1131 (1975); Kimbrell's Furniture Co. v. Friedman, 261
S.C. 172, 198 S.E.2d 803, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 340 (1973).
583 See, e.g., Sierra Financial Corp. v. Brooks-Farrer Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 698, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 422, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 1125 (1971).
584 501 F.2d 459, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 197 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974).
585 This arrangement was not unusual because the sole owner of D2 was also a 1/3
owner of L1. In fact, it was not uncommon for DI to send directly to LI what DI originally
owed on the car (before the assignment to D2) and settle with D2 later. Id. at 464 n.9, 15
U.C.C. Rep. at 205 n.9.
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faction of a money debt." The Eighth Circuit agreed, but went on
to rule that the "satisfaction of a money debt" exclusion in section
1-201(9) operates to deny BIOC status only when the debt satisfied
is owed directly to the buyer. The court held that when a sale elim-
inates the seller's debt to a third party, the buyer who assumes the
seller's obligation as part of the consideration for the sale may qual-
ify as a BIOC.5 8
6
The Eighth Circuit's interpretation of "buying" is questionable.
Section 1-201(9) merely states that "buying" does not include a
transfer in satisfaction of a debt. It does not distinguish between
debts owed to the buyer and debts owed to a third party. Yet the
Weidinger court obliquely distinguished the two, implying that it
would have denied the buyer BIOC status if the seller had owed
the debt to him.
587
Although the finding that D2 was a BIOC was unnecessary to
the holding of the case,588 the court's reasoning and the result it
reached contravene one of the basic policies of Article Nine. Article
Nine favors creditors who secure their obligations by perfecting
security interests in collateral held by their debtors. 589 Any situa-
tion in which the debtor is given essentially unfettered discretion to
favor an unsecured creditor over a perfected secured creditor in
derogation of a security agreement surely contravenes this policy.
Yet the approach taken in Weidinger has precisely this effect.
Under the Weidinger rationale, a party could change virtually
any transfer in satisfaction of a debt into "buying" in ordinary
course by interposing a straw man between the debtor-seller and
the creditor. Consider the following hypothetical. D1, a car dealer,
owes X $1,000. This debt is unsecured. L, an inventory lender, has
an ironclad perfected security interest in all ofDI 's inventory. D1 is
experiencing liquidity problems and would like to use the cars on
his lot to satisfy his $1,000 debt to X. With L lurking in the back-
ground, D1 cannot give X a car in satisfaction of the debt because
58 6 Id. at 463-64 n.8, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 204 n.8. The court found that D2 and LI were
separate corporations despite their overlapping ownership, and refused to hold that the
transfer of the cars to D2 was really a transfer to LI. Id. at 463, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 204. For
another case involving the third-party-debt issue, see First Nat'l Bank, Martinsville v.
Crone, 301 N.E.2d 378, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 542 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (buyer granted BIOC
status even though he paid off seller's debt to third party on items purchased by seller
from third party).
'8 See 501 F.2d at 463-64 n.8, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 204 n.8.
588 Section 2-326 disposed of the controversy and eliminated any need to refer to
§ 1-201(9). See id. at 464-65, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 205-06.
89 See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
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X could not qualify as a B JOC.590 Thus, D1 approaches D2 (an-
other car dealer) and, without mentioning his desire to favor X
over L, obtains the following agreement: D1 will transfer to D2
$1,000 worth of cars in return for D2's assumption of DI's debt to
X. So far, so good; D1 has followed the Eighth Circuit's holding like
a recipe. The net result, however, is that D1 satisfies his debt to
X using collateral subject to L's security interest. D2 qualifies as
a BIOC under the Weidinger rationale, X collects from D2, and L
has lost $1,000 worth of collateral. 591 X, the unsecured creditor
hitherto left out in the rain, now collects his money under the
umbrella of section 9-307, while L looks on helplessly at the di-
minishing pool of inventory that secures his debt. Even a security
interest in proceeds under section 9-306(3) is useless to L because
there are no "proceeds" to which his security interest can attach.
The only thing that might be called "proceeds" is D2's assumption
of Dl's debt, and it would be too novel to suggest that an inventory
lender has a security interest in that.592 D1 has defeated the under-
lying policy of Article Nine by favoring an unsecured creditor over
a perfected secured creditor.
One might argue that a good faith obstacle must be overcome
before courts would uphold this transaction. A good faith re-
quirement does apply to D2, who seeks the status of a BIOC, and
perhaps also to X. 593 But as long as D1 avoids collusion with X, or
D2, they will both meet the good faith requirement with little diffi-
culty. The most serious charge to which X or D2 is vulnerable is
knowledge of L's security interest. With respect to D2, such knowl-
edge will not affect his status as a BIOC, 5 94 and with respect to X, it
is too much to require that he vindicate L's rights by refusing the
novation. The only party who will have clearly acted in bad faith is
the party from whom L can expect the least: D1 .95
...See U.C.C. § 1-201(9), set out in note 543 supra.
"' Arguably, D1 has not "satisfied" his obligation at all. After all, X has not been paid:
he only has a new debtor. But the practical result is the same. Substituting a solvent debtor
(D2) for a debtor about to default (DI) gives X exactly what the "new value" requirement
of § 1-201(9) was designed to deny him: preferential treatment over otherwise equal or
superior creditors.
592 For the definition of "proceeds," see U.C.C. § 9-306(1).
593 See U.G.C. § 1-203.
594 See U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
591 The result reached in Weidinger can be supported by two arguments. First, al-
though our analysis focuses on how the secured inventory lender may be effectively subor-
dinated, the Weidinger court seemed more concerned about protecting the innocent pur-
chaser. After all, it is his property that will be taken away. Although we sympathize with
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4. Requirement 4: Was the Purchase Out of Seller's Inventory?
Since section 9-307(1) protects only those who buy out of
inventory, 596 a buyer cannot become a BIOC if the goods he buys
were "equipment" or "consumer goods" in the seller's hands.5
97
But even if an item is classifiable as "inventory" under section
9-109, this does not automatically make the buyer a BIOC.598 The
crucial test-a question of fact-is whether the seller is "in the
business of selling goods of that kind. ' 599 Factors relevant to this
determination include (1) whether the seller holds himself out to
the public as regularly selling the item; (2) whether the seller uses
business cards with an appropriate trade name; (3) whether the
buyer uses the seller's trade name to obtain financing for the sale;
(4) whether checks are regularly made out to the order of the
seller's trade name; and (5) whether a manufacturer does warranty
work for the seller's customers. These factors have been mentioned
only in passing. 61111 Others have generated more controversy and
case law.
innocent purchasers, we must point out that § 9-307(l) does not protect all purchasers; it
protects only those who buy goods out of inventory in commonplace commercial transac-
tions. Purchasing a car from a car dealer is certainly commonplace, but it is highly unusual
to pay for the car by assuming the seller's indebtedness. We suspect that those who engage
in such transactions are not the type of buyers § 9-307(1) was designed to protect.
Moreover, the specific mention of antecedent debts in § 1-201(9) gives these buyers suffi-
cient warning that they purchase at their peril. Second, one can argue that such transac-
tions may actually work to the secured creditor's benefit by mitigating the seller's cash-flow
problems and thus reducing the chances of default. Although this argument may please
academicians, it will little humor the perfected secured creditor whose debtor has just filed
for bankruptcy.
"' WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-13, at 940.
-97 2 GILMtORE, supra note 3, § 26.6, at 694. See, e.g., Newton-Waltham Bank & Trust
Co. v. Bergen Motors, Inc., 68 Misc. 2d 288, 290, 327 N.Y.S.2d 77, 80-81, 9 U.C.C. Rep.
1307, 1309 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 75 Misc. 2d 103, 347 N.Y.S.2d 568 (App. Term
1972); White-Sellie's Jewelry Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 477 S.W.2d 658, 661, 10
U.C.C. Rep. 888, 890 (Tex. Civ. App. 1.972).
"' 8See Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 35, 39, 321
N.Y.S.2d 317, 321, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 932, 935-36 (2d Dep't 1970) (automobile rental agency
not engaged in business of selling cars, although its cars classified as inventory under
§ 9-109). Section 9-109, which defines "inventory," includes certain goods not held for
sale. 2 Gtu sORE, supra note 3, § 26.6, at 694.
599 U.C.C. § 1-201(9). See also National Shawmut Bank v. Corcoran Motor Sales Co., 47
Mass. App. Dec. 72, 75-76, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 273, 275 (Boston Mun. Ct. 1971); Newton-
Waltham Bank & Trust Co. v. Bergen Motors, Inc., 68 Misc. 2d 228, 230, 327 N.Y.S.2d
77, 80-81, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 1307, 1309 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971), aff'd men., 75 Misc. 2d 103, 347
N.Y.S.2d 568 (App. Term 1972); Kimbrell's Furniture Co. v. Friedman, 261 S.C. 172, 177,
198 S.E.2d 803, 805, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 340, 342-43 (1973).
6 "'See Kaw Valley State Bank v. Stanley, 514 S.W.2d 42, 45, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 514, 517
(Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
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a. Does Selling the Item Have to be Seller's Primary Business? A
glance at section 1-201(9) should make it clear that the seller does
not have to be a "merchant" under section 2-104 before his buyer
may qualify as a BIOC. In Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental
System, Inc.,601 however, the New York Appellate Division held that
an automobile rental agency engaged primarily in the business of
leasing cars, but which occasionally sold them as well, was not "in
the business of selling" automobiles. 612 The opinion fails to reveal
whether the court reached this conclusion on the facts or whether
it found as a matter of law that the rental agency was not "in the
business of selling" because selling cars was not its predominant
business.
In Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,603 however, the
New York Court of Appeals held that predominance of sales was
not essential to a buyer's attaining BIOC status.6114 In Tanbro, the
seller's predominant business was converting unfinished textiles
into finished goods. Nevertheless, the court held that a sale of
unfinished goods was made "in ordinary course" because conver-
ters throughout the industry customarily made such sales. 605 Thus
the requirement of section 1-201(9) that the BIOC "buy from a
person in the business of selling goods of that kind" is satisfied if
the "sale [is] of the variety reasonably to be expected in the regular
course of an on-going business.1
606
As long as a sale is "in the ordinary course," it does not matter
that it was only incidental to the seller's primary business, or that
such sales were infrequently made.6n 17 In Tanbro, excess unfinished
goods were held in accordance with industry practice as inventory
for resale. This distinguishes the case from Hempstead Bank, where
the cars were not true "inventory" but capital assets of a leasing
firm.
608
In sum, the crucial inquiry appears to have shifted away from
whether the seller was literally "in the business," towards whether
the sale was ordinary or predictable in the industry. If the sale can
61 35 App. Div. 2d 35, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 932 (2d Dep't 1970).
602 Id. at 39, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 321, 7 U.C.C. Rep. at 937.
603 39 N.Y.2d 632, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260, 350 N.E.2d 590, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 385 (1976).
604 Id. at 637, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 262, 350 N.E.2d at 592-93, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 389.
605 Id.
6136 Id. at 637, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 262-63, 350 N.E.2d at 593, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 390.
6
07 Id. at 637, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 262, 350 N.E.2d at 592, 
19 U.C.C. Rep. at 389.
118 Id. at 637-38, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 263, 350 N.E.2d at 593, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 390.
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be reasonably anticipated as a matter of industry custom, it will
trigger the protection of section 9-307(1). Thus, even if leasing cars
were a company's primary business, the company might be "suffi-
ciently" involved in selling cars to bring this activity within the
sweep of section 9-307(1).609 Moreover, even where the seller
makes only one sale of a particular item, he will still have engaged
in "the business of selling goods of that kind" if the item comes
within a class of goods regularly sold by the seller.61
b. A Shift in the Use of Collateral. The use of the collateral
changes if the seller buys an item originally classifiable as "equip-
ment," "consumer goods," or "farm products" in his hands, and
later transfers the item to his inventory. For example, assume the
seller gives a security interest in "equipment" to a creditor who
properly perfects. Unfortunately for the creditor, the seller also
regularly sells this item in the ordinary course of his business.
Sooner or later the seller places this item in his inventory and sells
it to an innocent buyer. Professor Gilmore suggests that the buyer
in this case should defeat the secured party, in spite of the secured
party's argument that the item was not in fact "inventory."' 611 We
agree. Gilmore's analysis comports with the policy of section 9-307,
since it protects buyers who have relied on ownership rights ob-
tained through normal channels of commerce.
c. What Type of Interest Was Sold? Where sales within an indus-
try typically involve the transfer of all rights to an item, a sale of a
one-half interest has been held not "in the ordinary course." Thus,
in Whitmire v. Keylon, 61 2 a sale was deemed "out of the ordinary"
because the buyer bought only a one-half interest in a boat while
the seller reserved the other half for himself. Although it was cus-
tomary to sell the entire interest in a boat to two buyers who each
609 American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Mar-K-Z Motors & Leasing Co., 11 111. App.
3d 1046, 1048-49, 298 N.E.2d 209, 211, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 142, 144 (1973), affd, 57 Ill. 2d
29, 309 N.E.2d 567 (1974). Failure to obtain a merchant's license required by a state tax
statute has been held inconclusive as to whether the seller was a "person in the business of
selling goods of that kind," possession of the license constituting only one relevant factor in
the overall business context. Kaw Valley State Bank v. Stanley, 514 S.W.2d 42, 19 U.C.C.
Rep. 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
6111 Whitmire v. Keylon, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1203, 1206-07 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) (dictum)
(where lumber dealer dealt in waterfront sporting goods, first and only sale of entire in-
terest in houseboat would constitute sale in "ordinary course").
61 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 26.8, at 699-700. For a decision employing this analysis
by analogy, see United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 321 (5th Cir. 1971).
612 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).
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took a one-half interest, it was extraordinary to sell only a partial
interest in the item, the seller retaining the rest.
61 3
Predominance of sales, a shift in the use of collateral, and the
type of interest sold are only some of the factors relevant in deter-
mining whether a seller is "in the business of selling goods of that
kind." It is most important to remember that, at least in close cases,
courts will scrutinize the equities and policies of the statute in re-
solving this issue.
614
5. Requirement 5: Did the Buyer Act in Good Faith?
If a buyer is to gain the protection of section 9-307(1), he must
act in "good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in
violation of the ownership rights" of others.615 Knowledge of the
security interest, however, will not automatically taint the buyer
with bad faith. He may still believe that the sale to him was
authorized. 61 6 As long as the buyer takes the collateral unaware
that the sale was unauthorized, he may take it free of the security
interest.617 Although courts have been slow to conclude that a
buyer acted in bad faith,618 they have not hesitated to protect se-
cured parties where bad faith was clearly involved.61 9
613 Id. at 1207.
614 See, e.g., Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Grandberry, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 193 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1972) (seller of mobile home satisfied "selling goods of that kind" requirement, despite no
indication of any other sales; court cited buyer's fifth grade education, appearance of trail-
ers as being held for sale, sales tour of five trailers, and § 9-307 policy of protecting
innocent buyers).
615 U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
616 Under § 9-306(2), set out in text accompanying note 515 supra, a security interest in
the seller's goods ends upon authorized sale.
617 WHITE & SUMERS, supra note 1, § 25-13, at 941-42. U.C.C. § 9-307, Comment 2,
states:
Reading [sections 1-201(9) and 9-307(1)] together, it results that the buyer takes
free if he merely knows that there is a security interest which covers the goods but
takes subject if he knows, in addition, that the sale is in violation of some term in
the security agreement not waived by the words or conduct of the secured party.
See also Whitmire v. Keylon, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1203, 1209 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) (knowledge
that seller had obligation to pay interest on collateral not sufficient to put buyer on notice
that sale of collateral violated secured party's ownership rights).
61' See, e.g., Balon v. Cadillac Auto. Co., 113 N.H. 108, 112-13, 303 A.2d 194, 196-97,
12 U.C.C. Rep. 397, 401-02 (1973) (buyer qualified as good faith purchaser of car despite
purchase from friend who obtained it through shady dealings).
61 See, e.g., Sierra Financial Corp. v. Brooks-Farrer Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 698, 702-03,
93 Cal. Rptr. 422, 424-25, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 1125, 1128-29 (1971) (sale made in bad faith
where buyer knew of security interest and purchased inventory at far below fair market
value with agreement that seller could repurchase goods at market price); South Omaha
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Tyson's, Inc., 189 Neb. 702, 704-05, 204 N.W.2d 806, 808-09, 12
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Section 1-201(19) sets out the basic good faith requirement of
the Code.61 The more exacting good faith standard applicable to
merchants is provided in section 2-103(1)(b). 621 When commercial
traffic involves BIOCs who are also merchants, the resulting clash
between these two good faith standards has produced inconsistent
rulings. One case has held that the standard under section
1-201(19) applies regardless of the nature of the buyer.622 Other
cases have held that where the purchaser is a merchant, the appli-
cable standard is that of section 2-103(l)(b). 623 Even these latter
cases, however, have split on precisely what section 2-103(1)(b) re-
quires of the merchant-buyer. 624
The Delaware Supreme Court's majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp.625 illustrate the diver-
gence of thought on this issue. D2, a car dealer, purchased two
new cars from D1, another car dealer. D2 paid for the cars, but, by
agreement, delivery was delayed for several days. 62 6 During this
interval, L, who held a security interest in all of Dl's inventory,
discovered that D1 had been selling his inventory without account-
ing for the proceeds. L promptly foreclosed on all of Dl's inven-
U.C.C. Rep. 352, 354-55 (1973) (where buyer knew that secured party consented to auc-
tion of collateral on condition that secured party have first right to proceeds, and buyer
sought to apply his purchase against debtor's unpaid account with buyer, buyer held not
BIOC since he knew that purchase violated ownership rights of secured party).
62) U.C.C. § 1-201(19) provides: "'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned."
621 U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) provides:
In this Article unless the context otherwise requires
(b) "Good faith" in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.
622 See Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 523 (Del.
1972).
623 See Swift v. J.I. Case Co., 266 So. 2d 379, 381, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 190, 192-93 (Dist.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 271 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1972); First Nat'l Bank, Martinsville v. Crone,
301 N.E.2d 378, 381, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 542, 544-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (dictum); Hemp-
stead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 35, 37-38, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317,
320, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 932, 934 (2d Dep't 1970).
624 Compare Swift v. J.I. Case Co., 266 So. 2d 379, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 190 (Dist. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 271 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1972) (buyer-merchant's failure to inspect filing records
before buying per se commercially unreasonable in tractor industry; good faith require-
ment unsatisfied), with Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d
35, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 932 (2d Dep't 1970) (mere failure to search for liens
not per se commercially unreasonable where financing statement lacked provision from
which buyer could determine that sale violated ownership rights of secured party).
625 290 A.2d 648, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 523 (Del. 1972).
626 Id. at 649, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 524.
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tory, including the two cars that D2 had purchased. D2, claiming
BIOC status, brought an action for conversion.
The crucial question was whether D2 purchased the au-
tomobiles in "good faith." The trial court concluded that the
Code's drafters intended the standard to vary with the buyer.
Thus, if the buyer wore the hat of a "consumer," "honesty in
fact"627 would be the applicable standard. But if the buyer sought
to wear the hat of a "merchant," he would also have to observe
"reasonable commercial standards. ' 628 On appeal, the majority of
the Delaware Supreme Court was "unable to approve that
rationale. '629 The court relied on Article Nine's lack of a defini-
tional reference to Article Two,630 the express reference to section
1-201(9) in section 9-307, the Comment's "Definitional Cross Re-
ference" to section 1-201(9), and the express limitation of the Arti-
cle Two standard to Article Two.
6 3 1
The dissent emphasized Code policy, rather than Code lan-
guage, in reaching the opposite conclusion:
It is said by the majority that this transaction must be gov-
erned in its entirety by Article 9 and specifically by [section]
9-307(1). I think, however, this cannot be, because that section
speaks of a buyer in the ordinary course of business which
means, it seems to me, that he must be a purchaser not familiar
with the usages of automobile dealers dealing with each other.
Since [D2] is not such a buyer, but is in fact a fellow car dealer
knowing of the customary usages in the trade where one dealer
purchases from another, it must be considered in that light. It is,
therefore, a merchant buyer, the standard of conduct for which
is prescribed in [section] 2-103(1)(b) which provides that good
faith in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and "the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade. 63
2
The language of section 9-307(1) clearly indicates an intention to
oil the wheels of trade by protecting all honestly acquired owner-
627 U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
628 U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b). The trial court in Sherrock used the standard applicable to
merchants and found that the buyer had failed to act in a commercially reasonable man-
ner. See Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 277 A.2d 708, 713 (Super. Ct. 1971), rev'd,
290 A.2d 648, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 523 (Del. 1972).
629 290 A.2d at 650, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 526.
630 The court cited § 9-105(4), which refers to Article One but omits any reference to
Article Two. Id. at 650, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 527.
631 Id. at 651, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 527.
632 Id. at 652, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 528.
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ship interests. Much can be said for imposing an objective standard
of reasonableness on merchant-buyers familiar with particular
goods and commerical practices. The Code's drafters and state
legislatures, however, have rejected the reasonableness require-
ment. Whether reform is necessary should be for them, not the
courts, to determine.
6. Requirement 6: Did the Buyer Buy Farm Products?
If the buyer deals with one "engaged in farming operations"
and buys goods classified as "farm products ' 633 in the seller's
hands, 634 any pre-existing perfected security interest in the collat-
eral will take priority. 635 Regardless of whether the buyer otherwise
qualifies as a BLOC, section 9-307(1) will not sever the security
interest when he buys "farm products from a person engaged in
farming operations. 6 36 The only axe the buyer has with which to
cut off the security interest in the collateral is section 9-306(2).637 If
the buyer cannot show that his purchase was authorized by the
secured party, he will have to surrender the collateral.
Although a sale of farm products to a BIOC does not sever all
security interests, farm products that pass from one engaged in
farming operations to a farmers' cooperative, for example, may be-
come "inventory" in the process. 638 In such a case, the goods are no
longer "farm products," and section 9-307 gives secondary buyers
-i.e., those who buy from the cooperative-full protection.6 39
633 For the Code's definition of farm products, see note 171 supra.
634 Since the Code defines farm products with respect to "the debtor" (U.C.C. § 9-109(3),
set out in note 171 supra), § 9-307 apparently requires that the goods qualify as "farm prod-
ucts" in the seller's hands. For cases in which courts assume that the goods must be farm
products in the seller's hands, see United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 813-14, 9 U.C.C.
Rep. 321, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Busing, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 1120, 1123 (E.D.
Il1. 1970).
635 2 GILMoRE, supra note 3, § 26.6, at 694; WHrTE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-13,
at 940. Gilmore correctly concludes that the definition of "farm products" (see note 171
supra) makes the requirement that the seller be engaged in farming operations redundant.
636 See 2 GILaORE, supra note 3, § 26.11, at 714; First Nat'l Bank v. Smoker, 153 Ind.
App. 71, 286 N.E.2d 203, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 10, rehearing denied, 153 Ind. App. 71, 89, 287
N.E.2d 788, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 289 (1972).
637 See notes 515-30 and accompanying textsupra.
63 See Lisbon Bank & Trust Co. v. Murray, 206 N.W.2d 96, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 356 (Iowa
1973).
639 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 26.6, at 695. See also United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d
804, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 321 (5th Cir. 1971). In Hext, a ginning company ginned a farmer's
cotton. Because it was customary to buy cotton directly from the ginning company without
participation by the farmer, the court held that the purchase was not made from one




7. Requirement 7: Was the Security Interest
"Created by his Seller"?
Even if a buyer establishes that he bought in the ordinary
course of business, he will still lose if his seller did not create the
security interest asserted against the buyer.64" The "created by his
seller" limitation of section 9-307(1) applies to priority disputes
arising from multiple sales. Consider a typical fact pattern: D1, a
dealer, has given a security interest covering all of his inventory to
L. If B1, a fully qualified consumer-BIOC, buys from D1, he will
take the item free of L's security interest because D1 created this
interest. Suppose, however, that B1 obtains independent financing
from F and gives F a security interest in the item purchased from
D1. Next, BJ (in violation of his security agreement with F) sells the
item to D2, another dealer. Finally, D2 sells the item to B2, another
fully qualified consumer-BIOC. A priority dispute ensues be-
tween F and B2, and B2 seeks victory on the strength of his BIOC
status. B2, however, will not take free of F's security interest (as B1
did of L's security interest) because D2 (B2's seller) did not create
this interest 641-B1 did. But B2 has one (low) trump card left to
play. He can allege a D2-B1 agency relationship with BI as princi-
pal and D2 as agent. If B2 can prove such a relationship, he will
satisfy the "created by his seller" requirement because B1, as the
principal, would qualify as his seller. But now B2 has taken himself
out of section 9-307(1) again! B] is not a person "in the business of
selling goods of that kind" and hence B2 would not be a BIOC.
6 42
" See U.C.C. § 9-307(1). For a case in which this requirement was mysteriously over-
looked, see Swift v. J.1. Case Co., 266 So. 2d 379, 11 U.C.G. Rep. 190 (Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 271 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1972).
641 See Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Goodman, 24 Cal. App. 3d 131, 100 Cal. Rptr. 763,
10 U.C.C. Rep. 529 (1972); Black v. Schenectady Discount Corp., 31 Conn. Supp. 521,
324 A.2d 921, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 519 (C.P. 1974); National Shawmut Bank v. Corcoran Motor
Sales Co., 47 Mass. App. Dec. 72, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 273 (Boston Mun. Ct. 1971).
642 Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Goodman, 24 Cal. App. 3d 131, 100 Cal. Rptr. 763, 10
U.C.C. Rep. 529 (1972). If D1, whose inventory secures obligations owed to L, sells directly
to D2, who then sells to B2, a wrinkle appears; D2 now qualifies as a BIOC. (In the origi-
nal hypothetical, D2 was not a BIOC because B1 was not a person "in the business of
selling goods of that kind." U.C.C. § 1-201(9).) A literal reading of § 9-307(1) would not
change the result. D2 (B2's seller) did not create the security interest which B2 seeks to
avoid, and thats the end of it; L wins. However, § 2-403(1) of the Code provides that "[a]
purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had." Since D2 qualifies as a
BIOC, he has full title to the item free of L's security interest. When he sells to B2, he
transfers full title, and § 2-403(1) will shelter B2 from the reach of the competing security
interest. But hold on! Where is the authority in the Code for the proposition that an
Article Two provision governs the disposition of an Article Nine priority conflict? Profes-
sors White and Summers have suggested that § 2-403 should not be used to resolve Article
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Yet all is not lost. If B2 successfully applies agency principles to
show that B1 really was his seller, victory remains possible under
section 9-307(2).643 The sale is now between two "amateurs," and if
F's interest is an unfiled purchase money security interest,6 44 B2
will emerge victorious.
645
In light of the policy underlying section 9-307, the "created by
his seller" requirement is difficult to justify. If a goal of section
9-307(1) is to protect innocent buyers from secured creditors
whose debtors pollute the stream of commerce, there is no valid
distinction between B1 and B2. Each has purchased out of a
dealer's inventory without knowledge of adverse claims to the
item.6 46 But while section 9-307(1) hands B1 a gleaming scalpel
with which to cut off the meddlesome security interest, it offers B2
nothing. B2 can sue D2 for breach of warranty of title,647 but he
gets no protection under section 9-307(1).
Perhaps this result can be justified. The "created by his seller"
requirement may reflect the Code's policy of placing the ultimate
loss, as between two innocent parties, on the party who dealt most
Nine priority disputes. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-15, at 946. But see Skilton,
supra note 126, at 78-87.
Exclusive use of Article Nine to resolve such a dispute creates an anomalous result.
The underlying goal of § 9-307(1) is to protect innocent buyers who purchase out of inven-
tory. See text accompanying note 646 infra. Yet we have just seen that a refusal to apply
§ 2-403(1) renders the secured party victorious over B2 and vanquished by D2. Hence the
"created by his seller" language causes § 9-307(1) to protect a fellow dealer but not an
innocent buyer. It is hard to believe that the drafters so intended to frustrate the purpose
of § 9-307(1). On the other hand, reading a shelter principle into Article Nine would
render the "created by his seller" requirement effectively useless in most cases and would
do little to avoid unfair results in those cases to which it still applied. For example, in the
hypothetical set out in the text, B2 would still not be protected even though he bought
from a dealer. IfBl is not a BIOC, D2, having bought from a consumer (B)) rather than out
of inventory, could not qualify as a BIOC. Accordingly, his buyer (B2) could not be shel-
tered with protected BIOC status under § 2-403 even though he bought out of inventory.
For a discussion of another serious shelter principle problem, see note 126 supra.
643 See notes 649-64 and accompanying text infra.
644 Filing is generally not required to perfect a purchase money security interest in
"consumer goods." See U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d). In our hypothetical, B1 is a consumer. Thus,
F's retention of the purchase money security interest in Bl's purchase without bothering to
file is in keeping with common practice. If, however, the item purchased is a motor vehicle
or fixture, F must file to perfect (id.), and § 9-307(2) will be useless to B2 if F properly
perfected.
6" See note 652 and accompanying text infra.
646 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-13, at 942-43. Where the "equities"
clearly favor the BIOC, courts have managed to avoid the application of this restriction.
See, e.g., United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 321 (5th Cir. 1971).
647 See U.C.C. § 2-312(l)(b); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-13, at 942-43.
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closely with the "bad guy. '" 48 After the sale from BI to D2, the two
innocent parties are B2 and F. B2 will sue D2, who will sue B1,
continuing up the line until the "bad guy" is forced to pay. If B1
absconds or is judgment-proof, D2, who dealt most closely with B 1
in the "fraud," will bear the ultimate loss.
D. Protecting the Buyer in Amateur Sales--Section 9-307(2)
Like section 9-307(1), section 9-307(2) allows the buyer to
sever a perfected security interest in goods when certain conditions
have been met:
In the case of consumer goods, a buyer takes free of a se-
curity interest even though perfected if he buys without knowl-
edge of the security interest, for value and for his own personal,
family or household purposes unless prior to the purchase the
secured party has filed a financing statement covering such
goods.
649
Unlike section 9-307(1), however, the scope of this provision is
so narrow that it is of little importance. Section 9-307(2) resolves
priority conflicts arising from a sale of used goods by one con-
sumer to another when the security interest in the collateral is a
purchase money security interest perfected without filing.
65'1
Section 9-307(2) protects the buyer 651 only if four conditions
are satisfied:
(1) In the seller's hands the goods are either consumer
goods or farm equipment...
(2) The buyer must have no knowledge of the security in-
terest
(3) The buyer must buy for value and for his own family or
648 The warranty provisions of Article Two on Sales and of Articles Three and Four
on Commercial Paper and Banking Transactions are based on this notion. Proximity to the
"bad guy" improves one's opportunity to examine and judge the "bad guy's" commercial
responsibility. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 15-1, at 495.
649 U.C.C. § 9-307(2).
651 Section 9-302(l)(d) provides:
(1) A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests except the
following:
(d) a purchase money security interest in consumer goods; but filing is re-
quired for a motor vehicle required to be registered; and fixture filing is
required for priority over conflicting interests in fixtures to the extent pro-
vided in Section 9-313 ....
651 For a discussion of the term "buyer," see notes 546-61 and accompanying text
supra.
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household purposes or for his own farming operation (i.e.,
goods must usually be consumer goods in his hands)
(4) There is no filed financing statement covering the
goods.
652
For several reasons, section 9-307(2) is seldom applied in prac-
tice. First, this provision and section 9-307(1) protect mutually ex-
clusive classes of buyers. Under section 9-307(1), the goods must
be "inventory" in the seller's hands. In contrast, under section
9-307(2) the goods must be "consumer goods" in the seller's
hands.653 Second, if a financing statement has been filed naming
the sold goods as collateral, the fourth condition has not been met
and section 9-307(2) does not apply.6 54 Finally, unlike section
9-307(1), section 9-307(2) is inapplicable to transactions in which
the buyer is a dealer or a trustee in bankruptcy, because the goods
will not be used for personal or household purposes. 655 In short,
section 9-307(2) applies only to the less commercially significant
sales "by amateurs to amateurs.
'6 56
Since section 9-307(2) reaches only amateur transactions, it
poses few interpretive problems. Consider the following hypotheti-
cal, based in part on Balon v. Cadillac Automobile Co.
65 7
The parties are: S, the owner of an automobile dealership; B, a
customer of S; and D, a dealer-seller and secured party. S wishes to
buy one of D's automobiles for B. Posing as a consumer, S enters
into an installment contract with D for the purchase of the au-
tomobile. D retains a purchase money security interest in the car
but does not file, believing that under section 9-302(1)(d) he has an
interest in "consumer goods" that perfects automatically upon sale.
S sells the car to B for cash and absconds with the money.
When the payments fail to appear, D traces his security interest to
the car in B's hands. B resists and seeks to invoke the protection of
section 9-307.
652 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-14, at 943.
653 Id. at 944.
654 For certain security interests, such as those covering motor vehicles, filing is re-
quired for perfection. See U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d), set out in note 650 supra. Hence, in these
cases a financing statement will generally be filed. Security interests in most "consumer
goods," however, perfect automatically. In these cases § 9-307(2) provides the only incen-
tive to file. Due to the expense and inconvenience of filing, the low value of many con-
sumer goods, and the improbability of running into a § 9-307(2) conflict, financing state-
ments covering security interests in consumer goods often are not filed.
655 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-14, at 944 n.92.
656 Id. at 944.
657 113 N.H. 108, 303 A.2d 194, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 397 (1973).
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In analyzing these events, we must first classify the car in S's
hands. Because S is an automobile dealer and B treated him as
such, there is a temptation to say that the car in S's hands was
"inventory." If this is the case, D's purchase money security inter-
est was never perfected, 658 and B will win under either section
9-307(1)6 59 or section 9-301 (1)(c). 66 0 Section 9-307(2) would be whol-
ly inapplicable since the goods were not consumer goods in the
hands of the seller. 661 To avoid this result, one must find, as did
the Balon court, 662 that S purchased as a consumer, and that the
car was therefore a "consumer good" in his hands. This puts sec-
tion 9-307(2) back on the blackboard with condition (1) satisfied,
gives D the section 9-302(1)(d) perfected purchase money security
interest he thought he had, and places the burden on B to show
that the other three conditions of section 9-307(2) have been met.
Condition (2) of section 9-307(2) requires that the buyer lack
knowledge of D's security interest at the time of sale. The facts of
the hypothetical raise serious doubts as to B's good faith, as D
would undoubtedly argue. But it is possible that B acted in good
faith, and if he can convince the court of his ignorance, 663 he will
clear this second hurdle.
To satisfy the third requirement, B will have to show that he
purchased the car for "his own personal, family or household
purposes. "664 Since B is a typical consumer, this condition will be
easily met. But it is the final requirement-the one exclusively in
D's control-that seals B's victory. If D had filed a financing state-
ment, all would be lost for B. But D neglected to file, and B jaunts
contentedly across the finish line unsullied by D's security interest.
58 See U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d), set out in note 650 supra. This section allows perfection
without filing only if the security interest is in "consumer goods."
659 See notes 542-45 and accompanying text supra.
66, See notes 531-41 and accompanying text supra.
661 See Bennett v. W.T. Grant Co., 481 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973); National Shawmut
Bank v. Corcoran Motor Sales Co., 47 Mass. App. Dec. 72, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 273 (Boston
Mun. Ct. 1971).
662 Balon v. Cadillac Auto. Co., 113 N.H. 108, 112, 303 A.2d 194, 196, 12 U.C.C. Rep.
397, 401 (1973).
663 See, e.g., id. at 112-13, 303 A.2d at 197, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 401-02.
664 U.C.C. § 9-307(2). See Balon v. Cadillac Auto. Co., 113 N.H. 108, 303 A.2d 194, 12
U.C.C. Rep. 397 (1973) (automobile dealer who purchased in capacity as consumer qual-
ified under § 9-307(2)); Kimbrell's Furniture Co. v. Friedman, 261 S.C. 172, 198 S.E.2d 803,
13 U.C.C. Rep. 340 (1973) (pawnbroker did not qualify as a consumer under § 9-307(2) be-
cause he did not put goods to own personal use); White-Sellie's Jewelry Co. v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 477 S.W.2d 658, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 888 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (pawn-
broker cannot prevail under § 9-307(2) because he does not buy for own personal use).
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E. Protecting the Buyer of Chattel Paper-Section 9-308
"Goods" are not the only assets that may secure a debt. Re-
sourceful businessmen also finance their enterprises by creating
security interests in intangible assets. Section 9-308 settles priority
disputes involving two types of intangibles: chattel paper and in-
struments.665 Section 9-105(1)(b) defines "chattel paper" as
a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary obligation
and a security interest in ... specific goods .... When a trans-
action is evidenced... by such a security agreement.. . the group
of writings taken together constitutes chattel paper.
666
The most common example of chattel paper is an installment con-
tract attached to a security agreement.667
Section 9-308 supplies the following rules:
A purchaser of chattel paper or an instrument who gives
new value and takes possession of it in the ordinary course of his
business has priority over a security interest in the chattel paper
or instrument
(a) which is perfected under Section 9-304 (permissive filing
and temporary perfection) or under Section 9-306 (perfection as
to proceeds) if he acts without knowledge that the specific paper
or instrument is subject to a security interest; or
(b) which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject
to a security interest (Section 9-306) even though he knows that
the specific paper or instrument is subject to the security in-
terest.
668
Section 9-308 thus governs the chattel paper counterpart to the
section 9-307 inventory "goods" purchase. The adversaries in this
arena are the holder of a security interest in the chattel paper and
the subsequent purchaser of the paper. The opening clause of
section 9-308 enumerates three of the four requirements a pur-
chaser must satisfy to take the chattel paper free of the creditor's
security interest. The purchaser must: (1) give new value, (2) take
possession of the chattel paper, and (3) purchase it in the "ordinary
course of his business.
6 69
665 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 27.3, at 729.
666 U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b).
667 For a concise discussion of how financers deal with chattel paper in a commercial
setting, see L. LAKIN & H. BERGER, A GUIDE TO SECURED TRANSACTIONS 126-30 (1970).
668 U.C.C. § 9-308.
669 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-17, at 949. See also 2 GILMORE, supra note 3,
§ 27.3, at 731.
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The fourth requirement depends on the nature of the security
interest held by the creditor. If the creditor holds a security in-
terest in the debtor's inventory and claims that the security interest
shifted to the chattel paper upon sale of the inventory, 67" he has
a "mere" proceeds claim to the chattel paper. Under section
9-308(b), there is no fourth requirement for the purchaser of this
paper; he will win even if he knew of the creditor's security inter-
est in the chattel paper.67 ' If, however, the creditor has given value
directly against the chattel paper 67 2 (as where the creditor has
taken a security interest in the debtor's accounts receivable), 673 the
purchaser must satisfy a fourth requirement: he must take without
knowledge of the creditor's security interest in the chattel paper. 674
Commercial Credit Corp. v. National Credit Corp.675 presented a
tailor-made situation for the application of section 9-308. The par-
ties involved were Mathews, the dealer (D); Edgerson, the buyer of
inventory goods (B); Commercial, the retail financer and purchaser
of chattel paper (F); and National, D's inventory lender (L). D sold
a car to B. In return for the automobile, B signed an installment
contract and gave D a security interest in the car. As proceeds of
the sale, the chattel paper (i.e., the installment contract and security
agreement) was unassignable under the terms of the trust agree-
ment executed by L and D. 67 6 D breached his contractual duty to L
670 The shift is accomplished by operation of § 9-306(2). 2 GiLMORE, supra note 3,
§ 27.3, at 730.
671 Rex Financial Corp. v. Great W. Bank & Trust, 23 Ariz. App. 286, 289, 532 P.2d
558, 561, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1155, 1157-58 (1975). U.C.C. § 9-308, Comment 2 explains:
Clause (b) of the section deals with the case where the security interest in the
chattel paper is claimed merely as proceeds-i.e., on behalf of an inventory fi-
nancer who has not by some new transaction with the debtor acquired a specific
interest in the chattel paper. In that case a purchaser, even though he knows of
the inventory financer's proceeds interest, takes priority provided he gives new
value and takes possession of the paper in the ordinary course of his business.
672 Whether the creditor financed the inventory whose sale gave rise to the chattel
paper is irrelevant. U.C.C. § 9-308, Comment 3.
673 2 GiLMORE, supra note 3, § 27.3, at 729-30.
674 U.C.C. § 9-308(a) & Comment 3.
675 251 Ark. 541, 473 S.W.2d 876, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 232 (1971).
676 The trust agreement provided: "Trustee shall deliver to Entruster from the pro-
ceeds of said sale, the amount of said minimum sale price. Until such delivery, Trustee
shall hold the entire proceeds in trust for Entruster; separate from the funds and property
of Trustee .. " Id. at 544, 473 S.W.2d at 878, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 235. The court did not
focus on the effect of this language, and wavered on whether the case was controlled by
§ 9-306(2) or § 9-308. If L had authorized the assignment of the chattel paper, its security
interest in the paper would have been cut off by § 9-306(2). F alone would then have had
rights in the paper, and § 9-308 would have been inapplicable. Despite the trust
agreements explicit language, the court at one point seemed to follow this route: "[A]fter
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by transferring the chattel paper to F in return for the discounted
cash value of the paper. Justifiably outraged, L brought an action
against F to recover the chattel paper and the corresponding right
to receive future installment payments from B, claiming the chattel
paper as proceeds of the sale of his inventory collateral. F, in turn,
claimed the chattel paper as a protected purchaser.
1. The Inventory Lender's Section 9-308(b) Strategy
Assume the inventory lender (L) finds himself in this situation.
He must argue that the chattel paper purchaser (F) failed to meet
one or more of section 9-308's four requirements.
Under section 9-308(b), L will first attempt to show that his
claim to the chattel paper is more than a "mere" claim to proceeds.
If he fails, priority will be determined by section 9-308(b), which
makes the chattel paper assignee's knowledge of competing se-
curity interests irrelevant. What does it take to make L's interest
more than a "mere" interest in proceeds? Would it be enough if L
perfected his interest in proceeds by specifically including proceeds
in his inventory financing statement? Apparently not.677 Some
separate transaction is required through which L acquires a specific
interest directly in the chattel paper. 8 Absent a separate transac-
tion, there is nothing to indicate that L relied substantially on the
chattel paper (as F did) in extending credit.67 9 Thus, fairness
[D] sold [B]'s contract to [F], [L]'s security interest would not have followed the chattel
paper into the hands of [F], but would have continued in the proceeds [D] received from
[F] in the sale of the chattel paper (contract). Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-9-306." Id. at 549, 473
S.W.2d at 880, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 239. However, the court then went on to discuss a
commentator's example involving § 9-308 that it viewed as "in point." Id. at 549-50, 473
S.W.2d at 880-81, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 239. The court thus appears not to have been tuned
in to the "authorized/unauthorized" distinction.
677 See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Financial Servs. Co., 133 Ga.
App. 488, 211 S.E.2d 430, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 396 (1974) (claim to chattel paper held "mere"
daim to proceeds despite specific inclusion of proceeds in financing statement); WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-17, at 951.
678 Rex Financial Corp. v. Great W. Bank & Trust, 23 Ariz. App. 286, 289, 532 P.2d
558, 561, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1155, 1158-59 (1975). Such a transaction might go like this: L
advances credit on D's inventory; the inventory is sold; chattel paper comes to D as pro-
ceeds from the sale; D pays off the inventory advance, and L gives D a new loan secured
by the chattel paper.
67
9 Id. White and Summers suggest that the inventory lender who merely claims "pro-
ceeds" in his financing statement should be allowed to testify as to the extent to which he
relied on the chattel paper in extending credit. According to this view, if L can convince
the court that he "placed substantial reliance on the chattel paper," he should be allowed
to meet F on the more favorable turf of subsection (a) rather than subsection (b). WHITE &
SumF.its, supra note 1, § 25-17, at 951.
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favors F; for him the "chattel paper is his main course," but for L it
is "merely the frosting on the cake."68 13 F has given new value and
has taken possession of the chattel paper in the ordinary course of
his business. His claim is thus superior to L's "mere" proceeds
claim. That F may have known of L's security interest in inventory
and proceeds is irrelevant; F will prevail even if he knew that D was
under a specific duty to turn the chattel paper over to L as pro-
ceeds of the sale.
68 1
2. The Inventory Lender's Section 9-308(a) Strategy
Assume now that L has more than a "mere" proceeds interest
in the chattel paper. L's strategy changes. He will now try to show
that F purchased the chattel paper with knowledge that L was
lending directly against it. Section 9-308(a) makes such knowledge
fatal to F's claim.
If L had had the opportunity or the foresight to monitor D
closely, he would have taken possession of the chattel paper at the
time of sale. F then could not have taken possession of the chattel
paper and, without possession, would have lost the protection of
section 9-308.682 If L did not wish to take possession of the chattel
paper, he still could have protected himself by indicating his se-
curity interest on the face of the chattel paper. If L had done so,
F could not possibly have taken the paper without notice of L's
interest.
683
3. The Inventory Lender's Other Strategies
Under section 9-308 L can always try to show that F either
failed to give new value for the chattel paper or failed to take
possession of it in the ordinary course of his business. 6 84 Beyond
the examples given in section 9-108-making an advance, incur-
ring an obligation, or releasing a perfected security interest-what
constitutes "new value" is not always clear.6 85 Thus, L may have
680 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-17, at 951, quoted in Rex Financial Corp. v.
Great W. Bank & Trust, 23 Ariz. App. 286, 289, 532 P.2d 558, 561, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1155,
1158 (1975).
681 Rex Financial Corp. v. Great W. Bank & Trust, 23 Ariz. App. 286, 532 P.2d 558,
16 U.C.C. Rep. 1155 (1975); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-17, at 949.
682 U.C.C. § 9-308 (opening clause).
683 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 25.5, at 669; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-17,
at 950.
684 The purchaser of chattel paper must always satisfy these two conditions to prevail
under § 9-308. See note 669 and accompanying text supra.
685 U.G.C. § 9-108 is set out in note 346 supra.
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some latitude within which to disqualify F.
Finally, L may try to show that F did not take possession of the
chattel paper in the ordinary course of his business. Whether F
took possession is easy enough to determine, but proving that F
did not take in the ordinary course of his business is much more
difficult. The "ordinary course of business" requirement of sec-
tion 9-307 is totally different from the "ordinary course of his
business ' 68 6 requirement of section 9-308. Under section 9-307, the
standard is objective; under section 9-308, it is subjective. 687 Thus,
"ordinary course of his business" means the chattel paper pur-
chaser's normal operating procedures, 688 not the practice normally
followed in the industry. 68 9 It is not enough for L to show that no
reasonable finance company purchases chattel paper in this man-
ner; L must show that F's purchase was totally out of character.
690
L's problem, unfortunately, is that F, not L, can better determine
whether the purchase was "ordinary."
A subjective test, however, works to L's advantage in one re-
spect. Because section 9-308 speaks of "his business," its terms do
not cover amateurs. A purchaser may only invoke the protection of
section 9-308 if he is a "professional" in the lending business. 9'
Thus, unlike the large field of BIOCs who can defeat L under
section 9-307, the class of L's potential adversaries under section
9-308 is relatively small.
F. The Twilight Zone Between Sections 9-307 and 9-308
The intersection of sections 9-307 and 9-308 has produced
a troublesome problem for which the Code provides no clear
solution.
The facts of Commercial Credit Corp. v. National Credit Corp.,
692
used as the hypothetical in the previous section, illustrate this issue.
In the hypothetical, B buys inventory goods from D. We tacitly
cloaked B with BIOC status, and in Commercial Credit, B appears in
that capacity. B's purchase from D in the ordinary course severs L's
686 U.C.C. § 9-308 (emphasis added).
667 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 25.5, at 667; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 25-17,
at 949.
68 Rex Financial Corp. v. Great W. Bank & Trust, 23 Ariz. App. 286, 532 P.2d 558,
16 U.C.C. Rep. 1155 (1975).
189 See notes 609-10 and accompanying text supra.
(90 Rex Financial Corp. v. Great W. Bank & Trust, 23 Ariz. App. 286, 532 P.2d 558,
16 U.C.C. Rep. 1155 (1975).
691 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 25.5, at 667.
692 251 Ark. 541, 473 S.W.2d 876, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 232 (1971).
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security interest in the inventory. The only security interest L has
after the sale is a proceeds interest in the chattel paper transferred
to F.6 1 3 After section 9-308(b) comes to the rescue, F rides off into
the sunset with the chattel paper safe in his saddlebag.
694
But what if B fails to qualify as a BIOC? If the sale to him is
unauthorized under section 9-306(2), L's security interest in the
inventory collateral survives the sale, and F's chattel paper becomes
just that, a piece of paper. Section 9-308 resolves the conflict be-
tween L and F when both are tearing at the chattel paper, but does
not govern the conflict between an unsevered security interest in
inventory collateral and the chattel paper assignee's security in-
terest in the buyer's goods.695 Section 9-312, which determines
priorities among conflicting security interests, should settle this
dispute. The assignee (F) will probably be protected by section
9-312's purchase money priority provisions.6 96 But one commen-
tator, relying on the policy of section 9-308,697 believes that the
chattel paper assignee should be protected whether or not he
qualifies for purchase money priority.698 Otherwise, he reasons,
priority will turn entirely on whether the buyer (B) qualifies as a
buyer in ordinary course.6 99 The central function of section 9-308
is to allocate risks between D's inventory lender and D's chattel
paper assignee. The status of B, he argues, should not disturb that
allocation:
[U]nless we say that [F] should check with every buyer directly
before [he] takes the chattel paper, there is nothing that [F]
did or failed to do that should make [his] position of priority
dependent on the kind of buyer [B] was. The question posed by
section 9-308 is what is, or should be, the ordinary course of
business for a retail financer like [F].
Did [L] bear the risk of its dealer-debtor misconduct, in case
his dealer-debtor sold to a buyer in ordinary course, as far as
[L's] rights against [F] are concerned? Yes, says section 9-308. It's
not too much to say that [L's] risk versus [F] should likewise
691 Id. at 549, 473 S.W.2d at 880, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 239.
694 Id.
695 Skilton, supra note 126, at 79.
696 U.C.C. § 9-107, Comment 1, states that "a financing agency has a purchase money
security interest when it advances money to the seller, taking back an assignment of chattel
paper."
697 U.C.C. § 1-102(1) provides that "[tihis Act shall be liberally construed and applied
to promote its underlying purposes and policies."
698 See Skilton, supra note 126, at 79-80.
699 Id.
[Vol. 62:834
ARTICLE NINE PRIORITY RULES
extend to the case where [B] is, unknown to [F] not a buyer in
ordinary course, since [L] already bears the burden of knowing
his dealer and keeping an eye on him. 700
We reject this argument. It is one thing to grant to a good
faith buyer of chattel paper priority as to the paper itself, but quite
another to grant priority to an assignee of a security interest who
has neither made an effort to determine the good faith of the
collateral's holder, nor looked into the circumstances in which the
collateral was acquired. Such precautions are required of other
assignees of security interests, and we see little reason to distin-
guish chattel paper purchasers. Moreover, chattel paper assignees
will almost always be protected by the purchase money priority
rules. But in the rare cases in which section 9-312 fails to protect
the chattel paper assignee, we see no reason to saddle an innocent
inventory financer with the loss.701
G. Protecting the Holder in Due Course--Section 9-309
Section 9-309 helps resolve priority battles fought by the titans
of the Code: the perfected secured creditor versus the holder in
due course, the holder of a negotiable document of title, or the
bona fide purchaser of a security. The section provides:
Nothing in this Article limits the rights of a holder in due
course of a negotiable instrument (Section 3-302) or a holder to
whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated
(Section 7-501) or a bona fide purchaser of a security (Section
8-301) and such holders or purchasers take priority over an ear-
lier security interest even though perfected. Filing under this
Article does not constitute notice of the security interest to such
holders or purchasers .
702
Citizens Valley Bank v. Pacific Materials Co. 7o3 illustrates the op-
eration of this section. In that case the plaintiff bank had filed a
financing statement covering all of D & P Construction Co.'s pro-
ceeds and accounts receivable. Rogers, one of D & P's account
debtors, settled his account by issuing a promissory note to D & P
as payee. D & P negotiated this note to defendant Pacific, and
Rogers later paid Pacific. At trial the bank claimed a perfected
70
0 Id. at 85.
71 For more general discussion of priorities among security interests created by differ-
ent debtors, see notes 109-26 and accompanying text supra.
702 U.C.C. § 9-309.
703 263 Or. 557, 503 P.2d 491, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 1009 (1972).
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security interest in the proceeds. Pacific argued that its status as a
holder in due course (HDC) entitled it to priority. Relying on the
requirement that an HDC take an instrument "without notice...
of any... claim to it on the part of any person, 7 0 4 the bank argued
that its filing of a financing statement gave Pacific constructive
notice of its interest in the note, thus disqualifying Pacific as an
HDC.7 0 5 As the court pointed out, however, section 9-309 explicitly
provides that filing "does not constitute notice of the security inter-
est. '70 6 Pacific therefore qualified as an HDC and took the note free
of the bank's security interest. 707
Beyond the simple rule that filing by itself does not constitute
notice of a security interest, there is disagreement about the degree
of knowledge necessary for disqualification under the requirement
that a holder take without knowledge of conflicting claims. At one
extreme, a concurring judge in Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake7018 found
that no real "claim" to an instrument subject to a security interest
arises unless and until the debtor defaults on the obligation se-
cured by the instrument.70 9 Under this view, even actual knowl-
edge of the security interest in the instrument will not prevent a
04 U.C.C. § 3-302(l)(c).
7'5 263 Or. at 558, 503 P.2d at 492, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1010.
7
0
6 Id. at 559, 503 P.2d at 492, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1010. See Howick v. Bank of Salt
Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 67-68, 498 P.2d 352, 354-55, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 124, 126 (1972) (con-
curring opinion).
7"7 If the facts in Citizens Valley were slightly different, the parties' claims could be
analyzed under § 9-308 without regard to HDC status. Although we have discussed this
section only in the context of a chattel paper purchase (see notes 665-91 and accompany-
ing text supra), it applies equally to purchases of negotiable instruments. Assume that
Pacific was a professional lender that gave new value for the note and took it "in the ordi-
nary course of [its] business." See U.C.C. § 9-308; notes 686-91 and accompanying text
supra. Under § 9-308(a), Pacific would then take priority in the note over the bank's se-
curity interest because it "act[ed] without knowledge that the . . .instrument [was] subject
to a security interest." The bank's filing of its security interest would not have provided
notice to Pacific. See U.C.C. § 9-309. If we change the facts further so that the note consti-
tuted proceeds of inventory rather than accounts receivable, Pacific would prevail under
§ 9-308(b), even if it had notice of the bank's security interest, because the bank's claim
would have been a mere claim to proceeds. See notes 677-81 and accompanying text supra.
Under the pre-1972 Code a holder of a negotiable instrument did not enjoy this protec-
tion, because § 9-308 applied only to chattel Paper and non-negotiable instruments. U.C.C.
§ 9-308 (1962 version). In jurisdictions that have adopted the 1972 amendments, the im-
portance of § 9-308 to the professional lender cannot be overstated: he may prevail against
competing perfected secured creditors without qualifying as an HDC. 3 U.L.A. 1977 Pam-
phlet, U.C.C. § 9-308 note (Official Reasons for 1972 Change). See text accompanying
notes 713-14 infra.




9Id. at 68, 498 P.2d at 354, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 126.
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holder from taking the instrument in due course .71 " In contrast,
Standard Acceptance Co. v. United States7 1' suggests that a security
interest specifically extending to "proceeds" constitutes a "claim" to
any instrument received as proceeds. Thus, a holder disqualifies
himself as an HDC by taking the instrument with notice of such a
security interest. 712 A fortiori, notice of the security interest in the
instrument itself will preclude the holder from holding in due
course.
Article Nine supports the test formulated in Standard Ac-
ceptance. Section 9-309 expressly provides that filing is insufficient
to give notice of a conflicting security interest to an HDC. We do
not believe that the drafters would have specifically addressed this
question if they did not fear that courts would view such notice as
fatal to the would-be HDC. The rule would be unnecessary, how-
ever, under the Howick position that even actual notice of a conflict-
ing interest is insufficient to deprive the holder of HDC status. The
drafters apparently gave thought to this matter, and we conclude
that they consciously decided to limit the exception regarding
notice of claims to cases involving constructive, rather than actual,
notice.
Stronger evidence of the drafters' intent that knowledge of the
security interest should defeat HDC status appears in the commen-
tary to section 9-308 accompanying the 1972 amendments to Arti-
cle Nine.71 3 One purpose of the amendment to section 9-308 was to
extend its protection to purchasers of negotiable instruments, who
were previously limited to whatever protection was available under
section 9-309. Elaborating on this theme, the comment states: "The
holder of a negotiable instrument had protection only if he
achieved the holder in due course status referred to in section
9-309, which status would not be achieved if the holder had knowl-
edge of a conflicting proceeds claim. 714 This language directly
710 Id.
711 342 F. Supp. 45, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 37 (N.D. 111. 1972). In Standard Acceptance the
debtor sold collateral subject to a security interest that specifically included "proceeds," and
received payment in the form of a check. The debtor negotiated the check to the Internal
Revenue Service to discharge a federal tax obligation. Although the court dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it went on to provide this gratuitous analysis: When
the collateral was sold, the security interest shifted to the check as "proceeds" under
§ 9-306(3)(a). Because the IRS had actual knowledge of the security interest, it could not
claim protection as an HDC.712 Id. at 48 n*, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 40 n*.
713 3 U.L.A. 1977 Pamphlet, U.C.C. § 9-308 note (Official Reasons for 1972 Change).
7 1 4 Id.
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supports the Standard Acceptance view. 715 This, coupled with the
implication of the actual language of section 9-309, leads us to
reject the Howick concurrence and accept Standard Acceptance as the
correct interpretation.
71 6
H. Goods Returned to Inventory-Section 9-306(5)
Rather than requiring the buyer to obtain outside financing, a
seller may agree to sell on an installment plan, reserving a security
interest in the goods until they are paid for. The seller will then
convert the buyer's future installment payments into ready cash by
discounting the receivables. If the buyer defaults, the seller or the
transferee of the receivables will repossess the goods to satisfy his
claim. Once repossessed, the goods may again become subject to
the security interest of the seller's inventory lender. 717 If the goods
are then sold to a second buyer, even more claims will arise. Sec-
tion 9-306(5) establishes priority rules for sales involving both a
715 Furthermore, Standard Acceptance will not impair the free flow of negotiability, be-
cause § 3-105(2)(a) makes it difficult to convey notice that the instrument is itself collateral
without destroying the instrument's negotiability. A negotiable instrument must "contain an
unconditional promise or order to pay." U.C.C. § 3-104(l)(b). The promise is uncondi-
tional even though the instrument itself "states that it arises out of a separate agreement."
U.C.G. § 3-105(l)(c). But the promise is conditional if the instrument "states that it is
subject to or governed by any other agreement." U.C.C. § 3-105(2)(a). Section 3-105(i)(e)
does not affect this problem, since this provision merely ensures that an instrument is not
rendered conditional if it states that it is secured; in this case the instrument itself is se-
curity. Thus, any debtor or secured creditor seeking to impart notice of a security interest
by placing explicit language in the instrument will face this dilemma: the more general the
language is made to ensure negotiability under § 3-105(1)(c), the greater the risk that it will
be found insufficient to notify subsequent holders that the instrument is subject to a se-
curity interest; the more specific the language is made to notify subsequent holders, how-
ever, the greater the chance that negotiability will be destroyed under § 3-105(2)(a). The
net result is that knowledge of a security interest will play a significant role only in isolated
instances where the holder has acquired peculiar knowledge of the commercial circum-
stances surrounding his receipt of the instrument. Because the holder in such cases will
presumably take the instrument with a heightened awareness of the significance of his
action, we see no reason to cloak him with HDC status.
716 The Standard Acceptance view causes an interesting result under § 9-30 l(1)(c) when a
dispute arises between a non-HDC and an unperfected secured creditor. If the holder lost
his HDC status because he had knowledge of the security interest in the instrument, he not
only loses the protection of § 9-309 but that of § 9-301(l)(c) as well. To prevail under
§ 9-301(l)(c), the holder must take the instrument "without knowledge of the security in-
terest." U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(c). However, if the holder does not qualify as an HDC because
he violated one or more of the requirements under § 3-302, he loses only the protection of
§ 9-309; as long as he can show that he gave value and took the instrument without knowl-
edge that it was subject to a security interest, he will defeat the unperfected secured cred-
itor. Thus, § 9-301(l)(c) distinguishes between non-HDCs, and favors those who lost their
HDC status for reasons unrelated to the Article Nine security interest.
717 See U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a).
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transfer of receivables and a later return or repossession of the
goods:
If a sale of goods results in an account or chattel paper
which is transferred by the seller to a secured party, and if the
goods are returned to or are repossessed by the seller or the
secured party, the following rules determine priorities:
(a) If the goods were collateral at the time of the sale, for an
indebtedness of the seller which is still unpaid, the original
security interest attaches again to the goods and continues as a
perfected security interest if it was perfected at the time when
the goods were sold. If the security interest was originally per-
fected by a filing which is still effective, nothing further is
required to continue the perfected status; in any other case,
the secured party must take possession of the returned or re-
possessed goods or must file.
(b) An unpaid transferee of the chattel paper has a security
interest in the goods against the transferor. Such security in-
terest is prior to a security interest asserted under paragraph
(a) to the extent that the transferee of the chattel paper was
entitled to priority under Section 9-308.
(c) An unpaid transferee of the account has a security interest
in the goods against the transferor. Such security interest is
subordinate to a security interest asserted under paragraph (a).
(d) A security interest of an unpaid transferee asserted under
paragraph (b) or (c) must be perfected for protection against
creditors of the transferor and purchasers of the returned or
repossessed goods.
71 8
Upon the repossession or return of goods, section 9-306(5)
does four things: (1) it reinstates the inventory lender's security
interest; (2) it shifts the transferee's security interest from the chat-
tel paper or account to the returned goods; (3) it fits all the security
interests in the goods into one of four categories: a subsection (a)
claim, a subsection (b) claim, a subsection (c) claim, or a subsection
(d) claim; and (4) it draws on other Article Nine provisions to
resolve priority disputes involving these claims.
Courts have had problems applying section 9-306(5). Some
have failed to realize that a repossession has taken place; 719 others
718 U.C.C. § 9-306(5).
719See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. National Credit Corp., 251 Ark. 702, 473
S.W.2d 881, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 285 (1971), discussed in notes 740-45 and accompanying text
infra; Bank of Beulah v. Chase, 231 N.W.2d 738, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 259 (N.D. 1975), dis-
cussed in note 741 infra.
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have incorrectly classified the competing interests; 72" and still
others have overlooked security interests upon which a party could
have prevailed.7 2 ' Despite this sloppy analysis, however, most
courts have somehow arrived at correct results. Before describing
their struggles with section 9-306(5), our analysis turns to the clas-
sification of claims under that section.
1. The Inventory Lender's Claim-Section 9-306(5)(a)
Subsection (a) merely codifies the inventory lender's and
seller's expectations: the lender extended credit and retained a
security interest, believing that proceeds of the inventory's sale
would retire the seller's indebtedness. But if the goods are re-
turned to the seller because of the buyer's rescission or default, the
basis for any expectancy in proceeds evaporates. Thus, the lender's
security interest reattaches to the returned goods with the same
effect it had prior to the sale.722 If the security interest was origi-
nally perfected by possession, the lender must again take posses-
sion of the returned goods or must file to preserve his perfected
status; if he initially perfected by filing, he need only make sure
that his financing statement has not lapsed.
Before a subsection (a) claim can arise, the security interest
must have covered the goods at the time of sale and must have
secured a debt still outstanding when the goods are returned to the
seller. 723 If the goods were not collateral at the time of sale, or if
the indebtedness secured by the goods has since been paid off, a
security interest in the returned goods cannot reattach under sub-
section (a). If the returned or repossessed goods go back into the
seller's inventory, the inventory lender will often be able to assert a
subsection (d) claim based on a security interest covering the
seller's after-acquired property. 724 To do so successfully, however,
720 See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Financial Servs. Co., 133 Ga.
App. 488, 211 S.E.2d 430, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 396 (1974), discussed in note 754 infra.
721 See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 125
Ga. App. 477, 188 S.E.2d 110, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 196 (1972). This aspect of the case is
discussed in notes 758-59 and accompanying text infra.
722 Although the opening clause of section 9-306(5) requires a transfer of receivables,
Gilmore has suggested that the security interest should reattach even if no receivables have
been transferred. He explains the requirement as stemming from the drafters' preoccupa-
tion with priority disputes between the inventory lender and the receivables transferee. 2
GILMORE, supra nofe 3, § 27.5, at 737.
723 Id.
724 See U.C.C. § 9-204(1). Inventory financers often maintain ongoing relationships
with dealers, and take security interests in all of the dealer's after-acquired inventory. Re-
gardless of § 9-306(5)(a), this security interest in the debtor's inventory will reattach to
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the inventory lender must establish that the seller has "rights in the
collateral.
725
2. The Chattel Paper Transferee's Claim-Section 9-306(5)(b)
As a matter of commercial practice, the seller and his chattel
paper transferee usually agree that if the goods giving rise to the
chattel paper are returned, they will replace the useless chattel
paper as the transferee's security. 726 But even without an agree-
ment, section 9-306(5)(b) automatically works this shift in interests.
To resolve conflicts arising between an inventory lender claim-
ing under subsection (a) and a chattel paper transferee claiming
under subsection (b), section 9-306(5) looks to the priority rules of
section 9-308.727 The result is that the party who would have re-
ceived priority in the chattel paper takes priority in the returned
goods, regardless of whether either party has taken steps to perfect
his interest in the goods. 728 It is only when the transferee takes on
a subsection (a) claim that perfection is irrelevant. Indeed, the sub-
section (b) security interest must be perfected to take priority over
goods when the buyer rejects them and the goods are returned to inventory. Although it is
clear that this reading of the statute reduces substantially the importance of the priority
rules of subsections (b) and (c), we find nothing in the statute that destroys security in-
terests arising outside § 9-306(5).
725 If the dealer lacked authority to repossess the collateral, or if he was merely the
agent of the receivables transferee, the transferee can argue that the dealer, in reposses-
sing, obtained "no rights in the collateral." According to this reasoning the dealer would be
unable to create other security interests in the returned goods (see U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(c)),
and creditors claiming the repossessed collateral would be subordinated to the receivables
transferee. See Mother Lode Bank v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 46 Cal. App. 3d
807, 120 Cal. Rptr. 429, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1131 (1975). InMotherLode the court held that the
financing company with a security interest in the dealer's inventory was not entitled to
repossessed trucks in the dealer's possession as against the retail financer. The retail fi-
nancer had repossessed the trucks and had returned them to the dealer for the dealer's
repurchase, as required by their recourse agreement. The court held that the dealer had
no rights in the collateral to which the inventory financer's interest could attach, because
the dealer had failed to repurchase the trucks from the retail financer. Id. at 813-14, 120
Cal. Rptr. at 432-33, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 1137-38.
726 2 W. HAwKLANO), supra note 114, 1 2.32020702, at 731.
727 See notes 665-91 and accompanying text supra.
728 Section 9-306(5)(b) states that the transferee's claim is superior to the subsection (a)
claim "to the extent that the transferee of the chattel paper [is] entitled to priority under
Section 9-308." By negative implication, the subsection (a) claim is superior to the extent
that the transferee is not entitled to priority under § 9-308.
No case specifically endorses this negative implication, and a court might conclude that
if the chattel paper transferee does not take priority under § 9-308, then § 9-306(5)(b) does
not apply. That would transport the conflict between the subsection (a) and subsection (b)
claims out of § 9-306(5) and into § 9-312. At that point perfection in the returned goods
would not only become relevant, but probably determinative.
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any other claim. 29 Clearly the chattel paper transferee must per-
fect his interest in the returned goods if he is to obtain maximum
protection. Even though the security interest in the chattel paper
shifts to the returned goods, perfection of the interest in the chat-
tel paper does not automatically carry over to the goods.731, If the
interest in the chattel paper was perfected by possession, the trans-
feree must either take possession of the returned goods or file.'
If the transferee filed as to the chattel paper, his perfected status
with respect to the goods depends on what the financing statement
covers; if the financing statement covers only the paper, and not
the returned goods, the security interest in the goods must be
perfected. 732 If the financing statement does cover the returned
goods, the transferee's perfected status simply continues in the
goods. 733 Because the chattel paper assignee will frequently have
no way of knowing when goods are returned to the seller, he
should always include the goods in his financing statement cover-
ing the chattel paper. In addition, unless the transferee repossesses
the goods himself, he always runs the risk that his perfected status
will lapse.
734
3. The Account Transferee's Claim-Section 9-306(5)(c)
With one exception, the foregoing analysis of chattel paper
transfers also applies to transfers of accounts. The exception, how-
ever, is important. Unlike the chattel paper transferee's security
interest, the account transferee's interest in the returned goods is
always inferior to the inventory lender's subsection (a) claim. 73 5
Although the Comment to section 9-306 suggests that priority dis-
putes between unperfected subsection (a) claimants and transferees
of accounts or chattel paper should be decided under section
9-312, we find nothing in section 9-306 to support this position.
72' See U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(d).
73) U.C.C. § 9-306, Comment 4. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 27.5, at 737-38.
731 U.C.C. § 9-306, Comment 4; 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 27.5, at 737.
132 2 GiLMORE, supra note 3, § 27.5, at 738.
733 Id.
7 41 Id. Professor Gilmore has suggested that, to mitigate the transferee's problems, the
returned goods should be deemed "proceeds" of the chattel paper. Then, under section
9-306(3), the transferee would have 10 days after the debtor's "receipt of the proceeds" to
perfect his interest in the goods. Id. at 737. We concur. Gilmore's analysis conforms to the
parties' expectation that the goods will provide substitute security for the "destroyed" chat-
tel paper.
73r U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(c). Of course, the accounts assignee may protect himself by ob-
taining a subordination agreement. See U.C.C. § 9-316.
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Section 9-306(5)(c) subordinates the subsection (c) claim to "a se-
curity interest asserted under paragraph (a)." Because the priority
rule of subsection (c) does not distinguish between unperfected
and perfected security interests, we reject the Comment's mysteri-
ous suggestion. Hence, as under subsection (b), perfection is ir-
relevant to priority disputes resolved under subsection (c).
As with chattel paper assignees, whether the account trans-
feree must perfect with respect to returned goods depends on
whether the financing statement covering the account also covers
the goods. If it does not, the account transferee may nevertheless
be able to claim the returned goods as "proceeds" of the account.
This would buy the transferee ten days' time in which to perfect his
interest in the returned goods. 36
4. Claims of the Seller's Purchasers and Creditors-
Section 9-306(5)(d)
Whenever the conflict over returned goods involves a subsec-
tion (d) claimant, section 9-306(5) does not explicitly set priorities.
It merely provides that the interest of the receivables transferee
must be perfected to have any effect in priority battles against
subsection (d) claimants. If the subsection (d) claimant is a "cred-
itor" of the seller, the parties must resort to sections 9-301 or
9-312; if the subsection (d) claimant is a "purchaser" of the re-
turned goods, the parties must resort to sections 9-301(1)(c) or
9-307.73  The receivables transferee does not have to perfect his
interest in the returned goods for protection against the subsection
(a) inventory lender, 738 since the latter is not a subsection (d) "cred-
itor" or "purchaser.
739
5. The Operation of Section 9-306(5)--A Case in Point
Commercial Credit Corp. v. National Credit Corp. 0 illustrates the
operation of section 9-306(5). National, an inventory lender, fi-
nanced automobiles for Mathews, a dealer, retaining a security
736 See note 734 supra.
737 See U.C.C. § 9-306, Comment 4.
7'8 See note 728 and accompanying text supra.
739 2 GILMORE, supra note 3, § 27.5, at 739; 0. SPInACH, SECURED TRANSACTIONS 109
(1963); Skilton, supra note 126, at 83 n.199. Section 9-306(5)(b) invokes the machinery of
§ 9-308 to resolve the conflict between the subsection (a) lender and the chattel paper
transferee. Bringing all subsection (a) claimants within the class of subsection (d) "creditors"
would short circuit that scheme entirely.
740 251 Ark. 702, 473 S.W.2d 881, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 285 (1971).
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interest in all of Mathews' inventory. Mathews sold a car out of
inventory to Morgan on the installment plan, and transferred
Morgan's chattel paper to Commercial, a retail financer. Upon
Morgan's default, Commercial repossessed the car. In the ensuing
priority conflict, Commercial claimed the car on the strength of its
chattel paper, while National relied on its security interest in the
dealer's inventory.
Without referring to section 9-306(5), the court analyzed the
case as if the only security interests involved were those arising
from the chattel paper. 74' The real question, however, was not who
had the right to receive payments from the buyer; the buyer had
defaulted. Rather, the issue was who was entitled to the reposses-
sed car. Under section 9-306(5)(b), Commercial held a security in-
terest directly in the repossessed car against the dealer. Under
section 9-306(5)(a), National's security interest in the car reattached
at the time of repossession. Thus section 9-306(5) should have
determined who had priority as to the car. Subsection (b) provides
that these two interests in the automobile should be ranked accord-
ing to the priority scheme provided in section 9-308 for competing
interests in chattel paper.7 42 Because Commercial had priority over
National in the paper,7 4 3 Commercial was entitled to the car.
The court drew attention to National's lack of a perfected
security interest in the car resulting from the lapse of its financing
statement.7 44 What effect this factor had on the court's decision is
unclear, but under the priority rule of section 9-306(5)(b) perfec-
tion is irrelevant. Even if National's perfected status had never
lapsed, Commercial still would have prevailed because-and only
because-Commercial would have taken priority as to the chattel
41 Id. at 708, 473 S.W.2d at 885, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 291-92. In analogous cases other
courts have also failed to realize that a repossession had occurred, and that the conflict
directly concerned the repossessed goods. In Bank of Beulah v. Chase, 231 N.W.2d 738,
17 U.C.C. Rep. 259 (N.D. 1975), for example, the court concluded on similar facts that
"the conflicting security interests are not in the [repossessed] motor vehicle itself, but
rather in the [chattel paper] which carried the right to repossession of the motor vehicle."
Id. at 744, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 265. Such a view is technically incorrect: § 9-306(5) gives
certain claimants security interests directly in returned goods, and only in certain situations
will the priorities in the chattel paper determine the priorities in the repossessed goods.
For example, if the chattel paper transferee competes with a § 9-306(5)(d) "creditor" or
"purchaser," priority in the chattel paper is irrelevant; if the chattel paper transferee is to
prevail, he must assert his security interest in the repossessed goods.
742 U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(b).
743 251 Ark. at 708, 473 S.W.2d at 885, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 291-92. See U.C.C.
§ 9-308(b).
714 See 251 Ark. at 704, 707-08, 473 S.W.2d at 883, 884-85, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 289,
291-92.
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paper. Only if National had qualified as a subsection (d) "creditor"
would Commercial have had to perfect its interest in the repos-
sessed car.745 But because Commercial, rather than Mathews, re-
possessed the car, it was never returned to Mathews' inventory.
Hence, National's security interest in Mathews' inventory never
reattached to the repossessed car.
6. The Effect of Section 9-306(5) on Security Interests
Arising Outside that Section
Courts have consistently misapplied section 9-306(5). But the
drafters must share the blame. Section 9-306(5)'s overly simplistic
rules open a Pandora's box of questions. The most significant un-
answered question is the effect section 9-306(5) has on security
interests created outside that section, but held by section 9-306(5)
claimants.
a. The Survival of the Chattel Paper Assignee's Purchase Money
Security Interest. Prior to the buyer's return of the goods to the
seller, the chattel paper transferee has two security interests: a
security interest in the chattel paper itself against the seller, and a
purchase money security interest in the goods against the buyer.
746
When the buyer returns the goods, what is the effect of section
9-306(5) on the transferee's purchase money security interest?
Does section 9-306(5), by shifting the chattel paper interest to the
returned goods, preclude the transferee from tracing his purchase
money security interest through the buyer to those goods if he
cannot collect from either the seller or the buyer? We think not.
Nothing in the language of section 9-306(5) limits the chattel paper
transferee to his interest therein, and it would be erroneous to read
language granting security interests as simultaneously destroying
others. Nevertheless, the seller's other creditors might present the
following argument: The two interests existing in favor of the chat-
tel paper transferee after the goods have been returned exist
against two different debtors. The purchase money security in-
terest applies against the buyer, the chattel paper interest against
the seller. Section 9-312 will rank in priority only those claims
existing against a common debtor, i.e., the seller. Because section
745 U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(d). Following the court's reasoning, Commercial in fact perfected
when it took possession of the car upon Morgan's default. See 251 Ark. at 706, 473 S.W.2d
at 884, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 290.
746 See U.C.C. § 9-107. Comment I to § 9-107 explains that "a financing agency has a
purchase money security interest when it advances money to the seller, taking back an
assignment of chattel paper."
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9-306(5)(b) explicitly makes the chattel paper transferee a creditor
of the seller, the transferee may assert only his interest under sec-
tion 9-306(5)(b).
We reject this argument. It is not settled that section 9-312
resolves only priority disputes involving a single debtor.747 Assum-
ing that the return to the seller was unauthorized, 748 the chattel
paper transferee should be allowed to assert his purchase money
security interest in the returned or repossessed goods as if section
9-306(5) were nonexistent. If the retail financer had obtained his
purchase money security interest by advancing money directly to
the buyer, rather than by accepting transfer of the chattel paper
from the seller, he could unquestionably assert his purchase money
interest against the seller's other creditors. Section 9-107, which
defines purchase money security interest, does not distinguish be-
tween a security interest obtained by lending to a buyer, and a
security interest obtained by accepting a transfer of chattel pa-
per.749 Thus we see no reason for treating the purchase money
security interest of the chattel paper transferee any differently
simply because section 9-306(5)(b) gives him an additional interest
in the goods.
Providing the chattel paper transferee with a remedy on either
his section 9-306(5)(b) interest or his purchase money security in-
terest subjects the return and repossession cases to a double-
barreled analysis. Such an analysis will not apply, however, if the
buyer's secured party "authorized" the buyer's return or the seller's
repossession. 7511 If the buyer returns the goods in an attempt to
rescind the sale, or if he defaults on his payments, the chattel
paper transferee will find it difficult to claim that he did not au-
thorize the return of the goods to the seller. The buyer, in our
opinion, is always "authorized" to pursue whatever remedies he
has, and is always "authorized" to surrender the goods when he
defaults.7 5 In many cases, therefore, the chattel paper transferee
will be deemed to have authorized the return or repossession and
will consequently forfeit his purchase money security interest. But
747 See notes 121-26 and accompanying text supra.
48 See U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
711 See U.C.C. § 9-107, Comment 1.
50 See U.C.C. § 9-306(2); notes 515-30 and accompanying text supra. This analysis
assumes that a return or repossession constitutes a "disposition" of collateral. See
U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
751 Of course, repossession by the seller may not be authorized, in which case the
purchase money security interest would persist.
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if the chattel paper transferee can show that the return was not
authorized, his purchase money interest may be his ticket to vic-
tory. This is exactly what happened in International Harvester Credit
Corp. v. Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. 
752
International Harvester (International) and Commercial Cred-
it (Commercial) had each filed a financing statement covering all of
the dealer's inventory, International having filed first. Dealer sold
a skidder out of inventory to Miller in return for an installment
note and a purchase money security interest in the skidder. Dealer
then transferred the chattel paper to Commercial, which filed
within ten days after Miller took possession of the skidder.
7 53
Somehow the skidder came into the possession of Lewis, who
traded it in when he purchased a new skidder from Dealer. Dealer
received the new skidder from International in exchange for a
note secured by the traded skidder. Shortly after the Dealer's sale
to Lewis, Miller stopped making payments to Commercial. Com-
mercial then looked to the traded skidder for satisfaction of
Miller's obligation. Using the analysis proposed above, Commercial
could have asserted either its section 9-306(5)(b) interest or its
purchase money security interest in the traded skidder.754
Under section 9-107, Commercial's security interest in the
skidder qualified as a purchase money security interest. 755 Miller's
disposition of the skidder-allowing Lewis to gain possession-
was unauthorized; 756 under section 9-306(2), Commercial's pur-
chase money interest continued in the skidder after its return to
the dealer. Thus the court invoked section 9-312 to subordinate
International's perfected security interest, obtained after the old
skidder was traded in, to Commercial's purchase money security
interest.7
57
752 125 Ga. App. 477, 188 S.E.2d I10, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 196 (1972).
753 To acquire special protection under § 9-312(4), a creditor with a purchase money
security interest in goods other than inventory must perfect within 10 days after the debtor
takes possession. See notes 200-02 and accompanying textsupra.
754 In a later case, International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Financial Servs.
Co., 133 Ga. App. 488, 211 S.E.2d 430, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 396 (1974), the Georgia court
cryptically stated in a -footnote that Commercial Credit should have been decided under
§ 9-306(5). Id. at 492 n.1, 211 S.E.2d at 433 n.1, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 400 n.1. The court
provided no reason for this dictum, however, and we believe the Commercial Credit court's
reliance on § 9-312(4) was proper. See notes 747-49 and accompanying text supra.
755See 125 Ga. App. at 479, 188 S.E.2d at 112, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 198; U.C.C.
§ 9-107(a) & Comment 1.
756 125 Ga. App. at 477-78, 188 S.E.2d at 111-12, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 197.
757 Id. at 479, 188 S.E.2d at 113, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 198-99.
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The purchase money security alternative worked for Commer-
cial in this case because Miller's transfer of the skidder to Lewis was
unauthorized. If Miller himself had rescinded the sale and re-
turned the skidder, or if Dealer had repossessed when Miller de-
faulted, the skidder's return to Dealer might well have been "au-
thorized." In this event, section 9-306(2) would have severed
Commercial's purchase money security interest. Commercial could
then have asserted only its section 9-306(5)(b) security interest.
b. Survival of the Inventory Financer's Security Interest in the
Dealer's After-Acquired Property. Assume that Commercial failed to
file its purchase money security interest within section 9-312(4)'s
ten-day grace period. Or, better yet, assume that the court will not
allow Commercial to trace its security to goods in the dealer's
hands. Can Commercial still claim priority? Section 9-306(5)(b)
grants Commercial a security interest in the traded skidder against
the dealer. This interest is doubly perfected. Not only had Com-
mercial filed a financing statement covering all of Dealer's inven-
tory, it had filed a financing statement signed by Miller when the
original sale was made.
The pivotal question thus becomes whether international is a
claimant under subsection (a). If International is such a claimant,
Commercial prevails under subsection (b); having taken the chattel
paper for value in the ordinary course of its business, Commercial
would take precedence as to the chattel paper over International,
whose claim to the paper is, at best, a mere claim to proceeds from
the Miller sale.758 But International is not a subsection (a) claimant.
International comes under subsection (a) only if the skidder was
collateral at the time of its sale, and the indebtedness secured by
the skidder was still unpaid when the skidder was returned. Al-
though the skidder was "collateral at the time of the sale,"'" 59 the in-
debtedness it secured was apparently discharged. International
took the returned skidder as security for a new indebtedness
-credit extended by International to the dealer on the new skid-
der sold to Lewis. Thus, International qualifies as a perfected sub-
section (d) creditor; International's financing statement covers the
returned skidder as after-acquired property in the hands of the
dealer.
By operation of section 9-306(5)(b), Commercial holds a per-
fected security interest in the skidder against the dealer. By itself,
758 See U.C.C. § 9-308(b).
759 U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a). See generally U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(c) & Comment 3.
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however, section 9-306(5) does not resolve conflicts between a per-
fected subsection (b) claimant and a subsection (d) creditor; resort
must be made to section 9-312(5). A simple application of that
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